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United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) forms the basis for the United Nations
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which is currently the longest running United Nations peace-
keeping operation. However, the processes leading to the creation of an United Nations force,
as opposed to some other peace-keeping force under NATO or the Commonwealth have not
been adequately investigated in terms of the international political environment that existed at
the time.
Part I sets the historical context of the work. Chapter I examines the historical
development of the Cold War, the United Nations (particularly peace-keeping), and the doctrine
of non-alignment. Chapter II evaluates the Greco-Turkish conflict, the intercommunal history
of Cyprus, and the process of British decolonisation in Cyprus.
Part II presents a review of the period from the outbreak of intercommunal violence in
Cyprus to the eventual passing of Resolution 186. A period which had three distinct phases: (1)
a regional emphasis centred mainly on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, (2) a phase
of Superpower involvement, and (3) the involvement of the Security Council, which, on 4
March 1964, resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964).
The thesis concludes that despite the efforts of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey,
President Makarios engaged in a determined policy to internationalise the essentially
intercommunal situation in Cyprus in order to prevent a Turkish intervention in the island. In
the course of pursuing such an aim he was able to prevent the formation of a NATO-based
peace-keeping force by exploiting the Soviet Union's interest in the Eastern Mediterranean
basin. This move led the United Kingdom to initiate a first-strike policy and have the Cyprus
issue discussed in the Security Council. The eventual result of this was the formation of
UNFICYP, and it highlighted, in practical terms, the degree to which peace-keeping relied on
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A Note on the Transliteration of Names
At the start of the work I was confronted with the difficulty of transliterating Greek names from
the Greek script into the Latin script. To overcome this difficulty I have chosen to refer to
specific people by using the version used by themselves, or more usually recognised. Where this
is not apparent I will use the standard technique of transliteration, for example:
rAaKoq KAqpIOqq	 will read as:	 Glafkos Clerides	 (usual spelling)
and not	 Glafkos Kierides	 (standardised)
However, Turkish names will not be transliterated, but will be retained in the Turkish Latin
script, therefore,
Fazil Kucuk	 and not	 Fazil Kutchuk or Fazil Kuchuk
The Turkish script reads the same as the standard Latin script, and the sounds correlate to
English equivalents, with the following exceptions,'
Consonants:
C	 jasinjam








A	 am French avoir
E	 em bed
1(i)	 i in cousin
1(i)	 i as in pit
o	 oin hot
O	 German o in Konig
U	 uin push
U	 German ü in Führer
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was formed on 4 March 1964 as a result of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964). As such UNFICYP is the longest running United
Nations peace-keeping operation in existence, and, over the past thirty years, has played an important role
in the political life of the island. Yet why did the United Nations, as opposed to a some form of
alternative international organisation such as NATO or the Commonwealth, assume peace-keeping duties
in Cyprus? This question lies at the heart of this thesis.
In order to answer it one must examine the international political environment of the Cold War.
The origins of UNFICYP were not to be found in the immediate period leading to Resolution 186.
Instead, the true genesis of the peace-keeping force in Cyprus was to be found at the end of the Second
World War when the United Nations was founded by the victorious Allied Powers, whose aim was to
create an international organisation that would take a cooperative and robust approach to the maintenance
of international peace and security. Yet this idea proved to be short lived. Within a short space of time
the international system was divided as the East and West fought for spheres of influence. This was a
process that was intimately involved with the developing agenda of the newly de-colonised Third World.
As the Superpowers scrambled to assert themselves on these states they sometimes found themselves
engaged in situations that had the potential to escalate into something wholly more dangerous. In an
attempt to prevent this the United Nations finally found a role and peace-keeping was born.
Yet it is my contention that Cyprus did not immediately seem to fall into this category. Although
it was non-aligned with regard to the Superpowers, it was, through history, tied to Greece and Turkey -
both of which were members of NATO. However, the situation could never have been handled within
this forum. The perceptions held by the Greek Cypriots as to the relative importance attached to Turkey
within the Organisation ensured that they would be firmly against any attempt to have the issue of
intercommunal fighting addressed by NATO. The subsequent way in which the issue was manoeuvred
into the Security Council by the development of a Cold War interest provides the answer as to why the
United Nations Force in Cyprus was formed instead of a NATO-based force.
Yet does such a study really need to be undertaken? There are two particular arguments that may
be levelled with regard to this question - both of which, I believe, can be answered. For a start one may
challenge that the task of presenting a concise account of the period leading to the creation of Resolution
186 would not be a difficult thing to do. Indeed, at the most simple level, one could perhaps write the
following synopsis of the events recounted in this work:
In December 1963 fighting broke out between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island
of Cyprus. After an appeal for calm from the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey went
unheeded a nominally tripartite military entity - the Joint Truce Force (JTF) - was established
with the consent of the conflicting parties to try to restore order. However, the military pressures
of trying to sustain the force coupled with the apparent failure of peace-talks held between the
parties in London led to the suggestion that a new peace-keeping entity be created using
contingents from NATO countries. This, however, proved unfavourable to the Greek Cypriots,
and, after much diplomatic wrangling by a number of parties involved, including the two
Superpowers, the matter of the peace-keeping was moved to the United Nations Security
Council. After fifteen days of talks this process resulted in the passing of Resolution 186(1964),
and the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.
This outline represents, in a nutshell, the narrative of the thesis, but does not critically appraise the
reason why the various actors followed the path outlined above. Such an account does not go any way
towards telling us why things happened the way they did - why certain decisions were made, or why
particular options were discounted by the parties involved. To this extent, this thesis is a presentation of
a number of 'why?' themes surrounding the processes that eventually led to United Nations Resolution
186.
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Another criticism that may be ventured is that the subject under review is not a new topic. In
surveying the literature one may look to a large number of accounts that have tried to address the events
of the period from 21 December 1963-4 March 1964. Yet apart from the memoirs of those directly
involved' and a limited number of other exceptions, 2 these accounts have tended to neglect the overall
international aspects of the period for a number of reasons. Most accounts have, broadly speaking, been
written from one of two viewpoints: (a) as a preface to a piece of work that examines the post-Resolution
186 operations of the United Nations in Cyprus, 3 or, (b) as review of the internal political situation in
Cyprus which pays minimal attention to the presentation of an evaluation of the international politics
beyond citing the decisions within the analytical context of a discussion of the domestic policy outputs
of the Cypriot communities. 4 There seems, therefore, to have been little inclination to view the period
leading to Resolution 186 as a subject unto itself. Instead almost all writers have tended to see it as a
short period of transition within the greater picture of their individual projects.
Having stated this criticism, it would be wrong to say that this work will only focus on the
international and peace-keeping element of the crisis. One cannot write about the wider implications of
a problem without understanding the root cause of the problem. Therefore this work must inevitably -
if not necessarily - constitute an account of the internal politics of Cyprus during 1963-64. Yet this is a
period that has become highly politicised unto itself within the historical narratives of both the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot communities in the years since Resolution 186. Unlike the later events of July-August
1974, the crisis of 1963-64 has been rather less open to critical examination. For the Turkish Cypriots
1963, rather than 1974, represents the true beginning of the intercommunal civil war. 5 It constitutes, in
their mind, a period in which they argue that they were deprived of their constitutional rights and forced
to congregate in enclaves in order to protect themselves. Yet in contrast to this, the Greek Cypriot
community regards the events of 1964 as being in many ways a footnote, or, at most, a preface for the
'real' Cyprus Crisis - the events of summer 1974 - when the Turkish Army landed on the shores of the
island's northern coast and, over a period of a month, captured 36% of the territory. 6 In justifying the
emphasis placed on these respective views there are numerous arguments and a counter-arguments.
Although not wishing to engage in these discussions I will, nevertheless, be working on the premise that
1963-64 was indeed important. To this extent this work will shed more light on both sides' views of the
crisis, and present an account which may reveal why the respective communities have tried to focus on,
or ignore this period.
As much as the thesis is an attempt to understand both the internal and international politics of
the search for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus, there is another important aim inherent in the work. The
difficulties of finding an alternative to a United Nations peace-keeping force for Cyprus raised some
wider questions about the nature of peace-keeping in the political environment at the time. To this extent,
another major aim of this thesis is an attempt to understand, in the words of Professor Alan James, 'the
politics of peace-keeping' 7 as it related to Cyprus. To answer the question: Why was a NATO-based
peace-keeping force for Cyprus such an emotive issue? In order to provide an adequate answer it is
necessary to define what exactly we mean with the term 'peace-keeping' before moving on to present a





The term peace-keeping has, during the past forty years, entered the general vocabulary of International
Relations. In doing so it has come to be linked almost exclusively, but somewhat incorrectly, with the
actions of the United Nations. 8 Indeed, peace-keeping was not mentioned within the Charter of the
United Nations. To this extent it became, as described by Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-
General of the UN, in effect Chapter 6 ½ of the Charter. 9 This was an apt definition insofar as the action
of peace-keeping has fallen somewhere between Chapter VI of the Charter relating to the pacific
settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII that laid out 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, and acts of aggression'. As such it was an idea unforeseen and unplanned in the
negotiations leading to the formation of the United Nations Organisation. Yet, in the course of the
following fifty years it has, across the globe, had a profound effect, for better or for worse, on the
international system.
Defining peace-keeping has proved an inexact art. Depending on whom one asks the results have
proved to be widely differing. Given that the current use of the term has tended to be shaped by the
actions of the United Nations it is perhaps a fitting idea that the United Nations' definition be tackled
first:
'[A] peace-keeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military
personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain
or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and
are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they
achieve their objectives not by the force of arms, thus contrasting them with 'enforcement
action' of the United Nations under Article 42.' 10
Yet there are a number of differing and wider definitions of the term 'peace-keeping operation'. By way
of example we can look at the following, differing interpretations of the term.
'Operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve
or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual
conflict."
'Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defence actions), that are undertaken by
outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate
implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a
comprehensive settlement."2
There are, however, a large number of other definitions of both the substance and meaning of peace-
keeping. But the widely accepted meaning of peace-keeping as a non-coercive action undertaken with
impartiality and with the consent of the fighting factions seems to have been captured by these
definitions. However, if one compares the term peace-keeping as presented by the United Nations with
the other definitions one can see that there is an essential incongruity between the parties as to who or
what may conduct peace-keeping. Within these definitions there is still a confusion about the extent to
which the action of peace-keeping, under the principles listed above, can be undertaken by parties other
than the United Nations.
The Applicability of Non-UN Peace-keeping
It is, perhaps, possible to state that in performing the actions of peace-keeping, the non-UN peace-keeper
is, in a number of ways, simply replacing the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations makes
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two clear and important points as regards the theoretical implications of non-UN peace-keeping. In the
first instance the duties and obligations of a member state to the principles of the Charter are, under
Article 103, paramount over and above any other duties and obligations under 'any other international
agreement'. Therefore, for a state to enter into peace-keeping and be acceptable they must conform to
the consent rule of peace-keeping, and therefore either become (1) a peace-keeper or (2) a military force
on the territory of another state there with the consent of that state to assist in self-defence.' 3 Although
we are presented with two options, the second of the two is, or has the potential to be, coercive in its
operation and cannot therefore be considered as a peace-keeping operation.
In addition, the second point that must be remembered is that within the Charter of the United
Nations there is a clear role to be played by regional organisations. Indeed, the roles of these
organisations are explicitly outlined in Chapter Vifi of the Charter. Although such regional arrangements
were, like the rest of the Charter, formulated without reference to peace-keeping, they are nonetheless
theoretically open to peace-keeping interpretation. As White has noted, peace-keeping,
'[clan be lawfully undertaken by a regional organisation, or on an ad hoc, collective basis, or
indeed by individual states. Consensual, non-offensive operations do not breach a ban on the use
of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, nor are they actions which require
authorisation of the Security Council under Article 53 of the UN Charter, which is confined to
enforcement actions."4
Under this interpretation peace-keeping does assume a wider significance beyond the realms of those
actions undertaken solely by the United Nations. As long as a state acts in accordance with the principles
of the Charter and of peace-keeping generally, then there appears to be no reason why it cannot be done
on a unilateral or regional basis. This is a point on which James, in line with White, has noted:
'A competent authority has to take the decision to establish a peace-keeping operation. This
might well be an international organization of a universal or quasi-universal kind. But there is
no reason at all why regional organizations of a political sort should not act in this way. Nor is
there any reason why an ad hoc group of states should not organize a peacekeeping enterprise,
nor even why such a task could not be performed by a single acceptable state."5
Yet, in the period under review in this thesis, peace-keeping, even by the United Nations, was still in
many ways a rather novel idea. While UNEF had proved a successful example of such an action, ONUC
had exposed a number of teething problems that the UN would have to overcome in future operations.'
This was especially so for those future operations that would be conducted within a state, rather than
between states.' 6 However, in the former category, there had already been an example of a non-United
Nations peace-keeping operation undertaken. This was the Arab League force that operated in Kuwait
from 1961-63.
The force came about as a direct result of threats made by Iraq on Kuwait - which it saw as a
being a historical province - when the period of British protection came to an end in 1961. Given the real
fear of an Iraqi invasion that existed in the Kuwaiti Government an invitation was sent to Britain to
station troops in the country. Soon thereafter a British force arrived to protect the small state of Kuwait.
Yet the Arab League,' 7 indignant of the implications of such a move, and 'in an unusual unanimity of
opinion, set about the task of engineering its early withdrawal." 8 This was done with troops from Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia. This allowed for the successful removal
of the British troops, and the continued protection of Kuwait by the use of Arab troops against whom Iraq
'Both of these operations will be looked at in Chapter I
4
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would find it extremely difficult to act. Thus the force maintained peace through the intra-bloc
ramifications that would have arisen had one Arab state attacked another. However certain intra-
organisational problems, coupled with the decreased belligerence of Iraq meant that the force had only
a limited life-span. Indeed it had disappeared altogether by 1963.'
However, the presentation of information about the theoretical roots underlying peace-keeping
practice must be put into context within the work if it is to prove of value. By providing an analysis of
both what exactly we mean by the term peace-keeping as well as the questions related to the acceptability
of non-United Nations peace-keeping actions we are, in effect, laying the foundations for an analysis of
whether the plans for a Commonwealth, a tripartite Greek-Turkish-British, or even a NATO-based action
were viable as alternatives for a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The thesis will show that,
unlike the Arab force, the proposals for non-United Nations peace-keeping in Cyprus were complicated
by a number of factors. In the first instance, and unlike the Kuwait-Iraq situation into which the Arab
force was placed, the conflict scenario in Cyprus was, in essence, a mixture of an internal affair to the
Republic of Cyprus that had certain international implications for other states, rather than a simple
conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and a neighbouring state. Although, or perhaps because, it was
an ethnic conflict, Greece and Turkey were intimately involved in the island's affairs, as was Britain. The
second major consideration is the nature of the inter-organizational affiliations of the actors. Unlike the
use of the Arab League in Kuwait to which all interested parties belonged, in the Cyprus situation, the
three external actors were all members of NATO, but the Republic of Cyprus fell firmly within the Non-
Aligned Movement. This necessarily made the situation more complicated than the intra-organizational,
non-Cold War scenario that had paved the way for the Arab League Force.
Methodology and Sources
It is important that an historical thesis such as this has an adequate structure to allow a clear progression
through the information presented in such a way as to minimise confusion without losing significant
amounts of detail. To this extent I have chosen to proceed on a loose chronological basis that attempts
periodic thematic analyses of the various subject areas under discussion. This has been done to allow the
thesis to develop in such a way as to avoid repetition and, hopefully, create a clear strand of thought for
the reader to follow.
On the subject of sources, there have, as noted above, been a large number of limited accounts
written of the period. These narratives proved very useful in the initial structuring of the subject matter
of the work. In addition these works have been important insofar as the gaps in the accounts have allowed
an identification of the main questions relating to the processes of international politics that have not been
adequately answered before. Given the general lack of sufficient depth of these accounts I have, within
the main body of the thesis, attempted to move beyond these previously written histories and build-up
a picture of the events based on the primary research of a number of different sources. Many of these,
particularly the memoirs of those involved and the news media sources, have been widely cited before.
Likewise the United Nations documents, letters and records of the Security Council debates have been
utilised in several narratives. Yet these sources have only focussed on the information publicly presented.
No account yet written has attempted to draw in the invaluable revelations contained in the archives of
the British Public Records Office at Kew. This is where I have taken the chance to rewrite many of the
previously held assumptions formed from the use of such sources about the events in Cyprus leading to
Resolution 186. The value of this exercise is that it presents much of the untold story of the period. As
the historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote, 'anyone who has looked carefully at declassified government
documents from the post-1945 era will know how inadequate the public record [i.e. news media] is as
a guide to what was happening.' 2° This is as true of the events in Cyprus as any other case, and this will
become evident as the thesis progresses. In addition to this important evidence I have taken the
opportunity to interview a number people - many of whom were directly involved in policy making or
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implementation - who played a part in the processes being reviewed.
Chapter Outline
The work may be seen as having two distinct parts. Chapters I and II form Part I of the thesis and set the
historical background to the work as a whole. Chapter I provides an account of a number of post-Second
World War themes of international politics. The main focus is definitely centred on what might be termed
the 'macro-international' situation as it would affect the events in Cyprus. The main themes at play are
the development of the Cold War, and the implications for US and Soviet foreign policy with regard to
the Third World. The second element to be considered is the development of the role of the United
Nations in the Cold War era and, more specifically, the development of peace-keeping and the problems
associated with this development, especially the acrimonious relationship between the Soviet Union and
the Secretaries-General of the UN over the structure, financing and conduct of peace-keeping operations.
The final aspect of the chapter is the process of decolonisation and the impact that this process had on
the formation of a third 'approach' to international relations in the period, the concept of 'non-
alignment'. Both of these latter factors would be important with regard to the island of Cyprus - a colony
of the United Kingdom - that began its final process towards independence by waging a guerilla
campaign against British rule in 1955, and by doing so involved Greece and Turkey.
Chapter H sets the more specific historical stage for the thesis. If the theme of Chapter I is the
'macro-international' stage, then Chapter II focuses its attention on the 'micro-international' setting. In
the first part of this chapter I will review the history of Greece and Turkey, and outline the depth of the
historical antipathy of the two countries towards one another. Yet the work will show that the relationship
between Greece and Turkey had, for a quarter of a century from the 1930s to the mid-1950s, also been
shaped by a period of friendship during which both had become members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), and had seemed to have put most of their troubles behind them. Yet this improved
state of affairs was broken by a downturn in the political situation in Cyprus - a small island where the
Greek and Turkish communities were on the verge of civil war, as the Greek Cypriot community, in a
bid to unite with Greece, fought against British colonial rule on the island.
In an attempt to stabilise the situation, the United Kingdom brought both Greece and Turkey into
the political negotiations, and with this the relationship between the two began to crumble as each sided
with its own national community on the island. The outcome of the British decolonisation of Cyprus in
1960 was the creation of a constitution for the new republic that was seen as unworkable by the
leadership of the majority Greek Cypriot community. In December 1963, the President of Cyprus,
Archbishop Makarios, presented plans to amend the constitution to the three guarantors of Cyprus's
independence - Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. The rejection of these proposals by the
Government of Turkey soon led to another round of intercommunal fighting.
Chapters ifi, IV, & V constitute Part II of the thesis and represent the main body of the work.
Chapter III takes up the events during the first month following the outbreak of intercommunal
hostilities. This period was marked by the involvement of the three Guarantor Powers, who, in a show
of unity, created the Joint Truce Force to maintain the cease-fire between the Greek and Turkish
communities. However, the tense political situation on the island, coupled with the rise in concern in both
Greece and Turkey over the island, meant that the Force became a solely British enterprise. The chapter
will outline the work of the Force as well as describe the peace-making attempts undertaken by the
British Government. The failure of these peace-making efforts led to a plan to create a larger force made
up of contingents from NATO member states.
Chapter IV looks at the reactions of the various parties to the dispute to this plan. Although
favoured by the three Guarantor Powers, the Turkish Cypriots, and, importantly, the United States of
America, the proposal for a force of NATO member state contingents was wholeheartedly opposed by
the Greek Cypriot leadership, who feared that such a force would favour the Turkish Cypriots. The
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counter-proposal of the Greek Cypriots was the idea for an United Nations force. This proved
unfavourable to the other parties, who all remained steadfastly in favour of their original proposal. It was
at this point that the Soviet Union became involved, and the matter became a Cold War issue. The
resulting deadlock succeeded in forcing the British, who by this point were under considerable manpower
constraints, to take the matter of the creation of a United Nations force to the Security Council.
The period of deliberations at the United Nations Security Council in New York forms the focus
for Chapter V. Once at the United Nations, the position of the various parties still remained at odds with
one another. The interpretation of the treaties forming the Republic of Cyprus were a significant concern
for all involved, as was the legality of the Government of Cyprus as it now existed without the input of
the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the hi-partisan Cold War element seemed to take lesser
prominence as the position of the Soviet Union changed noticeably from outright support for the Greek
Cypriots, to a policy that, while maintaining such support, more accurately reflected their traditional
concerns about the structuring and financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations. After two-and-
a-half weeks of deliberation and discussion, the Security Council eventually passed Resolution 186
(1964) and a United Nations peace-keeping force for Cyprus was created.
The Conclusion will draw all the points together and will evaluate the actions of the various
parties in light of the wider international politics of the time. It will seek to address a number of questions
relating to the processes leading to United Nations Resolution 186, and highlight any paradoxes that may
have arisen between the general trend of international politics and the actions taken by the parties in
Cyprus. In addition the Conclusion will assess the nature of the difficulties presented in the search for
a non-United Nations peace-keeping effort.
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The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations
Introduction
To understand the significance of the events that took place in Cyprus in 1963-64, one must be forearmed
with a knowledge of the international system within which those events are located. An informed picture
of the processes and structures that developed the international environment in the post-Second World War
period are an integral part of our understanding of the later events that are recounted in this work. With
this in mind, this chapter is not a detailed account of every, or even of most of the incidents that occurred
in this period. It is, instead, a presentation of themes. These themes, illustrated with accounts of a number
of events that could, and have, filled numerous volumes, can be summarised as following three main lines:
the Cold War, the formation and development of the United Nations, and the process and consequences
of decolonisation.
To illustrate the shifting nature of international politics in this period, the chapter is divided into
chronological sections that broadly reflect the changes taking place within the international system at a
number of points. Although the exact details of 1945 may not now appear to play a direct role in the later
analysis of the Cyprus situation almost twenty years later, the happenings of that period set in motion a
train of events that did have such an effect. To this extent a study of the creation of the United Nations and
the subsequent development of the Cold War plays a significant role in providing an important analytical
tool by which we can explain the characteristics of the international system as it stood in 1963. This
understanding will, in the main body of the thesis, allow us to evaluate the reactions of a number of
international actors to the situation in Cyprus. Indeed, this thesis is, to a greater or lesser degree, an attempt
to analyse and explain the reactions of actors in the international system to events on the island in the
period leading up to the creation of United Nations Resolution 186 (1964) within the context of the themes
and events of international politics described in this chapter.
1. The Formation of the United Nations, 1943-1945
As the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany became more and more likely, a number of meetings and
conferences were held to decide the future of the world following the cessation of hostilities. The big four
powers of the 'United Nations' - those states that had formed an alliance against the Axis Powers - came
together to discuss the future of the international system and plan for an international organization to
oversee global peace and security in the new post-War era. Indeed, such was the interest in finding a way
in which to replace the failed League of Nations - that had been created as a result of the First World War -
that the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China
all participated in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held near Washington, DC that took place in the
Summer of 1944 in order to lay out a plan for such a post-War international body. Although the exact
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details of the Dumbarton Oaks process need not be recounted here, the meetings eventually produced a
blueprint for an organisation which would seek to prevent, or terminate, outbreaks of international conflict.
After a further meeting between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union held
at Yalta in February 1945,' the proposals were ready to put before the wider international community. In
advance of this meetings were held by several groups, or blocs, during which strategies were formulated
for the negotiations. 2 Once the preparatory stages were complete, the final plans for the United Nations
Organisation (UNO or UN) were duly put before the delegates of the fifty states attending the San
Francisco Conference - held from April to June 1945. The Conference was designed to allow a final
shaping of both the Charter and the structure of the new body by the wider international community that
had been excluded from the initial drafting process. In fact during the course of the proceedings a number
a proposals and amendments to the Charter by the participants were incorporated into the design of the
new organisation as contained in the Dumbarton Oaks document. The end result of the Conference was
a charter, signed on 26 June 1945, that, inter alia, laid out the mechanisms by which the Security Council -
the main body entrusted with dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security under
Article 1(1) - would conduct its work.
Indeed, the shape of the Security Council formed the basis of Chapter V of the Charter, and the
details of the Council's peace and security remit were contained in Chapter VI, 'Pacific Settlement of
Disputes', and Chapter VII, 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts
of Aggression'. 1 Importantly, it was agreed that the Council would be made up of eleven members, five
of which - the United States of America, France, 4 China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - would remain as permanent members, each of
which would have veto powers. The remaining six members would be elected for two year periods with
election held for three of the seats every year.
Concurrent with the formation of the Security Council, the General Assembly was formed as a
forum of discussion in which all members would have technically equal voting rights, with no veto. The
original proposals put forward at Dumbarton Oaks had originally envisaged a weak body, 5 but deliberation
at San Francisco forced the larger powers to widen the scope of the Assembly. As Luard states,
'In a number of ways.. .the powers of the Assembly had been marginally increased. It was given
wider powers of discussion, even in the area of security, and slightly increased responsibilities in
the economic and social fields. But none of this altered the basic structure, or the general
subordination of the Assembly in matters of peace and security which the Dumbarton Oaks
powers had ordained.'6
2. The Developing Cold War, 1946-50
Despite the imperative of cooperation in the fight against Germany, cracks had begun to show within the
wartime alliance at a fairly early stage following the cessation of hostilities. Within a short period of time
the relationship between the Allies began to evolve to reflect the political realities of the post-War situation
as both the West and the Soviet Union sought to make ideological gains in the post-War international
system. And soon the ill-feelings between the two camps came to play an important part in the
development of the new United Nations Organisation. Indeed, as early as 1946, the United Nations became
a casualty of the increasing tensions.
In addition to the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Charter of the United Nations
had established, under Article 47, the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Formed within the provisions of
Chapter VII as a means of providing specialist military guidance to the Security Council, it was seen as
'For full details see Appendix A.
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being of central importance to the future development of the United Nations' mandate to maintain
international peace and security. 7 The MSC, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, was in effect created to oversee the formation of a military role for the
new United Nations Organisation. Yet when the MSC was detailed to provide a report on this role the
deadlock that ensued once the report was issued effectively precluded the Committee from taking any
future action. 8 With the MSC now paralysed, the organisation would have to develop a new structure for
dealing with international conflicts - a matter of some importance for the future.
Yet the Organisation's dealings with the wider international system were also shaped and affected
by this breakdown of relations between the East and West. Within days of the first session of the Security
Council portents of future difficulties came to light as the Soviet Union blocked an Iranian complaint - that
they felt was supported by either the United States or the United Kingdom - about the continued Soviet
occupation of Azerbaijan. 9 As if playing tit-for-tat the Soviet Union soon responded by bringing to the
attention of the Council the continued British presence in Greece.'° The problem surrounding Greece
stemmed from the Second World War when the United Kingdom, after having initially supported a
communist-led Greek resistance movement, had, in the latter stages of the conflict, switched to another,
pro-monarchist, grouping. The communists, although bereft of British support, continued their actions
against both the Nazis and the right-wing resistance. At the end of the War the British supported group
formed a government, and the communists turned their attentions to fighting this." Maintaining their
position the communists used the mountainous north of Greece as their base from which to fight the
ensuing civil war. In the conduct of this campaign reports soon filtered through that the communist
guerillas were being supported by Greece's three northern, communist neighbours - Albania, Yugoslavia
and Bulgaria. Following a serious border incident with Albania, the Greek Government, supported by the
United States, attempted to bring the issue before the Security Council, but were blocked by the Soviet
Union. A second attempt to have the matter reviewed at the UN, this time in the General Assembly, was
successful and the USSR had to accept that the matter would now be investigated. To this end a body was
formed to examine the evidence and report back to the Organisation - the United Nations Special
Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). The Committee's work was important insofar as it made repeated
accusations of interference from the three countries, and was therefore recognised as being the first
significant example of East-West rivalry. As one commentator has put it 'UNSCOB was the first mission
created directly as an instrument of the Cold War'.' 2 However UNSCOB was not what we would today
term a United Nations peace-operation.' 3 Insofar as peace-keeping and peace-observation come under this
title of 'peace-operations' then the first event to place a peace-operation in the field was the formation of
the State of Israel.
1947 saw the end of the British mandate for Palestine and the formation of a Jewish homeland in
the area. Within hours of the declaration of the State of Israel, on 14-15 May, the infant republic was
attacked by its Arab neighbours. Although weak, the Israeli forces were able not only to defeat the
combined armies of, amongst others, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, but were able to extend Israel's borders
beyond those originally set out by, inter alia, the United Nations. This victory was soon followed up by
the UN which, although originally trying to solve the problem, was eventually, following the assassination
of its representative in Jerusalem, Count Bernadotte, forced to satisfy itself with containing the problem.'4
After working for over a year on the situation the Organisation saw the creation of a truce, in July 1948,
which was to be supervised by a United Nations observation mission based in Jerusalem (UN Truce
Supervision Organisation - UNTSO). Using military personnel from Belgium, France, Sweden and the
United States the force was mandated to ensure that the cease-fire between the belligerents was
maintained, a position it retains even to this day)5
Almost immediately following this, the United Nations was called upon to create another peace-
observation mission. This time, however, the focus of attention was to be in South Asia) 6 The prospect
of the British decolonisation of India had once again exposed the clear divide between the subcontinent's
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Hindu and Moslem populations. The sheer enormity of the problem of successfully iriaintaining the peace
between these two groupings was such that the British Government decided to follow a policy of partition
rather than progress with the maintenance of a post-independence unitary state, as was favoured by the
Hindu majority. The broad idea was that the Moslem community would form the state of Pakistan, and
the Hindus the, secular, State of India.' 7 Yet the division also granted independence to a large number of
the Princely States. One of these was the northern border state of Jammu and Kashmir. With a Hindu ruler,
but a predominantly Moslem population it was obvious that such independence could be a basis for future
conflict between India and Pakistan and, on 19 October 1947, fighting broke out. In order to calm the
violence, the ruler was forced to accept an Indian offer to send troops on the condition that a plebiscite
would be held at a later date to decide the issue of the status of the State. Yet, the fighting continued, and,
after an Indian approach to the United Nations, the Security Council passed a resolution - UN Security
Council Resolution 39 (1948) - which set up a commission to investigate the issue. Importantly, the
commission included a military adviser who in early 1949 presented India and Pakistan with a proposal
for the introduction of an observer force. This was duly accepted by both countries and by the middle of
February a small force - the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan- (UNMOGIP) -
had taken its place on both sides of the cease-fire line. Like UNTSO, this operation is still in place.
Although the formations of both UNTSO and UNMOGIP were not as a direct result of the Cold
War, it was the Cold War that was having the most significant impact on the development of the
international system at this time. However, the main focus of attention for the East-West rivalry was no
longer within the United Nations. Instead, Europe was proving to be the main battleground.
The Formation of NATO
The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West in Europe, although at the time unrecognised, preceded
the end of the War. As the Allies closed in on Germany on both the eastern and western fronts in a pincer
movement, the foundations for the post-War split were laid. The West's recognition of future Soviet
influence in the region of Eastern Europe was brought to the fore at the Yalta Conference, as the advancing
Red Army had marched through Czechoslovakia, and Poland and into Austria and Germany. Indeed, the
reality of Soviet hegemony over of the eastern part of the continent arising from its advance on Berlin was
quickly recognised following the cessation of hostilities in Europe. And in July 1945 the major European
Allies met for a conference at Potsdam in Germany to discuss the future demarcation of the continent at
which the Soviet position with regard to wider area of eastern Europe was again tacitly recognised. And
the formation of the Cominform in 1947, '...to coordinate and centralize the political roles of the
satellites" 8 was another important step towards the tightening of the Soviet Union's hold over the eastern
European States. Yet the formation of the body came as a response to counteract the effects of the Marshal
Plan for European reconstruction that saw the United States take a lead role in funding the rebuilding of
those European states that were, in the difficult economic period following the War, most prone to the
pressures of communist revolutions.'9
Although Yugoslavia soon managed to withdraw from Soviet control, the coup in Czechoslovakia
in February 1948 ensured that although the Soviet Bloc was in many ways a limited force in the UN
General Assembly - it had only five seats" - it was becoming a powerful influence in Europe. The
Czechoslovak experience ensured that the wider threat of communist expansion felt in western Europe
could not be easily allayed. Indeed, prior to the events in Czechoslovakia, in January of that same year,
the United Kingdom had in fact suggested that a organisation be formed to group together a number of
European states most at threat. The events in Czechoslovakia only helped to consolidate this feeling, and
in March the Treaty of Brussels was signed by Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the
"Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia and the Ukraine.
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Netherlands that formed the Western European Union (WEU). Yet the situation in Europe was looking
ever more perilous as in 1948 the Soviet Union attempted to institute a blockade of Berlin. With this in
mind the United States and Canada were brought in to the Union with observer status. However, within
months a plan had been put together by the United States for a wider security organisation to protect, both
physically and psychologically, western Europe from the Soviet threat. 2° This 'upgrading' - though the
WEU continued to exist 2 ' - of the Western European Union eventually led, in April 1949, to the signing
of the North Atlantic Treaty. With a mutual pledge to one another under the 'purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations', the signatories 'resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and
for the preservation of peace and security.' 22 It was from this plan that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) was later developed.
3. The Period of Strife, 1950-1955
Although there might now have been a greater feeling of stability within western Europe, 1950 was to
prove a year of monumental significance for both the United Nations and the wider events taking place
within the Cold War. Portents of the difficulties that the decade of the 1950s was to hold came only ten
days into the new year when the Soviet Union walked out of the Security Council and all other organs of
the United Nations after the General Assembly refused to recognize Chairman Mao's communist
government of the mainland People's Republic of China (PRC) over and above that of the Chinese
Nationalists' Government based in the island of Formosa (Taiwan). With the Soviet absence the events
of later that year were to lead the United Nations down a unique path when, in late-June 1950, the
communist Government of North Korea took the decisive step of intervening militarily in US-backed
South Korea.
Korea
The source of the problem lay in the post-Second World War division of the Korean Peninsula. After the
breakdown of reunification talks in 1948, two separate administrations emerged and with them came the
animosities of the Cold War. Yet the United States in a number of ways failed to realise the strategic
importance of Korea and had withdrawn its troops in 1949.23 This undoubtedly altered the perceptions of
Moscow to the opportunities presented in Korea. 24 After several months of heightened tension in which
there had been numerous provocative incidents arising from both sides, a decision was made by the North
Koreans to invade the South. When the operation began on 24 June 1950, such was the ferocity of the
attack from the North Koreans that the invading communist armies had made significant advances before
the United Nations Security Council was able, on 27 June, to pass a resolution that offered assistance to
South Korea to try to halt the action. 25 Given the continued Soviet absence, the resolution passed
unopposed. Calling for the creation of a United Nations Force to repel the North Korean troops, the
resolution led to the creation of what has been interpreted as the sole example of true Chapter VII
enforcement undertaken throughout the entire Cold war period. (Although in reality it can perhaps be
argued that the nature of the war in Korea amounted to little more than a proxy war between the five
permanent members of the Security Council.)
Indeed, in operational and structural terms the force - although under nominal UN authority -
amounted to little more than an United States led action supported by contributions from a number of other
states which sympathised with the Western position. Overall control of the force was vested in the veteran
commander of US troops in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur. Under such supervision the UN
sponsored action was soon able to repulse the North Korean armies well beyond the previous point of
demarcation between the North and South, and almost as far back as the Chinese border. This provided
the cue for Chinese intervention. Following a mass attack by Chinese troops the UN forces were forced
to retreat to the 38th Parallel which in turn created the present point of demarcation - a cease-fire line that
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has remained in place ever since.
The Soviet Union, furious at having been absent at the crucial moment of the vote on the Korean
Resolution returned to the organisation in August 1950. With their return, they soon started to make clear
their feelings on the issue of the United Nations' handling of a number of matters. Indeed, such was the
fear that a renewed Soviet role in the organisation would lead to institutional paralysis, the Western bloc
within the Organisation came together, on 3 November 1950, to pass a resolution - General Assembly
Resolution 377 (V) - entitled 'Uniting for Peace' that envisaged the use of the General Assembly as a
means of breaking deadlocks created within the Security Council whenever a matter came before the
Council that involved directly any one of the five permanent members of the Council. 26 This manoeuvre
was a clear statement of intent towards the USSR, and although a useful tool was yet further evidence to
the Soviet Union that the UN was an inherently western biased institution.
The Soviet Tension with the UN Secretary-General, Part I
Indeed, the anger of the Soviet Union over a number of issues, not least of which was Korea, led to a direct
criticism being levelled by the USSR against the Organisation's bureaucracy. Whereas previously the
Soviet Union had maintained an anti-Security Council and General Assembly position, the Soviet
perception of Secretary-General Trygve Lie's complicity with the US led action in Korea27 meant that
much of the Soviet attention was now to be directed against the Secretary-General and the Secretariat.28
Such was the irritation of the Soviet Union that it began to obstruct the UN's work by refusing to
cooperate with Lie. Soon it became apparent that this tension would not ease and Lie announced, in
November 1952, his decision to resign as Secretary-General. With this the Security Council was now
required to hunt for a suitable successor. Given the problems faced by Lie, this process proved to take
longer than had been expected and it was not until March the following year that the Council was able to
announce that they would be recommending to the General Assembly that the Secretaryship-General be
given to a little known Swedish minister - Dag Hammarskjöld.
Hammarskjöld's appointment was made to ensure that the United Nations would now have a
chief administrative officer rather than a political leader. Lie's actions had antagonised one of the
permanent members of the Security Council to such an extent as to make his position as Secretary-General
untenable. It was therefore considered necessary to appoint someone who would provide an
uncontroversial slant to the operation of the Organisation. The appointment of Hammarskjöld within the
events of the time is summed up well in the following comment,
'In spite of the reputation of ability and integrity which he had acquired among those who had met
him in negotiations or at conferences, it cannot be said that he was, at the moment, the obvious
candidate for this high international function. His election was much more due to this wish of the
Big Powers to see - after Trygve Lie who had taken a strong position in several questions - at the
head of the Secretariat someone who would concentrate mainly on administrative problems and
who would abstain from public statements on the political conduct of the Organization. Such a
careful and colourless official they thought to have found in Dag Hammarskjold.'29
Yet Hammarskjöld was eventually to prove everything but the 'colourless official'. Indeed, within a very
short space of time he had set to work on reforming the structure of the UN Secretariat. 30 This meant the
abolition of a certain number of posts and the streamlining of much of the hierarchy. Although this proved
to be ill-defined at first, the end product gave the organisation a greater degree of overall flexibility in its
handling of a number of issues. Indeed, the whole process was designed by Hammarskjold to raise the
prestige of the organisation; to this end the Secretary-General took personal charge of the reorganisation.
Once the changes to the organisation had been completed, Hammarskjöld set to work on
increasing the prestige of the Secretaryship-General in the international arena. This, however, proved to
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be less successful than the task of re-organisation. Although at the time of his appointment the Cold War
seemed to be thawing slightly - Stalin had recently died, and Eisenhower was now President of the United
States - the situation was far from warm between the two powers. This state of affairs was soon made more
than clear to the Secretary-General during his first major foray into international diplomacy, when, in
1954, Hammarskjöld attempted to assert the primacy of each member's obligations to the Charter of the
United Nations over all other duties and obligations that a particular member may have. In doing this he
was pointing the finger specifically at the United States Government which, despite Soviet pressure, was
steadfast in its opposition to bringing events occurring in Guatemala before the Security Council, instead
preferring to see the matter handled by the Organisation of American States (OAS). 3 ' At this relatively
early stage in his tenure, the difficulties of UN diplomacy within the Cold War environment became all
too apparent to the Secretary-General.
However, this setback was somewhat alleviated by the success experienced by Hammarskjöld in
his attempts to secure the release of a number of United States' airmen captured by the Chinese
Communists during the Korean War. Although regarded by the US as prisoners of war, the aviators had
been convicted of espionage by the PRC. After many meetings between the Secretary-General and the
Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai, at the end of December and beginning of January 1954-5, the PRC seemed
to be moving towards granting an early release to the men. Although, due to continued US belligerence
on the issue of negotiating with Communist China, the airmen were not released until August 1955, the
Chinese noted that their freedom was a direct result of the Secretary-General's personal intervention. To
this end, the incident brought a certain degree of autonomy to the Secretary-General.32
Superpower Détente, The Geneva Conference
The cold relationship that existed between the United States and China at this point did not seem to
parallel the thawing of relations between the United States and its western allies with regard to the USSR
at the same time. In July 1955 the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet
Union met at a summit meeting in Geneva. The meeting, held at the Palais des Nations - the former home
of the League of Nations - from 19-23 July proved to be a significant move towards East-West dialogue.
During the five days a number of issues were discussed and the final directive (not a communiqué) issued
at the end of the summit touched on the subjects of European Security and Germany, Disarmament, and
the development of contacts between East and West. To this extent the four powers also agreed that a
follow-up meeting between the foreign ministers of the countries should take place in Geneva during
October.33
Yet the thawing in relations between the two powers did not undo the damage done by the bitter
rivalry that had gone before. The strategy of containment within Europe remained and still left the main
body of the continent divided. With NATO the predominant force of the West and the newly formed
Warsaw Treaty Organisation providing a similar security arrangement for the East, the continent held little
prospect of further gains for either Superpower. As has been noted,
'All the talk of peaceful coexistence emanating from the 1955 Geneva Summit could not alter the
fundamental reality: the United States and the Soviet Union, far and away the pre-eminent powers
in the world, were locked in geopolitical competition. A gain for one side was widely perceived
as being a loss for the other. By the mid-1950s, the American sphere of influence in Europe was
thriving, and America's demonstrated willingness to protect that sphere with military force
deterred Soviet adventurism. But stalemate in Europe did not mean stalemate around the world.'
Indeed, these Cold War difficulties were not just limited to Europe. The events between East and West
had distinctly affected the tone of the UN in its workings. In summarising the United Nations during the
first decade of its existence, Luard states,
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'The shape of the UN in its first ten years was inevitably largely dictated by the political
environment in which it existed: an environment of bitter distrust and hostility between the two
super-powers and the nations which sunounded them, of competition for hearts and minds all over
the world, of fanatical faith among the members of each group that they, and the things they
believed, were right, while their enemies were the embodiment of evil - in a word, and
environment of cold war.'35
4. Decolonization and Peace-keeping, 1955-1960
With the comment that 'stalemate in Europe did not mean stalemate around the world' in mind, 1955 was
important for another reason. Although the East-West relationship had indeed been a dominant issue
within the United Nations Organisation for the previous ten years, the situation was such that throughout
this period it had been the case that the West had maintained the upper hand within the General
Assembly.36 Indeed for the first decade of the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc had consisted of the Soviet
Union, the two Soviet Republics of Byelorussia and Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, by
1955 the situation was beginning to change markedly. Although the number of Soviet satellite states that
had become members of the organisation still meant that the communist bloc represented a small, albeit
tightly knit, minority within the Assembly - the Arab and Commonwealth groups were bigger 37 - there was,
however, an ever increasing number of newly independent African and Asian states that were ensuring
that the vested interests of the 'colonial powers' would be challenged within the organisation as they had
never been before. 38 The emphasis was now about to change subtly from East-West issues to North-South
debates.
One may argue, therefore, that the most important event of 1955 was not the Geneva Summit or
the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Instead it can be ventured that it was the highly
publicised conference of African and Asian States held at Bandung, in Indonesia, from 18-24 April that
marked a fundamental change in the future developments within the international system and, more
specifically, the United Nations. Attended by delegates from twenty nine countries," it represented the
genesis of a firm movement on the part of the non-white peoples of the 'third world' to have their voice
heard within the international system. At the meeting many prominent leaders of the third world met to
form an agenda of issues that directly affected them. Indeed, if one looks at the speeches made by many
of the delegates one can get a good feel of the diversity of approaches taken to this fundamental reappraisal
of international politics that was being formulated. President Sukarno of Indonesia, during his address to
the conference stated that 'this is the first inter-continental conference of the so-called coloured peoples
in the history of mankind', continuing he told the assembled delegates,
'Do not think of colonialism only in the classical form.. .colonialism has also a modern dress, in
the form of economic control, intellectual control, and actual physical control by a small but alien
community within a nation.'39
Although the Conference was attended by a large number of states that had ties to the western bloc - either
Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Persia, Philippines, Saudi
Arabia, Siam, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen. Of the states invited only
one, the Central African Federation, did not attend.
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by military tiesi or through the Commonwealth" - the Soviet Union nonetheless perceived that a natural
alliance would form between itself and a number of the more 'neutralist' or communist leaning states.
Given the stated aspirations of this body with regard to decolonization, the USSR felt that most of the
members would naturally find themselves more in tune with the thinking of the communist bloc that they
would with the West - the bloc whose membership consisted of so many of the former colonial powers.
Indeed Prime Minister Nehru of India, in castigating Turkey for its membership of NATO did so on the
basis that the Organisation was, 'one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism.' 40 However, and in
the same speech, Nehru had, importantly, noted that it was 'an intolerable humiliation for an Afro-Asian
country to degrade itself as a camp follower of one or other side.'4'
Despite this apparent rejection by Nehru of the traditional bi-polarity of the international system,
General-Secretary Khrushchev nonetheless actively sought to focus on this developing body of states in
his attempts to direct Soviet policy against the West. Indeed, at the 20th Party Congress held in February
1956, he announced that,
'The new period in world history which Lenin predicted has arrived, and the peoples of the East
are playing an active part in deciding the destinies of the whole world, are becoming a new mighty
factor in international relations. In contrast to the pre-war period, most Asian countries now act
in the world arena as sovereign states which are resolutely upholding their right to an independent
foreign policy. International relations have spread beyond the bounds of relations between the
countries inhabited chiefly by peoples of the white race and are beginning to acquire the character
of genuinely world-wide relations.'42
It was undoubtedly the case that Khrushchev saw new international opportunities in the Afro-Asian states.
However, the United States was not wholly oblivious to the opportunities presented. Yet there was an
aggressiveness in the policy of the United States that alienated it from the Third World. Indeed,
Khrushchev's targeting of these areas was in many ways a response to the failure of western attempts to
bring a number of regions under its wing. As one commentator has noted,
'Whereas in Moscow a change in leadership brought with it a readiness to explore new
approaches to a changing Third World, in Washington, by contrast, the election of Dwight D.
Eisenhower ushered in an administration determined to globalize containment and to foist it on
countries who neither felt threatened by Soviet attack nor saw anything emanating from the Soviet
Union that necessitated alliance with the West. The driving force behind this policy was Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, who sorely misread the mood in the new nations. By uncritically
extending to the Third World a strategy designed for Europe and the Far East, he was guilty, much
like Stalin, of a rigid and parochial application of a policy perfectly good for one place to an
environment for which it was ill-suited. His "success" in creating military pacts in the Middle East
and South Asia proved a boon to Moscow: it did more to assure an eager welcome for Soviet
wares and accelerate the decline of Western influence in these regions than any other development
of the period. Khrushchev could not have accomplished as much so quickly in the mid-1950s
without the inadvertent assistance of Dulles.'43
IV For Example, Turkey was a member of NATO. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO) consisted of Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand alongside Australia, France, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.
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Yet these states would not, with the obvious exception of those in military alliances with the United States,
be so easily cajoled into forming a direct alliance with either the Soviet Union or the United States.
Bandung had been the first chance for a number of states to voice their concerns about issues that lay
beyond the remit of the Cold War between the East and West. The issue of prime importance for the
African and Asian states was the development of the southern hemisphere, as compared with the
imperative of strategic issues prevalent between the East and West in the northern hemisphere. To this
extent one may see the end result of Bandung as being the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a movement
which in many ways embodied Nehru's ideals presented at Bandung. However, and despite the professed
ideology of non-alignment with either the West or the East in its dealings on issues in the international
arena, the Movement soon came to be perceived as being more sympathetic to the Soviet cause than to that
of the West. As one former British senior diplomat wryly, and perhaps somewhat bitterly, observed,
'The newly formed Non-Aligned Movement sailed under the banner of 'anti-imperialism', a
rhetorical firearm more easily levelled against Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and other
Western European colonial powers than the Soviet Union which had skilfully concealed its direct
descent from the Tsarist Empire and which, with outrageous but effective cynicism and hypocrisy,
was quick to trumpet its championship of national liberation and total independence from the
wicked West. Indeed, when I was in Cairo in the early 1960's, may of us concluded that the true
meaning of non-alignment was giving the Soviet Union the benefit of all doubts, the West
never."
The First United Nations Peace-keeping Force, UNEF
Although the NAM had not yet been formed and the doctrine of non-alignment was at its genesis, the birth
of peace-keeping coincided closely with this new North-South agenda. Indeed, President Abdul Garnal
Nasser of Egypt, the protagonist of future events, was one of the prominent leaders attending Bandung.
During the course of the meeting he had made anti-colonialism a central tenet of his regional pan-Arabist
ideology. In the year following the Conference, and indeed before that, he had focussed on voicing support
for a number of states in the Mahgreb region which were engaged in conflicts against the French. 4' To
further Egypt's important regional role - as well, it might be argued, as his own prestige - he engaged in
diplomatic manoeuvres with both the United States and Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Uiiion and
Czechoslovakia on the other. When a deal to finance the building of a massive dam at Aswan fell through
due to Western irritation at Nasser's dealing with the communist bloc, the Egyptian President used, as his
tool to get back at the West, the strategically important Suez Canal that linked the Red Sea with the
Mediterranean. As a vital oil transit route it was one of the most important shipping routes in the world.
Given this strategic position it was therefore unsurprising that when Nasser nationalised the Canal, in late-
July 1956, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France - both of which had significant financial
interests at stake - took the decisive step, in the last days of October 1956, of attempting, with the collusion
of Israel,46 to invade the Suez Canal zone.47
Almost immediately the United States reacted by placing the matter before the Security Council
and presented a draft resolution. 48 (This was done despite the fact that the United States knew that the
United Kingdom and France, as permanent members of the Council, would veto any such resolution.) The
reason for this move had therefore to lie in the wider geo-political view of the situation by the United
States. Most important among these was the belief that the Soviet Union was making significant headway
in developing ties with the Egyptian state as well as other Arab states. Therefore the Anglo-French action
could be used by the Soviet Union as a propaganda tool against NATO and the West as well as being a
more direct means of becoming involved in the region. By bringing the matter before the United Nations
the United States more than likely felt that it could forestall any such Soviet involvement. In actual fact,
the United States found support from the Soviet Union, which also presented a resolution. 49 When both
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the US and Soviet texts were vetoed, the Security Council used the 1950 'Uniting for Peace' resolution
to have the matter moved to the General Assembly. After several days of emergency debate in the
Assembly, a resolution was eventually passed that called 'for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of
all forces being armistice lines and the reopening of the canal' 50 However the text of the resolution proved
to be of only limited value as it did not propose any practical measures to be taken. With this in mind the
Canadian Government proposed the creation of an international emergency force 'to secure the cessation
of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.' When put to the vote in
the Assembly the resolution passed. 5 ' The process of forming a peace-keeping force now began.
On the basis of the ideas presented, the Assembly envisaged the new force as one which would
work on the basis of consent given by the Egyptian Government. It would be comprised of a number of
troop contingents from several contributing states, and would work under the control of the United Nations
Organisation - rather than the governments of the individual troop contributing countries. Although this
plan of action was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union, there were clear reservations
expressed by Britain, France and Israel who all viewed the role of the UN as 'an instrument of pressure
on the Egyptian government; the force, they felt, should not be allowed to leave Egyptian soil until
desirable political settlements had been reached.' 52 However the United States was unwilling to be seen
to side with the tripartite action. To take any action which could be construed as showing undue sympathy
to the recognised 'aggressors' would jeopardise its relationship with the Arab states. Therefore the force
was created with this all important element of consent as a fundamental principle.
With such an assurance, the Egyptians accepted the presence of the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF). There was, however, one condition: namely, that the force not include contingents from
NATO countries. This would effectively preclude any contributions from Norway, Denmark and,
importantly, Canada - the initial sponsor of the resolution proposing the force. 53 In order to counter this
Hammarskjöld asserted his belief that although contributions from any of the permanent members of the
Security Council would be excluded, 54 and that the host state must have an important role in the
consultations regarding contributions, the principle of 'universality' within the United Nations demanded
that the UN itself - and the Secretary-General by default - must remain the final arbiter of a state's
suitability for peace-keeping duties. 55 Nasser therefore relented and the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian
troops duly took their place in the force when it finally arrived in Egypt, just over a week later, on 12
November 1956. Using troops from the above named countries as well as, eventually, Brazil, Columbia,
Finland, India, Indonesia, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, the force had, by March 1957, succeeded in achieving
all its mandated tasks and was then deployed on the Egyptian side of the 273 km Armistice Demarcation
Line (ADL) with Israel. It remained in place, supervising the cease-fire, until 1967.
Yet Suez had been an important event beyond the creation of the UN's first peace-keeping force.
The disastrous way in which the British and French had handled the whole crisis, coupled with the
Superpower unanimity of action (if not intent), had led to the downgrading of these two powers in the
international system. 56 This event, perhaps more than any other amount of pressure from the floor of the
General Assembly, seemed to mark the beginning of the process of large-scale decolonization 57 - a point
evidenced by the dramatic rise in the membership of the UN Organisation from sixty to one hundred in
the five year period from 195560.58
Hungary
Concurrent with the events in the Middle East, the Cold War was still being played out in Europe.
Although the containment policy in Europe had led to the Soviet Union's exploration of new vistas in the
wider world, the bi-polarity existing in Europe was not always as stable as might have been suspected. In
Hungary a number of large demonstrations at the end of the third week in October had led to the return
of the former Prime Minister, Imre Nagy. Once in power he sent a clear signal to Moscow that he expected
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. In addition, in a statement broadcast on 31 October
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1956, Nagy announced that Hungary would be withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. 59 The Soviet Union,
fearing the spread of such dissent to the other satellite states, took a decisive stand and moved their forces
into Budapest to crush the uprising.
The Soviet Union's moves had been, even from the earliest days of the crisis, a matter of
international concern, if not condemnation. 6° At the UN, the first response was a draft resolution put before
the Security Council by the United States. 6' However, the events surrounding Suez pushed the Council's
consideration of this aside within a day of it having been presented. When it next came before the Council
the Soviet Union had launched its military operation to retake Budapest. The proposed resolution, although
revised to take into account the changed circumstances, 62 was vetoed by the USSR. At this point the
Council, once again using the 'Uniting for Peace' device, moved the matter to the General Assembly.63
There the Soviet action was condemned and following a vote on a draft resolution, the Assembly
assigned responsibility for the matter to the Secretary-General. TM However, this would prove to be an
impossible task for Hammarskjöld. The Security Council, as the main organ of the UN in its peace and
security role had already failed through Superpower intransigence, so too, by its own reluctance, had the
Assembly. To expect the Secretary-General to succeed where the others had been unable to do so was, in
a number of ways, to expect the impossible. The Soviet Union remained finn in their refusal to move on
the issue, and after several months the matter eventually fell by the wayside. As one commentator later
noted, '[i]n Hungary there was no question of Soviet compliance with UN decisions, and, if no one was
prepared to challenge the Soviet Union, the UN and the Secretary-General were impotent.'65
Berlin
'To put it crudely, the American foot in Europe had a sore blister on it. That was West Berlin.
Anytime we wanted to step on the Americans' foot and make them feel pain, all we had to do was
obstruct American communications with the city across the territory of the German Democratic
Republic.'
Nikita Khrushchev66
The situation in Hungary had refocussed the centre of Cold War attention on Europe. The gradual decline
in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States that had occurred since the end of the
Second World war had now reached a point at which their respective ideological territories within Europe
had been almost wholly defined. As Hungary had shown, any attempt to encroach on the Soviet Union's
sphere of influence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, either internally or externally, would be firmly
resisted by the USSR at the United Nations and, failing this, by military methods. 67 Yet within this picture,
the city of Berlin continued to remain a small outpost of the West within the Soviet Empire.
The status of Berlin had been defined in the post-Second World War as a form of 'free-city' that
was not strictly part of Germany, but rather an area that was governed by the four main allied powers of
the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the city fell within the
Russian zone of occupation covering eastern Germany, land transit routes had been organised to link the
city with the western part of the country. However, the difficult position of the western powers vis-à-vis
Berlin was soon recognised by the Soviet Union. In 1948 Stalin precipitated a crisis over access to Berlin
VI Although the Soviet Union voted against the move, all the other members of the Council,
including Yugoslavia, voted in favour.
" Fifty votes in favour, eight votes against (all communist states), and fifteen abstentions (all the
Arab states and a number of Afro-Asian countries).
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when he imposed a blockade of the overland routes to the city. In order to maintain its hold on the western
zone of the town, the West had to organise a mass airlift to keep a regular supply of goods to the,
effectively, besieged population. Although Stalin was eventually defeated in his aims, 68 the situation
regarding the city was not completely resolved. In 1958, Khrushchev initiated another Cold War crisis over
Berlin when he announced that the Soviet Union had decided to implement a policy whereby all access
routes to the town would now come under the control of the East German Government. However, despite
the inherent difficulties to the western position created by such a move, the United States was able to delay
the matter through diplomacy, a move that did not find disfavour with the Soviet Union which had by now
realised the seriousness of the situation. 69 This realization would mark the beginning of a protracted period
in which the fortunes of Berlin would play a central role in the East-West relationship in Europe. Yet, in
addition to the situation in Europe, East-West tensions in the Middle East still appeared to be a major
concern as political trouble in the Lebanon once again threatened to polarise the Cold War ideologies in
the region.
The Lebanon, 1958
The roots of the conflict in the Lebanon are complex and any brief account is unlikely to cover fully the
intricacies of the problem.7° In summarising the political situation in 1958 it is important to note that when
the country achieved independence from France in 1943, the National Covenant that established the
political system determined that the structure of the state would consist of a president drawn from the
Christian community, a prime minister from the Sunni Moslem community, and a Shiite speaker for the
parliament. However, this arrangement came under threat in the early part of 1958 when President Camille
Chamoun announced that he intended to alter the Constitution to allow himself to stand for a second term
as President. Almost immediately, there were sporadic incidents of violence by some members of the
Moslem communities of the country, and within weeks large parts of Beirut and most of the area around
the Lebanese Syrian border were in rebel hands.7'
Yet President Chamoun interpreted these events as being a direct result of interference by
President Nasser of the United Arab Republic (UAR) - the result of a political union between Syria and
Egypt in February 1958 - who Chamoun believed was engaged in a regional policy of inciting the
populations of the more moderate, pro-Western Arab states to revolt. Chamoun also argued that the UAR
was supplying arms to the rebels. Therefore, on 13 May, he approached President Eisenhower about the
possibility of some form of intervention by the United States to assist the Government of Lebanon in its
defence against the communist threat posed by Nasserism. However, Eisenhower was not prepared to
become involved unless any United States' action was supported by a least one other Arab state. 72 At this
point Chamoun approached the United Nations to ask that an observer team be appointed to assess the
threat posed by the UAR.
Following a six day delay caused by an Iraqi request that the matter be first handled by the Arab
League - which failed to reach a conclusion - the United Nations Security Council finally met, on 6 June,
to consider the issue. After four days of deliberation, a resolution - UN Security Council Resolution 128
(1958) - was passed with the support of both the Lebanon and the UAR, with only the Soviet Union
choosing to abstain. By this point, Hammarskjöld had planned the structure of the United Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon (TJNOGIL), and within days the Group was up and running having drawn
on observers, equipment, and facilities supplied by UNTSO, UNEF, and the United Nations Relief Works
Agency (UNRWA) in Beirut." In addition Gab Plaza Lasso of Ecuador, Rajeshwar Dayal of India, and
viii However, UNOGIL, at its greatest extent, consisted of 591 military observers (November
1958) drawn from Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland,
India, indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Thailand.
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Major-General Odd Bull of Norway were appointed to be the three man Observation Group that would
report the findings of UNOGIL to the Security Council.73
On 1 July the Group's first report was released. 74 Noting that work had been hampered by the
rebels, the report stated that was apparently no foundation to the Lebanese charges that the UAR was
assisting the rebels. Chamoun was, as expected, furious about this and in a reply to the Secretary-General
criticised the findings of the report. 75 However, the United States had by now made it clear that it would
intervene to assist the President if it appeared that his government would fall. 76 The catalyst for this came
on 14 July when a bloody coup d'etat in pro-Western Iraq deposed and executed King Faisal and his
Prime Minister, Nun Said. 77 Fearing that this was the start of a regional move by Nasser to de-stabilise the
pro-Western regimes in the region, Chamoun invited the United States to intervene.
On the morning of 15 July, fourteen thousand US Marines landed on a beach near Beirut.
Immediately following this the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution that stated that the action of the
United States was in direct contravention of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. 78 In return the
United States put forward a plan that UNOGIL be converted into a full peace-keeping operation. This
proposal was rejected by Hammarskjöld on the basis that any such change instituted by the Secretary-
General would exceed his powers under the Charter. 79 A subsequent Swedish draft resolution claimed that
the intervention of the United States in the Lebanon, even under Article 51 of the Charter, was unjustified
insofar as the country was not under direct attack. 8° Yet two days later the United Kingdom landed three
thousand troops in Jordan, following an invitation from the Jordanian Government, which had, like the
Lebanon, argued that such an action was in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Once again the
Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution that called for the withdrawal of the British and American
troops from the two countries. This was vetoed by the United Kingdom and the United States, and a
Japanese draft resolution that called for the strengthening of UNOGIL was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
Yet the Japanese proposal had been favoured by Hammarskjöld, 8 ' who, despite his earlier comment about
exceeding his role, took the necessary steps to strengthen the Group. 82 At the same time, moves were made
to have the issue moved to the General Assembly.
All the while UNOGIL had been actively trying to disassociate itself from the forces of the United
States, whose presence, it was now realised, was the result of an overreaction to the earlier events in Iraq.
The new regime - although leftist in orientation and favoured by the Soviet Union 83 - had by now proven
to be as hostile to Nasser as King Faisal had been. Therefore the United States was left in the embarrassing
position of having to try to extricate itself from what was by now realised to be essentially a Lebanese
domestic affair.M Indeed, President Chamoun had by now accepted that he could not stand for re-election
and had been replaced. Therefore, by the time the General Assembly met, events had overtaken the need
for there to be such a meeting. Nevertheless, the debate took place and an agreement was eventually
reached when a resolution, sponsored by ten Arab states, was passed - General Assembly Resolution 1237
(ES-ifi) - that called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces was passed.
This resolution changed the nature of UNOGIL, which now became the mechanism to oversee
the withdrawal of the British and American troops from Jordan and the Lebanon. This role took central
prominence after the Group was able to report, on 29 September, that there had been no further incidents
of fighting between the Government forces and the rebels since their last report, 85 thus indicating that the
situation in Lebanon had been resolved. With the final departure of the United Kingdom and the United
States from the two countries, IJNOGIL submitted its last report, on 17 November, in which it noted that
its work was done and that it should be disbanded 86 - a move that was completed by 9 December.87
In conclusion the words of Alan James sum up the situation in the Lebanon: 'It was all a rather
crazy situation'. 88 Indeed, the situation had simply shown the extent to which the United States' paranoia
over communist expansion had drawn it into a ludicrous situation. Yet, if the Lebanon was a crazy
situation into which the United Nations had been drawn, the next situation was disastrous. In 1960, events
in Africa were to lead once again to the formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force.
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5. The Congo, Cuba and the Consequences, 1960-1963
In many ways the events and outcomes of the Congo crisis represented a new era for the United Nations.
The situation developed out of the ill-planned and badly executed Belgian withdrawal from its huge colony
in central Africa. 89 After mounting political pressure, the Belgian Government announced, following a
conference in January 1960, that it would grant independence to the mineral-rich country in June of that
year. Given that the country had almost no experience of autonomy, and that almost none of its population
was educated beyond the primary level, this period proved to be a remarkably short period in which to put
in place the mechanisms for the governance of an entire state by the Congolese themselves. However, this
difficulty was somewhat alleviated by the agreement between the Congolese and the Belgians that ensured
that Belgium would keep in place a large number of key personnel - both civilian and military - in order
to assist in the transition.
Yet the continued presence of the large number of Belgian officers serving with the army proved
to be a source of considerable resentment to the large body of Congolese who, deprived of the chance to
take positions of command, took to open revolt within days of independence, on 1 July 1960. The
bloodshed and violence of these mutinous troops was soon directed against the large number of Europeans
living in the country and with tales of rape and murder soon reaching the outside world, the Belgian
Government took the decisive step of conducting a military operation to halt the fighting. 9° This Belgian
action, in turn, proved to be the cue for Katanga, the richest province in the new federation, to secede. It
was at this point the Congolese Government approached the United Nations to secure military assistance
to aid it in removing the Belgian troops and to put down the rebellion in Katanga. 9 ' In a rare move, the UN
Secretary-General used Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to bring to the attention of the
Security Council the events in the Congo.92[x] After a short but heated debate,93 the Council eventually
passed Resolution 143(1960) that allowed for the creation of a UN force to assist the Congo. With this the
United Nation's second peace-keeping operation came into being as the Operation des Nations Unies au
Congo, (ONUC).
Within a week of its formation over three and a half thousand troops had arrived to serve with the
force. Drawn almost entirely from African countries in the first instance,' by early September the size of
the force had risen to fourteen thousand and included contributions from the European countries of
Sweden and the Republic of frelandY By this point the force, led personally by the Secretary-General, had
overseen the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga, but was still engaged in trying to
bring about the re-integration of the region into the state. Indeed, this process had been made all the more
difficult by the secession of another province, South Kasai, as well as the continuing feud between the
President, Joseph Kasavubu, and the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. This rivalry had been simmering
from before independence and had been a constant threat to the fragile stability of the country at the level
of central governance, and when a direct threat of full-scale interfactional violence between the rival camps
of supporters threatened to plunge the country into all-out civil war, the UN force took the unprecedented
step of ordering the airport to be closed and all radio stations to break communications. This move was
not only a departure from the accepted practice of non-coercive peace-keeping but also drew criticisms
of partiality from Lumumba's supporters insofar as it effectively assisted Kasavubu who maintained his
power base in and around the city whereas Lumumba had his main support from the distant Orientale
province.95 Soon after that Lumumba was ousted from power as a young army officer, Joseph Mobutu,
took over the running of the Government, with support from Kasavubu, and immediately closed all the
embassies of any communist countries.96
See Appendix A for text of the Article.
Ethiopia (460 men), Ghana (770 men), Morocco (1,250 men), and Tunisia (1,020 men)
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The Soviet tension with the UN Secretary-General, Part II
Although the United States had supported Hammarskjöld's approach to the Congo, 97 the failure of the
United Nations to prevent Lumumba's removal from power, the subsequent expulsion of the communist
embassies and the personal way in which the events in the Congo had been handled by Harnmarskjöld had,
at an early stage, resurrected Soviet ill-feeling towards the role of the Secretary-General of the UN.98
Indeed, such was the irritation that, in a speech made before the General Assembly on 23 September 1960,
Chairman Khrushchev made a radical, and unexpected, proposal:
'It is necessary that the executive agency of the United Nations reflect the actual situation now
obtaining in the world...We deem it wise and fair that the United Nations executive agency consist
of not just one person, the Secretary-General, but of three persons enjoying the confidence of the
United Nations.'99
Over the next few days, the Soviet Premier continued to make a number of personal attacks on the
Secretary-General and took several chances to try to push forward his 'troika' idea. Harnmarskjöld,
although having attempted to avoid a direct confrontation as long as possible, was eventually forced to
reply in no uncertain terms. Taking the podium he stated,
'I would not wish to continue to serve as Secretary-General one day longer than such continued
service was, and was considered to be, in the best interest of the Organization. The statement this
morning seems to indicate that the Soviet Union finds it impossible to work with the present
Secretary-General. This may seem to provide a strong reason why I should resign. However, the
Soviet Union has also made it clear that, if the present Secretary-general were to resign now, they
would not wish to elect a new incumbent but insist on an arrangement which - and this is my finn
conviction based on experience - would make it impossible to maintain an effective executive. By
resigning, I would, therefore, at the present difficult and dangerous juncture throw the
Organization to the winds. I have no right to do so because I have a responsibility to all those
states members for which the Organization is of decisive importance, a responsibility which
overrides all other
Although the Secretary-General was applauded by the greater number of delegates present, the relationship
between himself and the Soviet Government continued to remain on exceedingly unsteady ground, and
it was not long before the final, severing blow, came between the two parties. The event that, for the Soviet
Government, marked the final insult came in February 1961 when Lumumba was captured by Congolese
'Government' forces and delivered into the hands of the secessionist Katangan 'Government'. Once in
their possession, the Katangans killed the deposed Prime Minister.' 0 ' The Soviet Union, infuriated at the
lack of UN control over the situation, immediately made it known that they blamed the Secretary-General
for the United Nations' inability to protect Lumumba.'°2 As a consequence of this perceived failure, they
made it clear that they no longer recognised Hammarskjöld as the Secretary-General of the United Nations
Organisation and that in future they would not work directly with him - although they did make clear that
they continued to recognise the competence of the Secretariat as the Organisation's bureaucracy.
However, the Soviets were not alone in their suspicions towards the developing, and, it might be
argued, far reaching powers of the Secretaryship-General. The French Government of General de Gaulle
had also expressed its concern over Hammarskjöld's actions and even went as far as criticising the role
of peace-keeping in general. Indeed both the French and Soviet Governments had played an instrumental
role in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice when, in 1962, the Court had been asked
to rule upon the validity of peace-keeping within the bounds of payments for such actions.'° 1 This had
followed the announcements made by both countries in March-April of that year that they would no longer
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continue to pay their share of the costs towards the operation.
The Appointment of the Third Secretary-General, U Thant
The situation in the Congo, although eased somewhat by the creation of a government under a new Prime
Minister, still remained unresolved. In mid-September 1961, Hammarskjold attempted to push forward
stalled negotiations by making a personal trip to the Congo to meet with the various parties. After visiting
Leopoldville, the Secretary-General left for Ndola in Northern Rhodesia in order to meet with the leader
of the breakaway province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe. However, on the approach to the airstrip, the
plane in which he was travelling crashed killing all aboard. With the death of Hammarskjöld the United
Nations was deprived of its key figure. Beyond being the Secretary-General of the Organisation,
Hammarskjöld had defined a new role for the UN during a period in office that had begun with political
acrimony between the Superpowers and between the USSR and the Secretary-General. Although injecting
new life into the Organisation,'°4 Hammarskjöld was not totally removed from Lie in his relationship with
the Soviets. Although his style was far more diplomatic than the Norwegian's approach, the outcome was,
in many respects, the same.
The questions concerning the Soviet attitudes towards the Secretaryship-General and the question
of financing posed the first of many problems for the incoming Secretary-General, the Burmese diplomat
U Thant. An experienced hand at the United Nations - Thant had been his country's permanent
representative at the Organisation - he was seen to be someone who could help engineer a reconciliation
between the Secretariat and its critics. In many ways Thant seemed the ideal candidate as he was known
to have a quiet demeanour that did not easily lend itself to criticisms of antagonistic behaviour. Indeed,
Hammarskjöld himself had been on record as stating that he viewed Thant as a favourable replacement
once he retired.'°5 In addition to this, the Soviet Union regarded Thant favourably. As Khrushchev stated,
'We knew we could count on him to be more flexible than Hammarskjold; U Thant wouldn't
allow the UN to do anything detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union, the Socialist
countries, and those countries that were unaligned to military
Immediately upon his appointment, Thant focused much, though not all,' 07 of his attention on the Congo;
which was still far from being comprehensively resolved. Although the force was still in position it was,
by this point, substantially smaller than the 19, 828 troops that had been involved at ONUC's peak in July
1961 . 108 Indeed, in February 1963, ONUC made the novel and, as yet, unrepeated move of incorporating
a battalion of the Congolese National Army into its number. However, the overall political situation still
showed no signs of easing and it was not until Tshombe was able to increase his overall power that the
situation was broken when Katanga agreed to re-integrate into the Federation that the situation was
resolved, and the force was eventually removed in 1964.
Indeed, the crisis had proved to be for the United Nations a lesson in how not to do things in the
course of a peace-keeping operation. It remains, even today, the UN peace-keeping operation with the
highest number of overall fatalities,u as well as having cost the UN over $400 million. '° 9 One can therefore
see the extent to which the Congo operation had been a major undertaking for the United Nations.
However, it had also been a substantial point of friction between the Superpowers. Yet it was not the only
such point of difference or antagonism between the US and the USSR. To this extent it is important to
review the wider Cold War picture that existed by this point. In doing this there are two distinct events that
stand out as major points of consideration: the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962.




The events surrounding the building of the Berlin Wall stemmed directly from the previously described
events of 1958 during which the Soviet Union had attempted to assert the authority of the East German
administration. The fact that throughout the period from 1945-6 1 Berlin had been a city occupied but not
divided had meant that there had been a clear passage by which those seeking to flee the communist
controlled areas could do so. Such a migration from the East to the West was proving to be a drain on the
East German economy as a large number of those fleeing were in trained professions. Furthermore, such
actions were a direct humiliation for the communists, who had repeatedly attempted to paint the picture
of life in the East as being a socialist utopia.
Although the Berlin situation had been tense but stable since the events of 1958, the issue
remained firmly in place as a potential source of further Cold War friction. In June 1961, General-
Secretary Khrushchev - perhaps in an attempt to test the new US President, John F. Kennedy"° - once
again renewed the ultimatum to the West. The East German authorities, as if to highlight the lengths to
which they would go to prove their serious intent on the issue of recognition, soon thereafter erected
barricades around the western part of the city and thus created the Berlin Wall. With the flow of East
Germans to the West now stemmed the Wall had the added benefit of placing the West Berliners in a state
of psychological, if not physical, siege. Despite this, Kennedy did not respond with any overt action,"
preferring instead to send 1500 troops to reinforce the city's garrison." 2 This action had the benefit of
placing the Soviets in the difficult position of having to take the next step. Although the United States'
action caused a furore in West German political circles and led to a cold period in relations between the
two states, the tactic seemed to pay dividends as it delayed events until such time as Khrushchev made the
mistake of allowing the United States to take the decisive position in East-West relations during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
This incident proved to be one of the most dangerous events of the entire Cold War period, and any
attempt to try to explain the crisis in entirety in the bounds of this work would be doomed to failure in the
space available." 3 To this extent the account presented here places a significant emphasis on the role of
the United Nations during the crisis. This role was but one small element of the crisis and should in no way
be interpreted to mean that the crisis was centred on the United Nations.
The roots of the crisis can be traced to a US fear that the Soviet Union was attempting to gain a
foothold in the western hemisphere through the Caribbean island of Cuba, lying just off the US coast near
Florida. Since 1823 and the adoption of the Monroe doctrine, the United States had made it a clear tenet
of its foreign policy that the Americas, both north and south, represented its own sphere of influence and
was not open to outside meddling. The fact that the reciprocal agreement by which the United States would
not take an active interest in events beyond this area had been broken by the its role in both World Wars,
and, more particularly, by the creation of the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction did not
fundamentally effect the strongly held belief in the fact that the United States must control its own region.
With this in mind, the actions of the Cuban President, Fidel Castro, in attempting to solicit Soviet
support came as a direct challenge to this doctrine. Therefore when the United States discovered, on 14
October 1962, that the Cubans were in the process of building a number of missile bases for Soviet
intermediate range nuclear missiles it became a foreign policy imperative that they act to prevent this
extension of the Soviet Union's nuclear strike capability. In convening an emergency session of the
Security Council, the United States made a claim that it had in its possession a number of aerial
photographs that they claimed incontrovertibly proved that the Soviet Union was attempting to use the
island of Cuba as a means of extending its influence over the Western Hemisphere. After a draft
resolution" 4 put forward by the United States was predictably vetoed by the Soviets, the United States
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imposed a naval blockade around the island to prevent the importation of the Soviet missiles.
On the morning of 24 October, the Council met once again in order to hear the United States and
the Soviet Union as they faced one another across the floor of the Council chamber. The situation had by
this point reached a critical stage as a number of Soviet merchant ships were approaching the naval cordon
around the island. Under these circumstances the meeting was of vital importance. On this occasion a
resolution was put to the Council calling for the Secretary-General to confer with the parties, and to ask
both the US and the USSR to refrain from actions likely to aggravate further the situation. Thant duly
responded by sending messages to both President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev," 5 although many
within the UN felt that there was little that the Organisation could do under the tense circumstances."6
Although the Soviet merchant vessels were eventually allowed to continue on their way to the
island by the US naval forces, the situation still remained tense when the Council met once again the
following day - 25 October. As the permanent representatives of the Superpowers once again engaged in
debate, the US representative, Adlai Stevenson, was able to manipulate the proceedings in such a way as
to expose the Soviet Representative, Velerian Zorin, as a liar." 7 Although this action caused much by way
of consternation among the assembled onlookers, the United States had successfully managed to expose
the Soviet manoeuvres to the international community. From this point on the Soviet position weakened,
and although the crisis lasted several more days, the fact that the Soviet Union had been wrong footed by
the United States meant that, on 28 October, Chairman Khrushchev was forced to publicly announce that
the bases would be dismantled and the missiles returned to the Soviet Union." 8 (However, one must point
out that the final outcome was not a complete disaster for the Soviet Union as it had managed to ensure
recognition for Castro's Cuba, had led to the removal of US missiles from Turkey, and had resulted in a
firm recognition of the Soviet Union as a nuclear Superpower alongside the United States.)
In later months both the Soviet Union and the United States were to thank the Secretary-General
for the important role he played in diffusing the tension between the two states." 9 Yet the fact remained
that the United States, in achieving a victory within the Security Council, reinforced the fact that it had
won a political and strategic advantage - though not a full victory - in the crisis overall by not only
highlighting its resolve in maintaining its historic position with regard to the American Hemisphere, but
by also exposing a weakness in Soviet leadership. This had been aided by the disastrous way in which the
matter had been handled on the floor of the Security Council. Indeed, so bad had been Zorin's
performance before the Security Council that the Soviet Union soon replaced him with Nikolai Fedorenko
- a man who 'gave the impression that he had always led a quiet, scholarly and indeed bourgeois life... [and
who] seemed to have been picked because he made such a complete contrast with the old-guard hardliner
Zorin."2°
The Cold War Post-Cuba
At the end of both the Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crises, the pattern of the Cold War had changed. The
developing strategic superiority of the United States of America relative to the Soviet Union was by now
becoming apparent, yet the dangers of the Crisis seem to force both the Superpowers to reappraise their
positions. Over the next year there were significant moves made by both the United States and the Soviet
Union to reach a disarmament agreement. The Cold War had not ended with the termination of the Cuban
Missile Crisis or with the détente of the aftermath. Instead one may say that it had undergone a
metamorphosis from a period of direct Superpower confrontation into an era in which the Superpowers
fought for ideological territories through the manipulation of intra-state conflicts. The Soviets who were
now wary - if not outrightly fearful - of the superiority of the United States now engaged in foreign policy
'opportunism'. A policy which might best be characterised as a process whereby Moscow would become
involved in situations that presented themselves as being ripe for such involvement. Rather than
deliberately create such situations by which to confront the United States or become involved in a state
the Soviet Union now waited for events in the international system to present them with opportunities to
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embarrass the West at minimal cost to themselves. A firm set of boundaries had been created to demarcate
not only the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union but also the means by which they could achieve any
such extension. Although it must be noted that this demarcation did not see any attempt made by the
United States to encroach on the Soviet sphere, the end effect was a development of a strategic balance
of power between the Superpowers which seemed to favour the West. As one commentator has noted of
this period,
'The cumulative result of the failure of Kruschev' s [sic] Berlin and Cuban initiatives was that the
Soviet Union did not again risk posing a direct challenge to the United States, except during a
brief flare-up at the end of the 1973 Middle East War...Instead, Soviet military pressure veered
off in the direction of supporting so-called wars of national liberation."2'
Despite much of the good work done in the period alter Cuba, it must be remembered that the personalities
of the protagonists had been considered to be a major factor both in resolving the Crisis and working on
the improvement of relations between the two Superpowers. It was therefore unsurprising that the world
was shocked by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas in late-November 1963. Almost
immediately Lyndon B. Johnson, the Vice-President, was sworn into office. A wholly different character
from Kennedy, George Ball, a senior US official in the State Department, noted in his memoirs that,
'Rapport with Lyndon Johnson did not come so easily [as compared to Kennedy]. He was a breed
I had only known from literature, legend, or at a distance.. .1 assumed I would never understand
Johnson as I had John Kennedy, for he was, as I saw it, a man from a different culture. Lacking
the tone and manners one expected of a President - with a breezy Texan tendency to oversimplify
and overstate, overpraise and overbiame - he would not, I thought, be easy to work with. That I
would never fully comprehend him was correct, since he was far more complex than Kennedy
and, as I came to perceive him, capable of strengths he did not visibly display and weaknesses he
could not effectively	 122
Yet this man was now faced with the task of proceeding with the work that his predecessor had so ably
managed, and to this extent the new President consciously maintained a sense of continuity between his
and the previous administration.' 23 Although there were a number of continuing international issues that
the United States had on its agenda, there were to be many more challenges. Less than a month after taking
office, an outbreak of intercommunal violence on the island of Cyprus proved to be the first new
international crisis of the Johnson presidency. Indeed, the Cyprus situation would eventually involve a
number of actors in the international system.
Summary of Chapter I
The United Nations was founded on the basis of the cooperation that had formed between the Allied
Powers during the Second World War in order to defeat the Axis Powers. However, the goodwill that had
been shown by the parties towards one another in adversity proved to be less than secure in a time of
peace. One of the first casualties was the newly formed United Nations Organisation (UN). At the United
Nations, the differences began to show at an early stage, and although the Organisation was able to form
two important peace observation missions, the situation was such that much of the Organisation's other
work in the field of peace and security was being marred by the pervasive 'cold' war. Indeed, in Europe
the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States led to the formation of an East-West divide in
the continent, and the creation of a security alliance, NATO, to protect vulnerable western European states
against threats from the Soviet Union and its satellite states.
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The death of Stalin in 1953, and the accession of Nikita Khrushchev presented a new period in
East-West relations. The 1955 Geneva Summit meeting was a significant move towards détente. However,
the Soviet Union was by now reappraising their international strategy. The Bandung Conference had, in
many ways, led to the formation of a new form of thinking within the international system; a third way
being shaped by the African and Asian states that sought to increase the pressure on the United States and
Soviet Union over the issues of decolonisation and development. Although not strictly aligned with the
Soviets, this movement seemed to show marked tendencies towards the Soviet position on a number of
issues, and thus went some way towards redressing the uneven East-West balance that had existed in the
United Nations throughout the previous decade.
With these key developments having occurred on the international stage in 1955, the UN was now
faced with its biggest challenge of all: the creation of the first United Nations peace-keeping force. Suez
marked a considerable turning point for both the Organisation and the wider international system. At the
same time as the UN took charge of the ambitious project of overseeing the peace between Egypt and
Israel, Britain and France effectively lost their positions of great power players. The US and the USSR,
by acting together though not in collusion, came out of the crisis as the unrivalled Superpowers of the
international system.
When contrasted to the success of UNEF, the Congo operation raised a number of important
questions about the scope of future peace-keeping. The way in which the operation of ONUC had been
handled by the UN, and in particular by Hammarskjöld, and the sheer financial cost of the operation had
made it unpopular with both the Soviet Union and France. Indeed, the friction between the Secretary-
General and the Soviet Union had proved to be a source of a concern since the 1 950s. The fact that Trygve
Lie had felt compelled to resign, and that Khrushchev had taken the step of openly criticising
Hammarskjöld by proposing the creation of a 'troika' were both testaments to this. For Thant, the role of
Secretary-General would be as much an operation of overseeing an improvement in relations between the
position of the Secretaryship-General vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as it would be the more traditional task
of ensuring the overall smooth running of the Organization as a whole.
But perhaps the most significant event in terms of the overall Cold War, and, specifically, for the
future of the direct relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was the Cuban Missile
Crisis. This event effectively signalled the end of face-to-face period of confrontation between the two
Superpowers. With the process of decolonization proceeding apace, and the containment of Europe now
secure, the Soviet Union turned its attentions, more than ever before, to the opportunities presented by
conflicts in Asia and Africa - and, as it would come to pass, Cyprus.
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The Problem of Cyprus
'...the breakdown ofpeace in Cyprus cannot be an isolated event. Turkey and Greece are inevitably involved, and
with them the whole delicate strategic balance of the eastern Mediterranean and the southeast flank of NA TO.
Cyprus is wired like a detonator to other larger problems.'
Sir Brian Urquhart'
Introduction
Whereas the Cold War was affecting the general trend of international politics in the post-Second World
War period, there were a number of other historical factors that influenced the course of regional politics
on what might be called the 'micro-international' level. In terms of the Cyprus issue the main driving
force was the relationship between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the conflict
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots it is important to place the issue within the sphere of the wider
Greco-Turkish relationship as well as reflect on the importance of the United Kingdom's input into the
situation in the century preceding the events of 1963. This chapter is an attempt to relate this history and
to highlight the role of a number of key institutions and actors within the development of the relationship.
The development of the Byzantine Empire and its early contacts with the Ottoman Turks which
eventually led to the fall of Byzantium in 1453 is a theme that is still a strong and emotive influence on
the Greek nation. There can be little doubt that the three hundred years of Ottoman domination certainly
had an enormous impact on the cultural, political and social development of modern Greece. Likewise,
the attitudes that Turkey - as the former imperial ruler - has had towards Greece were significantly altered
in the early 1920's when Greece launched an attack on a weakened, post-First World War Turkey.
However, both Greece and Turkey were fortunate to have been blessed with two of their strongest
characters at the most opportune of moments. In 1930, Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece and Kemal
Atatürk, President of Turkey, signed a friendship pact. This paved the way for a quarter of a century of
peace and reconciliation between the two nations. A peace that was ended in 1954 when the issue of a
small island, Cyprus, became a matter of national concern for the Turks in the face of a Greek attempt
to have the matter discussed at the United Nations.
In many respects the history of Cyprus can be seen as running parallel to the wider events taking
place between Greece and Turkey. Throughout the narrative it is important to remember the role of the
Orthodox Church in the development of the island. In the Byzantine period it was the granting of
autocephalous status to the church that gave an identity to the Christian Orthodox religious leaders. It was
this identity that persisted through the persecution of the church under the Catholic Franks. It was also
this identity that kept the Greek Cypriots together under the harsher periods of Ottoman rule. However,
it was ultimately this identity that prevented the Greek and Turkish Cypriots from ever integrating and
forming a Cypriot national consciousness under British rule, and, more importantly, it was this identity
that launched the movement for the union - enosis - of Cyprus with Greece, and hence made the matter
of Cypriot self-determination an issue of conflict between Greece and Turkey.
The penultimate major stage in the development of Cyprus came during the period from 1954-
1960 when the Greek Cypriots engaged in a guerilla campaign in an attempt to force the withdrawal of
Britain as a colonial power. It was at this time that the national interests of Greece and the Greek Cypriots
diverged from those of the United Kingdom, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, and in doing so posed a
serious threat to the unity of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. In an attempt to prevent an irreparable
breakdown in the relations between these countries, a peace plan was initiated that resulted in the ZUrich-
London agreements that saw Cyprus become independent with the formulation of a power sharing
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agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Britain retained a number of military sites, and with
Greece and Turkey had a constitutional position as a guarantor of Cypriot sovereignty.
This arrangement brings us to the last phase of the genesis of the modem Cyprus 'problem'
which may be considered as being the events post-independence. The constitutional arrangements soon
proved to be a cause for hostility from the wider Greek Cypriot community who resented both the fact
that Cyprus had been denied enosis, and that in such a denial the Greek Cypriots had been forced not
only to give a share of power to the Turkish Cypriots beyond their numerical strength on the island, but
in doing so had, in effect, given Turkey a right of a say in the affairs of the island. It was therefore not
very surprising that certain elements of the Greek Cypriot community saw the only option as being an
armed struggle to push the Turkish Cypriot out of the constitutional arrangements. At the same time the
President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, formulated a plan to alter the constitution in an attempt to
make it more amenable to Greek Cypriot wishes. The rejection of this plan, and the resulting rise in
tensions between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island soon led to fighting.
1. The Greco-Turkish Conflict
The roots of the animosity between Greek and Turk can be traced back almost a thousand years. 2 In 1071
the troops of the Byzantine Empire led by their Emperor, Romanus IV, marched onto the field of
Manzikert, north of Lake Van in eastern Turkey, and confronted the Seljuk Turks for the first time. By
the end of the day Byzantium had been defeated, their emperor captured, and the Turks had won for
themselves a place on the Anatolian peninsula. Yet the history of the Greeks in the region had extended
back to the dawn of recorded history. A nomadic people, the early Greeks had descended into Greece
several thousand years earlier. A strong civilization, aided by figures such as Alexander the Great, had
extended this civilisation as far east as Persia, as well as around much of the Mediterranean basin.
Indeed, at the time of Christ much of the Jewish aristocracy was Hellenised, and it was from among the
Hellenised Jews that Paul of Tarsus came with the view of extending the message of Jesus beyond the
Jews. A mission that would eventually end with his journey to Rome.
The eventual success of Christianity within the Roman Empire took time, but within three
hundred years it had taken root even among the higher echelons of Roman society. However, by this
point the Empire was facing a number of threats on its northem borders and in 293 AD the Emperor
Diocletian split the Empire in an attempt to prevent the marauding Germanic tribes from destroying it
in its entirety. His son and successor, Constantine, the first emperor to be a Christian reunified the two
halves, and in doing so founded a city on the western shore of the channel connecting the Black Sea with
the Mediterranean. The city, eponymously named, was Constantinople. Built on the site of an older city,
Byzantium, the area was particularly Hellenic in culture. Thus the nominal official language of Latin was
soon replaced by the common vernacular - Greek.
As the Western Empire came under greater threat, so the Eastern Empire grew in strength. Long
after the fall of Rome, Constantinople continued to thrive and was proving particularly resilient in the
face of external threat. However, the growth of Islam and the formation of the Abbasid Caliphate in
Baghdad had also seen the institutionalisation of the slave army by the Arabs, the main body of which
was drawn from the horsemen of the Russian Steppes - the ancestors of the modern day inhabitants of
the Central Asian Republics better known to us as Turks. It was these Turkic horsemen who eventually
overthrew the Arab rulers of the Abbasid Caliphate. In 1068, Alp Arslan, a leader of the Seljuk Turks,
began his progress north-west. This movement soon brought them into contact with Byzantium, and from
that day on the field of Manzikert the Greeks and Turks have led a symbiotic existence.
However, the Seijuks Turks did not become the Turkic rulers of the region. The Mongol advance
into Europe in the middle of the thirteenth century severely weakened their presence in Anatolia, and they
were soon uprooted by another band of Turkic tribesmen, the Ottomans. These Turks, originally
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numbering in their hundreds, soon settled in cohabitation with the remaining Seijuks, but within fifty
years had broken out from the Anatolian peninsula to attack the Byzantine Empire which, after over two
hundred years of fighting Islam during the crusades had been irretrievably weakened. The new threat
from the Ottoman Turks simply proved to be too much to defend against. On Tuesday 29 May 1453 the
mammoth walls of Constantinople were breached by the Ottomans under their Sultan Mehmet II (The
Conqueror) and, in a frenzy of looting and destruction, Byzantium, the thousand year old Greek
Orthodox successor of the Roman Empire in the east, was brought to an end.
This final end of Byzantium had been preceded by the capture of Serbia in 1439, and
immediately following the capture of Constantinople the Ottomans took Albania. From there they
advanced into the Peloponnese, Hungary, and, in 1529, marched to the walls of Vienna. Although they
never captured the city it represented the farthest extent of the Ottoman Empire, and represented a direct
threat to Catholic Europe. However, the Ottomans were eventually to be the victims of their own success.
In order to advance as they had done it was necessary to have a superior military structure, but in forming
this structure the Empire had neglected many other social institutions. In effect the pursuit of territorial
expansion rendered the maintenance of internal coherence almost impossible and the Empire began to
breakdown. In this process of collapse the Empire was faced with both the threat of Russia, 3 and the rise
of nationalism.
In 1820 the Greeks rose up against the Ottomans. 4 With a nationalist consciousness developed
in the coffee houses of Europe, the independence movement drew together the key elements of Greek
society. The Phanariotes, the Greek civil servant class of the Ottoman Empire joined with the Klephtes,
thieving black marketeers, and were spiritually led by the Orthodox Church. The aim was self-
determination, and the method was open armed rebellion. In this the Greeks were aided by the support
of the Great Powers of Britain, France and Russia. On 20 October 1827, in an attempt to secure vital
Greek naval communication routes in the Peloponnese, the forces of these states engaged the combined
naval forces of the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II, and Mehmet Au, the Pasha of Egypt, at the Battle of
Navarino Bay. The victory of the Great Powers proved significant for the Greeks insofar as it determined
the success of their movement. The vanquished Ottomans were thus forced to accept, through agreements
signed in London the following year, the idea of an independent Greece.
This weakening of the empire, coupled by other losses made the Ottomans ever more prone to
predatory attacks from Russia. Such were British fears of Russian territorial expansion and possible
control of the Mediterranean that Great Britain became involved in the Crimea from 1854-56 in an
attempt to prevent precisely this outcome. In another war, in 1877, the Ottomans lost a number of eastern
provinces. Thus on 4 June 1878, in a desperate bid to prevent further Russian expansion, the Ottomans
again recruited Great Britain. The cost of such an alliance was the ceding of a small island, inhabited
mainly by Greeks, to British imperial governance. That island was Cyprus.
Although now protected by a treaty with London, the Ottoman Empire continued its political
decline. The Greeks, steadily expanding the territory of their state, had by this time articulated the
political concept of the Megali Idea which envisaged constituting the country of Greece within the
borders of the Byzantine Empire - thus uniting all Greek speakers. This thinking in part formed the
underlying cause of the first Balkan War which broke out in 1912 when the Ottoman Empire faced a
sudden attack by Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia on its remaining European territories. In a war lasting less
than a month the Greeks managed to capture Salonika, and the Bulgarians were able to force a passage
through to the Mediterranean. By the end of hostilities the army of the Empire had been routed and apart
from a minuscule area of Thrace little remained of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. However territorial
arguments amongst the tripartite alliance soon led Bulgaria to launch an offensive against its two former
allies. This sparked the Second Balkan War and the Ottomans, in a temporary reversal of fortune, were
able to retake the captured city of Adrianople (Edime) and in doing so secure a position in Thrace, and
therefore maintain a European foothold.
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Even in spite of notable military successes such as Gallipoli, the outbreak of the First World War
two years later effectively destroyed the Ottoman Empire. Weakened by the loss of its Balkan
possessions, the Ottomans were by now but a shadow of their former selves. However, the spread of war
in Europe coupled with an alliance concluded with Germany posed an opportunity for the Empire to
regain some of its former strength. Great Britain, seeking to counter the Ottoman threat, invited Greece
to enter the war against Bulgaria in return for territorial concession in Asia Minor and the ceding of
Cyprus to Greece. The plan, although accepted by the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, was
rejected by the Greek King, Constantine of the Hellenes. (This rejection on the part of the King was on
the basis of his pro-German sympathies derived from the fact that his sister was married to the Kaiser.)
However, when the King was forced to abdicate on 22 June 1917, Greece duly joined the war on the side
of the Entente Powers.
In the east, the Anatolian peninsula had been fairly safe due to the neutralisation of the Russian
threat following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. However, at the end of the War, the Ottomans soon
found themselves subject to the mercy of the Entente Great Powers. Great Britain, Italy and France soon
moved in to carve up the remnants of the Ottoman Empire of the Near East. This was to be done in
accordance with the pians laid out in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. On the Anatolian peninsula, the
heartland of the Ottoman Empire, the French and Italians quickly got to work planning their territorial
divisions. Britain, abstaining from this on the basis of having gained control of the Ottoman Near East
possessions, preferred to act as power broker and simply watched over the situation until a plan could
be finalised. Yet in the confusion of the implementation of the Franco-Italian plans Greece became
embroiled. On 15 May 1919 twenty thousand troops of the Greek Army landed in the port city of Smyrna
(Izmir).
The Modern History
The thought of a Greek invasion proved too much to bear for the Turks. (The demise of the Ottoman
Empire by now meant that almost all the Sultan's remaining subjects were Turkish as opposed to Arab,
Serbian, etc.). As Kinross put it,
'Constantinople was dismayed at the news. But it was a dismay stiffened by deep indignation,
which gave sudden reality to the Nationalist movement. Occupation by the Great Powers could
be accepted as an inevitable evil; but occupation by the Greeks, insolent and disloyal subjects
for a century past, was an affront which no patriotic Turk could endure.'5
It was from this state of turmoil that a young Turkish general and hero of the First World War stepped
in and not only repulsed the Greek military threat, but also realised the dream of a Turkish state. His
name was Mustafa Kemal, better known as Atatürk.6
Starting from a small power base centred around the town of Ankara, in the central plain of the
Anatolian peninsula, Atatürk was able to push outwards inflicting several major defeats on the Greeks.
At the same time he mobilised support for his ambition to abolish the Sultanate and form a Turkish
Republic centred on the geography of Anatolia. In the ensuing months the war ebbed-and-flowed as the
Greeks managed to make significant advances. Britain, remaining true to its original desires, took an
impartial approach in the conflict. Indeed on two occasions British forces acted in a manner that might
be considered as being 'proto-peacekeeping' in nature. In the first instance they attempted to prevent
Turkish advances from progressing beyond Chanak - a move that could have had serious consequences
as the Turks would have undoubtedly targeted Greece and thus provoked further war in Europe. 7 On the
second occasion, the British forces attempted to prevent the slaughter by the Turkish army of the Greeks
living in Smyrna (Izmir).8
By 1923, the Turkish military campaign against the Greeks had been completed. After notable
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Turkish successes led by Ismet Paa, a close friend of Atattirk, around the town of Inönii,' a final battle,
the Battle of Dumlupinar, inflicted massive casualties on the by now demoralised Greek Army. 9 This
defeat, and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 marked the end of a physical Greek
presence in Asia Minor that had stretched back at least two millennia. Despite the dreams of the Megali
Idea, the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, soon showed himself as being a realist about the existence
of a Turkish homeland - notwithstanding the fact that Greece was unable, militarily, to challenge the
Turks. With this in mind, Venizelos and AtatUrk formally concluded, in 1930, the Treaty of Friendship
between the two countries. The treaty in effect marked the first time that the two peoples had voluntarily
chosen to live in proximity to one another with a spirit of cooperation, rather than conflict, as the guiding
force behind their relationship.
Despite accusations made by certain Greeks against Turkey over its lack of assistance to Greece
during the Second World War, the general spirit of cooperation remained.' 0 At the cessation of hostilities
in 1945 the post-War scramble for territory, ideological if not physical, by the Soviet Union and the West
did not overlook Greece and Turkey. With Greece engaged in a civil war against the communists," and
Turkey being a neighbour of the Soviet Union, both seemed prime candidates for Soviet expansion. In
an attempt to prevent this the United Kingdom, with support from the United States, undertook
responsibility for economic and military aid to the two countries. However by late-1946 it had become
all too clear that Britain was unable to continue in this role. After an approach made by the British
Government to the United States,' 2 President Truman quickly made clear his intention, '...to take over
Britain's historic role of blocking a Russian advance towards the Mediterranean." 3 This therefore laid
down the roots for the wider policy of containment that became known as the Truman Doctrine, a policy
that was cemented the following year when both were included in the announcement made by the US
Secretary of State, George Marshall, to finance the post-War redevelopment of Europe.' 4 From this point
onwards the United States had marked them as being firmly within the Western camp.
In 1952 the special position of both Greece and Turkey was formally recognised by the West
when they became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). For Greece and Turkey
this step meant that they were both now recipients of a commitment from the other NATO members to
treat any attack made upon them as an attack on all NATO members. For NATO, the accession of
Turkey, in particular, was particularly vital as it now afforded NATO a non-Arctic route into the Soviet
Union.' 5 This position, coupled with Turkey's geographical contiguous position with the Near East and
Iran marked Turkey out for special attention. This position was again strengthened by the 1954 signing
of the Balkan pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, just a few months later, the
quarter century of entente between Greece and Turkey was brought to a close as the issue of the small
island of Cyprus inflamed nationalist passions in the region.
The importance of these victories were later recognised when Atatürk instituted a policy of




2. A History of Cyprus
The island of Cyprus lies at the far eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. Its total land area is 3,572
square miles, thus making it the third largest island in the Mediterranean. Elongated in shape, the island
is one hundred and fifty miles long and sixty miles wide. Just forty miles from its northern coast, Turkey
is the island's nearest neighbour. Syria lies seventy-five miles to the east, Egypt two hundred and fifty
miles south, and Rhodes, two hundred and seventy miles west. Mainland Greece lies over five hundred
miles west of the island.
At first the island was inhabited by an indigenous population - the Etho-Cypriots.' 6 Around three
and a half thousand years ago the first Greek colonists came to the island where they settled in
cohabitation with the original islanders.' 7 As the region developed Cyprus was conquered by the
Assyrians, the Persians, the Ptolemies, and, in 58 BC, by the Romans. In fact, it was during Roman rule
that the island became the first territory in the world to be ruled by a Christian when in 45 AD the Roman
Proconsul, Sergius Paulus, was converted by St.Paul and the Cypriot And when the
Roman Empire was divided, Cyprus was incorporated into the eastern half, where it soon came to play
a part within the intricacies of Byzantine politics. An attempt by the Patriarch of Antioch to claim
authority over the Church in Cyprus was thwarted when - miraculously - the tomb of St.Barnabus was
discovered on the island containing an original copy of the Gospel of St.Mark. The Antioch claim was
therefore rejected, and a synod convened by the Emperor Zeno, in 489, ruled in favour of giving self-
governing (autocephalous) status to the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Furthermore the Emperor, 'gave to
its archbishop in perpetuity the extraordinary privilege of carrying a sceptre instead of a pastoral staff and
of signing his name in purple ink, as only the Emperor might do."9
Despite these concessions to the Cypriot Orthodox Church, the island nonetheless remained an
administrative province of the Byzantine Empire for another seven hundred years. This period came to
an end in 1191 when the English King Richard I, on his way to the Holy Land as part of the Third
Crusade, landed in Cyprus to rescue his bride-to-be, Berengaria of Navarre, who had been kidnapped by
Isaac Comnenus the last Byzantine ruler of Cyprus. Richard, not content with the success of this
endeavour, proceeded to capture the whole island. After the conquest he promptly sold the island to the
Knights Templar for a forty thousand bezant down payment and continued on with his journey. The
Knights, unable to control the unruly inhabitants quickly asked for their money back, and Richard
grudgingly agreed. However, all was not lost as Guy de Lusignan, the nominal King of Jerusalem quickly
came forward as a new buyer. Guy took the title of Lord of Cyprus and so began three hundred years of
Frankish rule in Cyprus.
As has been stated, the history of the Lusignan rule was 'essentially the history of the Royal
Court in Cyprus and not a history of the people of Cyprus.' 20 Given that the island was run under
traditional feudal principles with the nobles all being drawn from prominent crusaders this appears to be
a fair comment to make. Life was indeed pretty wretched for the greater, Greek, proportion of the
population. However, for this narrative, the chief effect of the Lusignan rule was the change in the
position of the Orthodox Church. In 1220, Guy's brother Amaury, the first King of Cyprus, replaced the
Orthodox Archbishop and bishops with their Catholic counterparts. This was followed, on 3 July 1260
with the Bulla Cypria, a papal bull issued by Alexander IV, that officially subordinated the Orthodox
Church to that of the Catholic. From this point on the autocephalous church gradually weakened. By the
time the Lusignan dynasty was replaced by Venetian rule on 26 February 1 489,2I the Cypriot Orthodox
Church, although still surviving, was in a fragile state. During the next eighty years of mercantilist
Venetian rule the Church's fortunes, like that of the people, sunk even lower.
At the heart of the entire Venetian reason for holding Cyprus was the need to maintain a vital
strategic military post in the eastern Mediterranean in order to prevent Ottoman and Egyptian attacks on
their merchant fleet. Yet despite such intentions, the Ottomans proved to be too strong in their desire to
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take the island. Tn 1570, the Ottoman Sultan, Selim II, made a demand to the Venetians that they leave
Cyprus. The Venetians, somewhat unsurprisingly rejected this demand, and Selim ordered one of his
senior generals, Lala Mustafa Paa to take the island by force. The ill-treatment of the Cypriot Church
by the Venetians coupled with the knowledge of Ottoman tolerance towards Orthodoxy did not make the
Church an active partner to Venetian attempts to resist the invasion,22 an invasion that was eventually
marked by extreme cruelty by the Ottomans against the Venetian defenders of Famagusta when the city
eventually fell in August 1572.23
The Ottoman Period
Within the year, the Orthodox Church was re-established as the sole Christian denomination in Cyprus.
This was undoubtedly as a result of the considerable dealing the Ottomans had with the Patriarchate of
Constantinople since the fall of the city just over a hundred years before. However, with the benefits to
the Church that came with Ottoman rule, there was the arrival of a large number of settlers who had been
part of the original invasion force. Numbered at around fifty thousand they were mainly Turkish in
origin. 24 It was these settlers who formed the basis of the Turkish Cypriot population.
Despite the initial positive feelings that the Greek Cypriots may have had towards the Ottomans
as a liberation force, the impression of the Turks as barbarians soon came to the fore. This was
attributable in part to the events of 1571, but also became apparent as the Ottoman Empire weakened and
the worst excesses of local Ottoman rule became apparent. The revolutionary events taking place in
Greece in the 1820's proved to be a catalyst for a limited uprising by the Greek Cypriots against their
masters. Although approached directly as a potential participant in the independence movement as early
as 1818 the Greek Cypriot Archbishop recognised the precarious position that Cyprus was in. Rather than
support the revolution in any outward manner, the Archbishop instead offered moral and financial
assistance. However, in 1821 a number of documents inciting the Greek Cypriots to rebel fell into the
hands of the Ottoman Governor of the island. As a means of both retribution and deterrence he ordered
the execution of a large number of leading Greek Cypriot figures including the Archbishop. This action
only hardened the position of the Church and in fact led to its wholesale politicisation. This factor would
play a significant role in the future of the island, even after Cyprus was ceded to Britain on 4 June 1878
in an attempt by the Ottomans to prevent further Russian expansion.
British Rule
Even given the fact that there were specific geo-political reasons underlying Great Britain's move to take
control of the island it was undoubtedly the case that for the Greek Cypriots the arrival of the British was
heralded with an air of hope. Many saw Great Britain as a power that might have been sympathetic to
the aspiration of enosis. For the British Government, which had obtained the island as a place d'ar,nes
in order to protect its interest in the Suez Canal and the Near East as well as to prevent a Russian push
towards the Mediterranean, any idea that Cyprus might be relinquished in favour of some Greek
nationalist ideal was out of the question. This remained the case even when the initially perceived value
of the island was reduced by the recognition that without a deep water harbour the island could not be
used as a naval base and that the 1882 creation of a garrison in Egypt rendered the island inconsequential.
Furthermore, open opposition was expressed by the Turkish Cypriot community to any form of move
towards enosis as they soon made it clear that should Great Britain choose to leave then the island should
immediately be returned to the Sultan.
Yet the change in governorship, although not predisposed to Greek Cypriot ideas of union with
Greece, soon elevated the position of the Greeks within the administrative structures of the island. With
the departure of the Ottomans, the Turkish Cypriots quickly lost their privileged status. This was
compounded by the fact that, '[alt the beginning of British colonial rule, the Turkish Cypriots lacked both
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a social structure and a significant political influence. They became an unimportant minority in a society
controlled by the Greek Cypriots.' 25 This was compounded somewhat in 1881 when the British
authorities instituted a legislative council to act in an advisory capacity. It was constituted in such a way
as to give the Greek Cypriots nine representatives and the Turkish Cypriots six. However, within the civil
service structures, the Turkish Cypriots still retained a modicum of power. Indeed, it could be argued that
for all that they lost in political status the Turkish Cypriots were nonetheless 'treated favourably
concerning new posts in the administration.' 26 Such over representation was, in turn, interpreted by the
Greek Cypriots as the first manifestation of a British divide and rule - divide et impera - policy in Cyprus.
Therefore, even at this early stage in the British rule, it was becoming apparent that a divide was
beginning to open between the two largest communities on the island.
The outbreak of the First World War, and the siding of the Ottomans with Germany led to the
British annexation of Cyprus. A failed attempt to lure the Greeks into the war with an offer of the island
meant that the United Kingdom still retained the island as the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The fact that
Atatürk set the territory of modem Turkey as the Anatolian peninsula meant that Cyprus ceased, with the
signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, to be a political issue between the United Kingdom and Turkey, and
instead became solely an issue between Britain and Greece. On 10 March 1925 Britain formally declared
Cyprus a Crown Colony.
With the changed relationship between Turkey and Cyprus, the calls for enosis grew louder.
Following the island's change of status in 1925 the composition of the Legislative Council was changed
to increase the Greek Cypriot representation to twelve. This proved insufficient to meet the demands of
the Greek Cypriot community and in October 1931 there was a mass uprising in favour of enosis. In
response to what became a violent incident the British colonial authorities adopted a number of 'steps
to prevent a repetition of similar incidents', 27 among these provisions,
'the display of the Greek flag was forbidden. All political parties were banned. Ten important
communal leaders, including the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia, were deported from the island
for life. Two thousand Cypriots were jailed. A huge collective fine was imposed to pay for
damage done by rioters, which included the burning of Government House. The press was
censored even more severely that before. In fact, all the dreary arsenal of colonial rule was
deployed.'28
Insofar as open agitation for enosis was held in abeyance until 1955, these measures certainly had the
desired effect. Nonetheless, union with Greece remained an openly talked about aspiration among the
Greek Cypriots. On 15 January 1950, a plebiscite was conducted by the Ethnarchy council that showed
a 96% support rate among Greek Cypriots who participated in the vote in favour of enosis. 29 These
figures were widely trumpeted by the Greek Cypriots as showing almost complete support amongst the
community in favour of the union. However there was considerable open opposition to this plan
expressed by the Turkish Cypriots. In a move supported by the United Kingdom, the Turkish Cypriot
community presented a document to the United Nations that clearly stated their opposition to any form
of union between Cyprus and Greece.3°
The Greek Cypriot cause for enosis was given an important boost when thirty-five year old
Michael Mouskos, was elected in absentia3 ' Bishop of Kition, young by any standards for such high
office. 32 And just two years later, on 18 October, Mouskos was elected, unopposed, Archbishop of the
Autocephalous Church of Cyprus, and in doing so took the title Makarios III. His appointment coupled
with the development of a Greek political consciousness of the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots gave
a new impetus to the question of Cypriot self-determination. On a visit to London late in 1953 the Greek
Prime Minister, Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, met with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony
Eden, and broached the subject. The British response was an outright refusal to even consider discussing
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the issue. An outraged Papagos returned to Greece where continued Greek Cypriot pressure eventually
led, on 3 May 1954, to a public commitment by the Greek Prime Minister to take the matter to the United
Nations. So began the difficult and violent process that would eventually lead to Cypriot independence.
3. Towards the Republic of Cyprus
Despite vehement British opposition to such a course of action, Greece attempted to take the matter to
the General Assembly of the United Nations. Using its full diplomatic weight in a General Assembly still
western orientated, the United Kingdom was able to argue that the matter was an internal problem and
therefore not subject to scrutiny by the Organisation. Under a motion put forward by New Zealand on
17 December 1954, the Assembly decided to postpone discussion of the right of self determination by
the people of Cyprus. This ensured, much to the fury of both the Greek Cypriots and the Greek
Government, that the matter was not even put on the agenda.33
The failure of the Greek attempt to have the matter discussed at the UN impressed upon the
Greek Cypriots, and indeed Papagos, 34 the need to assess alternative methods by which they might
achieve their stated aims. In early 1951 Makarios had met for the first time a retired officer of the Greek
Army, Colonel George Grivas - a Cypriot by birth. As the events progressed, Grivas became more and
more involved in the planning for an armed uprising against colonial rule and under his guidance
equipment was shipped to Cyprus in preparation. Rumours of such activity were largely ignored by the
British authorities, until, in January 1955, Ayios Georgios a small Greek caique was stopped and boarded
by HMS Comet off the coast of Cyprus. Onboard was discovered a considerable quantity of arms. The
seriousness with which the United Kingdom now viewed the threat had come too late to have prevented
a substantial build-up of weaponry on the island. On 1 April 1955, peace on the island came to an end
with a series of explosions at a number of key administrative buildings around the island. The EOKA
uprising had begun.
As an organisation EOKA" was able to unite many disparate factions of the Greek Cypriot
community. 35 But it was unable to reconcile its differences with the Greek Cypriot Communist Party -
AKEL - whose members believed that non-violent political action was the correct path to follow, rather
than the armed struggle favoured by the right-wing. 36 This led to a paradox 'which made Cyprus unique
in fighting an anti-colonial struggle in part against the Communist party.' 37 Despite the stated intention
of enosis, EOKA at first attempted to take a conciliatory line with the Turkish Cypriots. In July of that
year it issued a pamphlet, in Turkish, explaining its position and clarifying that the struggle was aimed
at the British and not the Turkish Cypriot community. 38 Nonetheless, the Turkish Cypriot community
rejected any association with EOKA, preferring to remain under British rule. In fact, the community
actively sided with the colonial authorities. Although always having been a feature of the Cypriot police,
the Turkish Cypriots were making up for the absence of a large number of Greek Cypriots that had left
the ranks following the start of the EOKA campaign.39 Furthermore elements of the Turkish Cypriot
community formed a counter movement called Vol/can (Volcano) that employed similar guerilla tactics
to EOKA but aimed its activities against the Greek Cypriots. 40 Later the organisation became even more
structured with support from Turkey4 ' and changed its name to the Turkish Resistance Movement, or
TMT. In later years Rauf R. Denkta the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and member of both
Vol/can and TMT,42 explained the reasons for the Turkish Cypriot opposition to EOKA,
'Turkish Cypriots were killed because we would not concede the union of Cyprus with Greece.
EOKA, the underground organisation, declared that anyone who opposed the union of Cyprus
with Greece was to be eliminated. We were opposed as a whole community, as a national
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.
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community, to Greece so we were marked enemies. EUKA declared that the fight with the
British would be long-drawn, or might be long-drawn, but they would win it and when they had
won it the fight with the Turkish Cypriots would be short and sharp.'43
By the summer of 1955, events had taken a considerable turn for the worse. Violence was engulfing the
island and in August of that year the United Kingdom called a tri-partite conference to be attended by
the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and his Turkish counterpart, Fatin Zorlu, in
order to discuss issues of eastern Mediterranean peace and security, and, more particularly, the issue of
self-government for Cyprus. This event marked a monumental turning point in the affairs of the island.
By calling in Greece and Turkey, the United Kingdom was announcing that the matter did indeed have
a wider aspect to it than just being an internal matter. As Eden explained in his memoirs written before
the conclusion to the matter of independence,
'In geography and in tactical considerations, the Turks have the stronger claim in Cyprus; in race
and language, the Greeks; in strategy, the British, so long as their industrial life depends on oil
supplies from the Persian Gulf. Progress in self-government could not be made until these claims
were reconciled, and one of two methods had to be chosen. Greeks and Turks could be
associated with the British in control of the island, or the island could be partitioned.'
To the Greek Cypriots the invitation to Greece appeared to be an acknowledgement of their pan-Hellenic
feelings over the issue. However, by inviting Turkey the Greek Cypriots accused the British Government
of enticing a Turkish interest in an island over which Turkey had relinquished all open political claim
to in 1923. Under these circumstances Makarios refused to attend, viewing it as a trap. 46 In view of his
absence, it came as little surprise that the conference soon broke down. With Greece working for self-
determination and Turkey demanding the retention of British colonial rule the conference was doomed
to failure on this basis alone.47 The violence escalated once more in Cyprus. Indeed, in what appeared
to be a Turkish retaliation to what they perceived to be overall Greek Cypriot political extremism in the
island, there were a number of anti-Greek riots staged in Istanbul and Izmir just prior to the end of the
conference.
The British response to this downturn in stability was to recall the civilian Governor, Sir Andrew
Wright, and in his place install the former Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Harding.
True to military form, Harding soon set to work radically altering the United Kingdom's approach to the
problem.48 In addition to increasing the number of troops in the island, harsh measures were introduced
including the imposition of the death penalty for a number of crimes, and the internment of suspected
EOKA members. Aware, nonetheless, of a need to deal with the more specific problem of the political
root cause of the violence, Harding entered into negotiations with the Archbishop.
Makarios however remained firm on his demand that the Greek Cypriots be granted the right of
self-determination, and therefore enosis. Yet the overriding strategic importance of Turkey in the region
in the eyes of the British Government necessarily meant that such a solution was ruled out. 49 The problem
was that Greece, the United States and the United Nations were unwilling to accept the validity of the
Turkish argument, and thus Makarios was able to retain his strength of position over the issue.so After
five months of negotiation with the Archbishop, no drop in the level of violence, and no evidence that
he was prepared to call for a cessation of hostilities over which he was regarded as having a considerable
say, the decision was taken by the British Government in early-March 1956 to deport the Archbishop to
the Seychelles.5'
Hoping that such an action would deprive the EOKA movement of a good deal of its momentum,
the action proved somewhat successful. However, the other aim of the move was to try to encourage a
new, more moderate leadership of the Greek Cypriot community which might in turn prove more
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amenable to British thinking. In this the deportation proved decisively unsuccessful. 52 In the meantime
the British Government enlisted the aid of the eminent jurist Lord Radcliffe in an attempt to draft a new
plan for self-government. With this new phase in progress, Harding went on an all-out offensive against
EOKA. In the most controversial of moves, he began authorising the execution of convicted EOKA
members.
By the autumn of 1956 the island was buzzing with British troops. The EOKA campaign had
been given a high profile in the United Kingdom, and there were around thirty thousand troops engaged
in island wide security. In addition the events concerning the Suez Canal two hundred miles south of
Cyprus had placed a massive emphasis on Cyprus's strategic role. With the importance played by the
British airbase in the events of early-November 1956 it was made even more apparent to the British just
how important the maintenance of a military foothold in the eastern Mediterranean really was. Indeed,
EOKA stepped up its attacks during November and in 416 attacks over forty people were killed many
of whom were British soldiers. 53 Despite the failure of the Suez Campaign, and the resulting importance
attached to the military facilities in to Cyprus, the situation now seemed to be changing with regard to
the United Kingdom's wider interests vis-à-vis Cyprus. As a senior Foreign Office official noted at the
time,
'On a long view, I think that the 'Turkish political' factor may become much more important that
HMG's need for a base in Cyprus. As Turkish friendship really is essential to retaining any
position in the Middle East, we can hardly throw it away just to be quit of our troubles with
Cyprus. And as Kirkpatrick [Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the
Foreign Office] always points out, the quickest way of killing NATO is to get out of Cyprus and
start a Greco-Turkish war.'54
Yet the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the uprising that would appeal to all parties remained as
distant as ever, especially so after Lord Radcliffe presented his ideas, in December 1956, which were
immediately rejected by the Greek Government.
The resignation of Eden in early 1957 and his replacement by the Foreign Secretary, Harold
Macmillan, heralded a new phase in the negotiation process. Many commentators have remarked on the
partitionist designs Macmillan held, 55 but at the same time Macmillan accepted the need for negotiation.
However the Turkish Cypriots, under the leadership of Fazil KucUk soon fell in-line with Ankara on this
plan to divide the island and taksim (partition) became the slogan of the Turkish Cypriots to match the
Greek Cypriot call for enosis. With no leader to replace Makarios emerging from the Greek Cypriot
Community, the decision was taken by the Prime Minister, in March 1957, to free the Archbishop from
his enforced place of exile from whence he went to Athens.
By the end of the year there had been no significant new developments to the whole question and
when Harding's two year tenure of the post of Governor of Cyprus came to an end a decision was made
to replace the Field Marshal with a civilian. On 3 December 1957, Sir Hugh Foot took over the post
vacated by Harding, and with his arrival came a new approach to internal security. Downplaying the
military attempts to beat EOKA, Foot chose to emphasise a desire on his part for constructive and open
dialogue. Another idea was formulated, working on the principle of self-government leading to self-
determination but this time it was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, on the advice of Ankara, as being a
firm step towards enosis.56
A few months later, on 9 June, 1958 the details of the Macmillan plan were announced that saw
the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey all take a direct role in the administration of the island for a
seven year period after which there would be a decision taken on the future. The idea envisaged a system
of cooperation to be worked out between Greece and Turkey which would strengthen their mutual ties
and thus alleviate the need to oppose one another over the future of the island. Needless to say, the plan
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was rejected. This time the Greek and Greek Cypriots came out firmly against it as they interpreted it as
being the first step towards partition of the island. Yet it was by now clear that enosis was not going to
be a viable way forward. In light of this realisation, the Archbishop made the monumental move in
September of that year to an acceptance of outright independence for Cyprus.
By this time the internal situation had deteriorated massively. The EOKA action had now been
running for over three years and the Turkish Cypriots had in that time mustered a considerable number
of men and arms within their own militia, TMT. Despite the British attempts to beat EOKA, there had
been no corresponding attempt to target the Turkish Cypriot group. However, with a serious prospect of
civil war breaking out between the two communities, the British colonial authorities took the decision,
on 22 July, to instigate a crackdown on any illegal organisation, whether it be EOKA, TMT, or any other
such militia.57
Impressed by such a serious turn of events in the island, the Greek and Turkish Governments
appeared to have taken a more concerned view of the situation. It was now becoming even more apparent
that the events in Cyprus were having a seriously deleterious effect on the wider Greco-Turkish
relationship and in doing so was posing a serious threat to the integrity of NATO's south-east European
flank. With this in mind NATO stepped up its efforts to avert such a crisis. In conjunction with this the
United Kingdom sought to introduce a bi-lateral negotiation regime in which Greece and Turkey would
settle the dispute of Cypriot independence between themselves. Thus a meeting was organised between
the Greek and Turkish Governments in Zurich commencing in January 1959. By 11 February an
agreement had been reached that saw a power sharing agreement set in place. On 17 February, the week
following Zurich, a conference was convened in London to be attended not only by Greece and Turkey,
but by the United Kingdom, and both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
With the details of the constitution in place the Greek and Turkish Cypriots went to the polls on
13 December 1959. Despite opposition from a surprising coalition of the right and left sponsoring an
eminent Greek Cypriot lawyer, John Clerides, Makarios was elected President with 66.28% of the Greek
Cypriot vote. For the Turkish Cypriot community, Dr. Fazil KucUk was elected unopposed as Vice-
President. With this matter complete the process of decolonisation moved into its final stage with the
result that, on the 16 August 1960, the Union flag came down for the last time and the Republic of
Cyprus came into being.
4. Independence and Constitutional Breakdown
With independence came the trappings of statehood. Within a yeas Cyprus had become a member of the
United Nations, the Council of Europe, and, following a vote in the House of Representatives, 58 the
Commonwealth of Nations. This seemed to herald a new phase in the relationship between the United
Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots. Makarios, on his arrival in London to attend the Commonwealth Heads
of Government Conference in March 1961 took the opportunity to clarify his view on the future state of
the Anglo-Cypriot relations. Speaking to reporters he stated,
'In spite of the differences and bitterness of the past, our relations with the United Kingdom are
now very good. We shall do our utmost, in a spirit of goodwill, further to strengthen our relations
with the U.K. as well as other participants in the Commonwealth...The past is forgotten.'9
However, and significantly, the Republic of Cyprus, despite the opposition of the Turkish Cypriots
(although not, it seems, of Turkey), 6° also became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed,
Makarios had attended the Bandung Conference in 1955 as an observer, 6 ' and had formed a good
relationship with Nasser, Tito and Nehru. 62 Upon independence, Makarios's first foreign trip as President
was not to Greece but to Egypt to see President Nasser, with whom he had formed 'a clear relationship'.63
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Despite his exile in the Seychelles, Makarios had vaguely known about the events of 1956 and it was
accepted that he had a good deal of respect for Nasser's stand against Britain and France.M Indeed, the
Archbishop had been appalled by the use of Cyprus as the base from which the operation was conducted
and the bombing runs launched.
In retrospect, it was hardly surprising that Makarios did not visit Greece. Greece did not
particularly want to have much more to do with Cyprus. Having come perilously close to ruining
completely the period of entente in the Greco-Turkish relationship, Cyprus had brought to an end a
quarter century of close cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, both Greece and Turkey
attempted to push Cyprus into the political background. As Woodhouse states,
'The interrupted progress of Greece towards a closer integration with the western world was thus
resumed. Even with Turkey there was a renewal of friendly exchanges. On the other hand, the
Cypriot nationalists were no longer treated as heroes. Gnvas cut a ludicrous figure in Greek
politics, and Makarios was received with marked coolness on his first visit to Athens as
President of Cyprus in 1962.'
In Cyprus, the situation remained nervous. There was still a significant proportion of the Greek Cypriot
community for whom enosis remained the national aspiration. The fact that the EOKA years had brought
about independence was as despised as the fact that this same independence had given the Turkish
Cypriots a say in the government of the island. The difficulties presented to Makarios by these factions
are well expressed by Markides who stated,
'One of the most difficult tasks that confronted Makarios from the beginning of independence
was controlling the various EOKA guerillas who participated in the anti-British campaign, a
problem characteristic of post revolutionary periods. As the heroes of the "revolution" and the
architects of the new political order, many of them pressed for special privileges in the form of
high government positions or jobs in the civil service commensurate with their rank in the
underground. Leading members of EOKA usually aspired to ministerial positions or their
equivalent. Dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of this segment of the population would
have spelled serious trouble for the government and obstructed the implementation of the fragile
agreements that launched Cypriot independence. The problem of appeasing EOKA members
was all the more urgent as the goal for which the guerillas fought was not independence but
union with Greece. Thus the legitimacy of they accorded to the new state was tentative at
most.'66
For the Turkish Cypriots the political outcome of the Zurich-London Agreements was considered to be
neither extremely good nor extremely bad.67 As Dodd has put it, 'for the Turkish Cypriots a huge gain
was that enosis was prohibited. But then so, too, was partition.' 68 Internally however things did certainly
appear to be outwardly bright for the Turkish Cypriots. They had been given a role in the government
that outweighed their numerical proportion in the population. As 18% of the island's populace they were
given 30% of all civil service posts, 40% of all military posts, and at the ministerial level they held three
of the ten appointments including one of the three key ministries, namely finance, foreign affairs, and
defence.
Therefore the resentment of a large portion of the Greek Cypriot community was not entirely
surprising. 69 Although the constitutional framework with its large number of rights granted to the Turkish
Cypriot community succeeded in bringing about a Turkish Cypriot acquiescence to majority Greek
Cypriot rule, these measures had included a number of details that gave the Turkish Cypriots
considerable autonomy, such as the introduction of two communal chambers that took responsibility for
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a large number of issues that were directly relevant to each community - matters such as religion and
education. More irritating for the Greek Cypriots was the additional elements of the constitution such as
the provision that the House of Representatives was forced to seek the agreement of the majority of both
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members before being able to pass legislation on matters fiscal,
electoral or municipal. Furthermore, all legislation was open to veto by either the President or the Vice-
President of the Republic. At the same time the constitution had given the Turkish Cypriots the right to
veto legislation and governmental action. Thus the Greek Cypriots did not have the decisiveness in the
affairs of the island at the unified governmental level that they felt was due to them by virtue of being
the overwhelming majority. Given this situation it was unremarkable that the Greek Cypriots soon
became resentful of the political bind in which they found themselves. Much of the resentment of certain
elements of the Greek Cypriots to this was directed to the planning of violence against the Turkish
Cypriots in an attempt to force them out of the political formula. Instrumental in these plans was the
Interior Minister, Polykarpos Yiorgadjis, a former senior figure of EOKA.7° Taking the codename
Akritas, he circulated a secret document - the Akritas Plan - that outlined the measures by which the
influence of the Turkish Cypriots would gradually be removed from the government.
As these measures were being planned serious political efforts were being made to find a means
by which the Greek Cypriot community could alter the constitution in order to reduce, or even eliminate,
the role of the Turkish Cypriots. Among the numerous difficulties presented by the Constitution, an
opportunity for alteration presented itself with a problem relating to municipal boundaries. Articles 173-
177 of the Constitution stated that, 'Provision is made for separate municipalities in the five main towns
Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos.' However, such provisions overlooked the
geographical realities underlying any attempt to implement such policies adequately. The Greek Cypriots
at first approached the Turkish Cypriots with a proposal to introduce unified municipalities with the
benefit of safeguards to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and the offer of certain financial
incentives. The Turkish Cypriots, holding firm to their conviction that before any such change could be
made the separate municipalities had to be instituted rejected such proposals. Makarios, stubbornly,7'
refused to do this and instead began to formulate a plan to change the Constitution as a whole.
The timing of any action to introduce such a plan posed the next problem. After more than a year
of negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots over the municipalities issue, Makarios finally
decided to approach the Greek Government with his ideas. The Greek Government in their turn advised
that Makarios approach the matter delicately. In a secret letter to Makarios in April 1963, the Greek
Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, stressed the geo-political dangers of a breakdown in
relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Referring to the plans he stated,
'This has the greatest importance for the Nation.
Firstly, in the terribly exposed - and for that reason dangerous - geographical area
occupied by Greece, she is not surrounded by many friends. Certainly the security of Greece is
not in any way served by the breaking off of her political relations with Turkey, the only
neighbour who is also an ally in NATO.'
Secondly, the Holy Ecumenical Throne, for which both we and all foreign churches feel
deep respect, and the valued and important Greek Community in Istanbul will face great and
serious dangers, which, as events have proved, are not fully averted by the existence of
satisfactory texts of international agreements or by any political measures.
Thirdly, other matters which arise as a result of the proximity of the two countries,
matters which in their totality assume vital importance for Greece, become unavoidably
difficult.'72
The position of the Karamanlis government was clear. 73 By this point, however, Makarios, despite Greek
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concerns, had made up his mind to push on with presentation of the constitutional amendments. An
opportunity came later that year when, on 17 July 1963, the eight year Greek Government of Constantine
Karamanlis fell following a constitutional dispute between the Prime Minister and the King. Due to a
number of difficulties successive attempts to form a new government proved short lived, and it was not
to be until the following February that Greece would have another solid government. The time was now
ripe for movement on the constitutional issue.
After the fall of the Karamanlis Government, Makarios almost immediately got to work on
drafting a final set of points to present to the Turkish Cypriots and the Guarantor Powers. 74 After seeking
advice from Sir Frank Soskice, QC - a former minister under Prime Minister Attlee - on the legality of
intervention by one of the Guarantor powers in response to such a change, Makarios was left, on 1
November, with a legal opinion outlining the carefully considered views of this eminent jurist. Simply
put, Soskice argued that intervention would not be legal if articles of the Constitution were left
unimplemented but that intervention would be justified if constitutional amendments were made that
could have a substantive effect as regards the security of the Turkish Cypriots. 75 Despite this Makarios
had made up his mind and proceeded to the next stage. After drawing up of specific details he consulted
with the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clark.
The Breakdown of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus
The presentation of the proposals to Clark and his reaction to them has been one of the most controversial
points of discussion in modem Cypriot history. Simply stated, the debate revolves around the degree to
which the British Government acted in concert with Makarios in his plans to alter the Constitution. What
we do know is that even before he had received the opinion of Sir Frank Soskice, Makarios had a
meeting with Sir Arthur Clark on 23 October at which they discussed the Archbishop's proposals.
Clerides states,
'Makarios assessed the reaction of Sir Arthur Clark as very encouraging. When Makarios
showed him the working paper I [Clerides] had prepared, his advice was to limit the proposals
for amendment to the most urgent issues.. .Sir Arthur, who represented one of the guarantors, did
not express any reservations about the advisability of proposing constitutional amendments or
any doubts about the need for amendments. On the contrary, he gave the clear impression that
he agreed with the idea and recommended, in order to make them more acceptable to the other
side, that the scope of the proposals should be limited.'76
On 12 November, Makarios submitted to Clark a list of proposed amendments. Although an unofficial
document Clark is widely accepted, though not universally so, to have taken it away and have made
handwritten amendments to the text before returning it to Makarios. 77 Just five days later Makarios sent
a copy of his amendments to the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, for his inspection prior
to an official submission to the Turkish Cypriots and the Guarantor Powers almost two weeks later. No
rejection or warning was received and therefore Makarios, on 29 November, submitted officially his
plans for a 13-point amendment to the Constitution. The details were as follows:78
(1) The right of veto of the President and Vice-President to be abandoned.
(2) The Vice-President to deputise for the President in case of his temporary absence or incapacity
to peiform his duties.
(3) The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be
elected by the House as a whole and not by the Greek or Turkish members respectively.
(4) The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House
in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
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(5) The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws
by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
(6) Unified municipalities to be established.
(7) The administration ofjustice to be unified.
(8) The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
(9) The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by
a Law.
(10) The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the
Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the
population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
(11) The number of members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from 10 to 5.
(12) All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
(13) The Communal Chambers to be abolished and a new system to be devised. (Should the Turkish
Community, however, desire to retain its Chamber, such a course should be open to it).
These changes proved unacceptable to Turkey, and on 11 December it officially replied to Makarios with
an outright rejection of the proposal. Despite assurances given by Makarios as to the intention of the
amendments to facilitate a smoother working of the Constitution, the plans effectively wiped out Turkish
Cypriot political power in the Republic of Cyprus, and almost immediately there was a marked
heightening of tensions on the island.
On 19 December, Sir Arthur Clark visited Clerides on his way to the airport to depart for
London. According to a memo submitted by Clerides to the Cypriot Government, Clark had remarked
on his personal regret that Turkey had been so hasty to reject the plan. At the conclusion of their
discussion Clerides notes that Clark stated,
'That in the event of clashes and fighting between the two sides, the use of the British forces in
Cyprus to restore law and order was totally out of the question, for two reasons: firstly, the
British forces in Cyprus were insufficient and would only be used to protect British nationals.
Secondly, in the opinion of the British Government, the guarantors are not entitled to intervene
in Cyprus without the consent of the Security Council, and this would take time.'79
With that clear statement of British policy from the man who supposedly knew the British reaction to
Makarios's ideas, Sir Arthur Clark left Cyprus. 8° Two days later, fighting finally broke out between the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Summary of Chapter II
Since their first interaction almost a thousand years ago, the relationship between the Greeks and the
Turks has often been difficult. In fact it could be argued that since 1071, the peoples of both nations have
drawn a certain amount of their identity from the periods of distrust, if not outright hatred, each has held
towards the other. Yet in 1930, under the leadership of two of the greatest figures in the history of these
two countries, Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal AtatUrk, an agreement was reached that sought to end
the latent, if not manifest, animosity that had, at times, clearly existed between the two nations throughout
the centuries. Indeed, for almost twenty five years a cooperative relationship between the two countries
began to develop, and with it the roots of a friendship. This culminated in 1952 with both countries being
accepted as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. However, in 1954, this improvement
was disrupted by events on a small island. This island, Cyprus, had not undergone the process of
harmonisation, albeit forced by national homogenisation, that had happened between Greece and Turkey.
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On Cyprus the Greeks and the Turks still lived together in an uneasy peace watched over by the imperial
governorship of Britain, a period of rule that was challenged by the Greek Cypriots who saw the
realisation of enosis as being the ultimate result of any move for self-determination within their
community. It was this desire of the Greek Cypriots, led by their Archbishop, to break free from this
colonial yoke and be allowed self-determination that in 1955 that brought the Turkish and Greek
inhabitants of Cyprus into conflict. It was, however, British attempts to retain control that brought the
two 'motherlands' of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus - Greece and Turkey - into direct
confrontation.
The Zurich-London Agreements, the end result of a four year attempt to rid Cyprus of British
rule in favour of enosis presented the Greek Cypriots with independence rather than the sought after
union with Greece. In recognition of Eden's claim that Britain, Greece and Turkey all had an interest in
the island, this independence was granted in such a way as to give each a vested interest and presence
in the island. In appeasing Turkish fears of a government in Cyprus determined to pursue enosis,
extensive political rights were given to the Turkish Cypriots that allowed them a veto on the island's
political affairs despite their minority status. For the Turkish Cypriots this was a recognition, perhaps
grudgingly by the Greek Cypriots, of their status as partners with the Greek Cypriots in the Constitution
of the Republic of Cyprus. To the Greek Cypriots such participation was a problem to be endured until
such time as alterations could be made. In November 1963, Makarios judged the time to be right and with
scant attention to warnings issued from all quarters he unilaterally proposed constitutional amendments,
and in doing so may have acted in collusion with the British High Commissioner.
The rejection of the constitutional changes by the Turkish Government proved to be a catalyst
for intercommunal violence. However, as was noted, the end of the anti-colonial EOKA struggle was not
the end to the EOKA aspiration for enosis. The power sharing agreement that had been forced upon the
communities of Cyprus by Britain, Greece and Turkey had, through the Treaty of Guarantee, ruled out
the options of both enosis and taksim as practical realities. This left both communities in a position in
which room to manoeuvre was severely limited. For some within the Greek Cypriot community the
rejection of constitutional proposals had underlined this. With this in mind, the time was therefore judged
to be right by certain hardline elements of the Greek Cypriot community to settle the problem once and
for all. A move that would undoubtedly once again embroil Greece, Turkey and Britain in the island of
Cyprus.
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(21 December 1963-2 5 January 1964)
Introduction
Following the Turkish Government's rejection of the proposed thirteen-point amendment to the
Constitution intercommunal relations on the island became markedly more tense, and by 22 December
there were a number of serious clashes centred around Nicosia. After several days the situation still had
not calmed and it became apparent that some form of interventionary action was needed in order to curb
the fighting. This was done by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - all of which had a vested
interest in halting the events taking place in Cyprus - under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee.
The resulting proposal for tripartite military action to try to prevent further fighting was accepted by both
Cypriot communities and the Joint Truce Force (JTF) was created. However, the difficult situation on
the ground in Cyprus meant that although the Force was tripartite in name, in practice it consisted solely
of British troops and the full cooperation of both the Greek and Turkish Army contingents was never
entirely realised. Yet, even on their own the British troops calmed the situation significantly. This was
assisted by a high-profile visit to Cyprus by the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who
managed to negotiate a number of agreements between the two communities including the creation of
a forum for dialogue to find a political resolution to the situation. In addition a conference in London was
convened to which both the Cypriot communities as well as both Greece and Turkey were invited.
At the London Conference the demands of the various parties were seen to be incommensurate
with one another. The Greek Cypriots demanded a return to a unitary state with minority safeguards,
while the Turkish Cypriots demanded some form of separation between the communities based on a
federal system. With the eventual failure of the London Conference the task of the Truce Force became
all the more difficult. Further rises in tensions on the island were coupled with the realisation that the
role of the Force was no longer short term. However the manpower commitments required for the
demands of such an action soon proved to be a major difficulty for the British Government which had
other military concerns in, inter alia, Africa and Borneo. Yet all options for the creation of some form
of international peace-keeping force seemed to be limited. The Commonwealth was deemed unlikely to
be able to help, and the involvement of the United Nations posed a serious chance of anti-British
interference from both the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian bloc - a factor that the United Kingdom was
not prepared to risk given the strategic importance of the Sovereign Base Areas. The difficult nature of
the problem eventually led to a Greek suggestion that some form of NATO-based peace-keeping be
instituted. This was a plan which was eventually put to the United States, thus heralding a Cold War
phase in the Cyprus Crisis.
1. The Beginning of Intercommunal Violence
One cannot be exactly sure of the cause of the outbreak of fighting. There are, however, a number of
possible explanations. Most plausible among these was a report featured in a Turkish Cypriot newspaper,
Halkin Sesi, that the Greek Cypriot leadership, in preparation for possible disturbances, had instituted
a number of measures by which they would contain any intercommunal conflict. One of these was
reported to be the creation of a number of road blocks to seal off the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia.
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In an attempt to ensure that these procedures would be effective, the paper declared that practice
exercises were being conducted after midnight within the old Venetian walls of Nicosia.' Thus when, on
20 December 1963, Greek Cypriot irregulars within Old Nicosia made a demand to see the identification
papers of some Turkish Cypriots, 2 Turkish Cypriot tempers exploded.
At around twenty past three in the morning of 21 December 1963, Greek Cypriot forces engaged
Turkish Cypriot irregulars in Nicosia following these alleged incidents earlier in the day. The extent to
which this initial fighting had been organised is debatable. 3 However, the result was not. Following the
first night's violence the casualty figures were put at two Turkish Cypriots killed, and eight wounded -
including both Turkish and Greek Cypriots.4 As the day progressed there were numerous accounts of
sporadic gunfire around the old town, and that a large crowd of Turkish Cypriots were roaming around
the streets, several of whom were armed with pistols. 5 Yet, appeals for calm issued both by President
Makarios, and Vice-President KUçuk, went largely ignored by the conflicting parties, and before long
the fighting had spread to several other parts of the city. 6 Soon serious concern was being expressed by
the representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States of America. On 22 December the
British acting-High Commissioner, Denis Cleary, and the US Ambassador, Fraser Wilkins, visited
Makarios and KUçUk to express their 'grave concern' over the situation and to appeal for 'calm and
moderation' .
Nevertheless, by the next day fighting was reported in the southern coastal town of Larnaca.
Despite the fact that this was soon halted following a meeting held at the offices of the District Officer,
the two communities in the town remained armed and hostile to one another. 8 By that evening the
violence had also subsided in Nicosia. However, the situation in both places remained extremely tense,9
and the Greek Cypriots were reported to be in exultant mood over a what they saw as their tactical
victories. As one observer noted: '[the h]eadquarters at ex-EOKA club is [a] hive of activity."0
Fortunately, at this point it was reported that the other main towns on the island remained quiet.
By 24 December, it became clear to all that the situation was more serious than had at first been
realised. The lull in violence that had occurred in Nicosia overnight erupted once again with heavy
attacks being made on Greek Cypriot families living in the primarily Turkish Cypriot suburb of
Omorphita, to the north of the city." In addition, Famagusta, quiet until this point, had also seen a limited
bout of intercommunal fighting as Turkish Cypriot gendarmes attempted to capture the headquarters of
the gendarmerie. However, this limited action did not seem to be indicative of the general mood in the
city - which had a Turkish Cypriot District Officer' 2 - as there was still free movement of Turkish
Cypriots within the Greek Cypriot quarter.' 3 Likewise in Kyrenia, following a meeting at the office of
the District commissioner, a 'peace pact' was announced between the town's Turkish and Greek
inhabitants.'4
Nonetheless, by this point London seemed to have become seriously concerned about the
situation in Cyprus. Although the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou - who was then in London
for a scheduled meeting of the Guarantor Powers - said, on 23 December, that the United Kingdom
regarded the matter as being an 'internal affair',' 5 by the next day this previously held view had
apparently changed. Kyprianou was invited to the Commonwealth Office, where he met with several
British Government ministers to discuss the events in the island.'6
Yet such concern was not wholly limited to London. In Athens the Greek Government was
becoming worried at the course events were taking, and in Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun
Erkin, had meetings with both the US Ambassador, Raymond Hare, and the Soviet Ambassador, Nikita
Ryzhov, at which he alleged that genocide was being committed against the Turkish Cypriots. This was
supplemented on the diplomatic front by the Turkish President, Cemal Giirsel, who issued appeals to
Queen Elizabeth, King Paul of Greece, and Presidents Johnson, de Gaulle, and Luebke asking for their
help in halting the fighting. In the text of his letter, presented in French, he placed the blame firmly at
the door of the Greek Cypriots stating, inter alia,
65
Chanter III
'A Chypre des bandes de terroristes Chypriotes Grecs déchainés aides par des forces regulieres
de l'ordre composées également de Grecs Chypriotes se livrent en application d'un plan pré-
établi a des atrocités sans nom contre les Turcs de Chypre sans discriminer femmes et enfants.
Ces attaques barbares que se poursuivant avec une intensité croissante depuis le 21 Décembre
vendredi soir ont pris l'ampleur d'un veritable genocide qui vise l'anéantissement de Ia
communauté Turque Chypriote."7
2. The Guarantor Powers Become Involved
With the breakdown of the cease-fire in Nicosia and a further increase in fighting on 24 December, the
three Governments finally decided to act and issued:
'a joint appeal to the Government of Cyprus and the Greek and Turkish communities in the
island to put an end to the disorders. The three Governments further offered their joint good
offices to help resolve the difficulties which had given rise to the present situation."8
Yet the Turkish Government's pressure did not stop at this.' 9 At two o'clock in the afternoon of
Christmas Day 1963, they sent three jet fighters to fly at low level over Nicosia. 2° As this was happening
a large number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots clashed around the village of Giinyeli, just north of
Nicosia, on the strategically important Kyrenia road. 2 ' Both of which actions prompted Greek Cypriot
fears that a Turkish invasion was imminent. With the fighting showing no signs of abating, the situation
on the island seemed to have reached a decisive moment. The appeal of the Guarantor Powers had
obviously failed to restore calm. As the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, noted of the
situation:
'When it became clear that this appeal had failed, the three Guaranteeing Powers, on 25th
December, informed the Government of Cyprus of their readiness to intervene, if invited to do
so, to restore order, by means of a Joint Intervention Force, under British command, and
composed of the forces of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey stationed in Cyprus.'22
With this offer to the Republic of Cyprus, Douglas-Home cut short his Christmas holiday in Scotland to
return to London. Upon his arrival he called a meeting of a number of British Government ministers
concerned to discuss the nature of the proposed intervention. 23 Following the cabinet meeting, a Prime
Ministerial statement was released outlining the arrangements for the formation the tripartite force and
stating the United Kingdom's input.
However, this decision was firmly opposed by the Labour Party, which interpreted such British
actions as being fraught with danger - a sentiment clearly expressed during a meeting between the Prime
Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary, Mr. Gordon Walker. After the
meeting, the Labour Party stated that they felt, 'that the problem should be put before the UN, and
expressed opposition to the use of British Troops in a police action.' However, the decision had been
already been taken by the Government and the United Kingdom was now committed. The question is
why did the Government choose to take on such a role?
The British Reasons for Tripartite Intervention
The reasons for British involvement are not complicated. Indeed, they can indeed by reduced to reasons
of direct national and strategic interests devolved from the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's), and from a
direct concern that by not intervening as a Guarantor Power, then Britain was leaving the situation to
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develop into something more serious if, or perhaps when, the other two Guarantor Powers, Greece and
Turkey, chose to become involved.
In a 2 Januaiy memorandum, the Prime Minister informed the Cabinet of the reasons by which
the British Government took the decision to become involved, he lay a heavy emphasis on the latter point
- that of the effect on Greco-Turkish relations by not intervening. In his words the Prime Minister stated:
'I have not called the Cabinet together over Christmas and the New Year because the decisions
which the Ministers most concerned had to take were related to whether or not we should accept
a role which we were pressed to undertake by the Greek and Turkish Governments and the two
communities in Cyprus. We saw no alternative to doing so if widespread civil war was to be
averted which would inevitably have spread to Greece and Turkey.'25
In addition to this important explanation, there was also the national interest reason as to why the British
Government should have chosen to take on board the responsibility of conducting a military action in
Cyprus. First, there were a large number of British nationals, mainly attached to the military, resident in
areas outside of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA5). In fact, the total number was put at 15, 661 26 j
addition there were around five hundred nationals of what were called 'friendly states' 27 which the British
Government evidently felt it had a duty to protect. However, this does not explain adequately why such
a large and potentially hasardous operation was undertaken. If it had simply been a matter of protecting
these civilians - who were mainly congregated in Greek Cypriot areas 28 - it would arguably have been
far easier to move them into the Sovereign Bases or even to have evacuated them from the island
altogether.29
The underlying reason for the offer to enter the Republic rather than withdraw into the Bases is
perhaps best found by analysing the strategic role of the Sovereign Bases themselves. As was noted in
Chapter II, these had been conceded to Britain in the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. In addition to the
Sovereign Bases, the United Kingdom had also retained a number of sites that although they were within
the Republic of Cyprus were used by the British Forces. The strategic importance of all these facilities
was stated in a minute written, on 28 December, by the Minister of Defence:
'As I see it, at the moment, we have three main reasons to maintain a military base in Cyprus.
Firstly, as a base for nuclear operations in support of CENTO in the area of the Russian/Turkish
and Russian/Iranian frontiers. Secondly, as a staging post in the Near East particularly as a back-
up should our free use of El Adem be restricted. Thirdly, as an advance base from which to
supply United Kingdom Base Forces should they be committed to operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean. For example, intervention in Jordan or Libya would be largely supplied from a
stockpile located in the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.'3°
For the British Government there was undoubtedly a fear that any major change in the balance of power
on the island could lead to either a political or military attack on the SBAs by the Greek Cypriots - for
many of whom the Bases continued to represent an invasive presence on the island - during, or in the
aftermath of, intercommunal fighting. It therefore seemed a logical move by the British Government to
intervene in a proactive way in order to forestall any such lighting, and therefore preserve the delicate
balance of power on the island. This would, in turn, protect the political foundations upon which the
Bases existed. This whole thinking is best summarised, although perhaps over exagerated, by Anthony
Verrier, a journalist covering the events at the time who stated,
'...it is essential to correct a general impression that the British forces are in Cyprus solely to
keep the peace. They are not. They are there first and foremost to preserve Britain's strategic
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interests on the island, which, through bases and other installations, provide in theory the
facilities for operations in the Middle and Far East. Since these interests cannot be preserved
while the island is in ferment, the garrison, reinforced from the United Kingdom, has perforce
switched to internal-security duties.'3'
The Greek and Turkish Reasons for Tripartite Intervention
For the Turkish Government the idea for a tripartite force rather than an immediate unilateral action was
certainly a good step forward. Given that the issue of Cyprus had proved to be emotive throughout the
latter part of the previous decade when the EOKA campaign had brought the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
to the verge of civil war, public opinion in Turkey tended to play an important role in shaping
government policy on the issue of Cyprus. Indeed, there had been a number of large-scale student
demonstrations during the first week or the crisis, 32 and although these passed off calmly for the most
part, u the fact remained that the Turkish Government was being pushed to provide a means of protecting
the Turkish Cypriots if the situation got so bad as to warrant such action. Indeed, there were a number
of significant Turkish military actions that seemed to point to a general mobiIisation. Yet a commitment
to go to war is, for any country, a dangerous course to take. To this extent, the joint intervention plan
provided the Turks with an opportunity to avert a direct conflict and still be able to protect the Turkish
Cypriots. It was perhaps with both of these courses in the balance, that Prime Minister Inönü held a
meeting attended by, amongst others, the Chief of the General Staff, General Cevdet Sunay, and several
other senior military commanders. 35 The result of this discussion was the support of the Turkish
Government for the intervention action coupled with continued planning for an unilateral intervention
if the tripartite plan failed.
At the same time there was a similar meeting in Athens of the Supreme Defence Council, at
which Crown Prince Constantine chaired a session comprised of the joint service chiefs and leading
ministers. 36 The primary Greek concern lay not with Cyprus per Se, but with the effects of a possible
Turkish action to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. An action that would necessarily require
a Greek counter offensive in favour of the Greek Cypriots. Yet although the Greek Government wanted
to take a moderate tone on the issue, 37 there was a degree of public feeling that wanted a more robust
Greek approach. In the northern Greek city of Thessalonica, around a thousand Greek students
demonstrated carrying placards saying 'Cyprus is Greek' and 'Get out of Cyprus, Turkish Barbarians'.18
Although the issue of the joint intervention was discussed, the fears of a Turkish invasion were
undoubtedly prominent in the minds of the Greek officials. Allegations of a Turkish mobilisation had
proved a matter of great concern for the Foreign Minister Venizelos, as had a rumour that Turkish
warships had been sighted off the coast of Cyprus - a worry communicated to the Ambassadors of both
the United States and the United Kingdom. 39 However, and in line with Turkey, the Greek Government
decided to adopt the plan for joint intervention at this stage in the hope that there would be no need to
enter into direct conflict with Turkey.
Archbishop Makarios Accepts the Guarantor Power Intervention
Despite the fact that the proposal for tripartite intervention had been agreed to in London, Ankara and
Athens, and that it had been put to the Government of Cyprus in unison by the three Guarantor Powers,
the Greek Cypriot community was not quick to respond. 1 However, by the following day, 26 December,
the Greek Cypriots maintained that they represented the Government of Cyprus at this
point, the political situation had reached a stage where the central government of the island consisted
almost solely of Greek Cypriots, and was no longer recognised by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In
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an answer was needed. The fighting on the island was still continuing and Turkey was undoubtedly
investigating the possibility of unilateral military action. ° With this in mind, Makarios finally
approached the British Government on the subject of the intervention, but before he gave his answer the
Archbishop placed a single condition on the granting of his permission - that the command of the force
would indeed be in the hands of a British General officer rather than vested in either a Greek or a Turk.4'
Thus 'fearing a Turkish invasion Makarios reluctantly agreed' to the proposed Joint Intervention Force.42
In line with the condition that the force would be commanded by a British officer, it was agreed
that command should be placed in the hands of the commander of the British Army units in the
Sovereign Base Areas, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Cyprus District, Major-General Peter
Young.43 In addition, Group Captain Campbell, Commander of the RAF station in Nicosia, was
appointed as Deputy Commander of the Force. As such Campbell was detailed to work with the
commanders of the Greek and Turkish contingents to the force, namely Colonels Tzouvelekis and Evsoz,
to ensure full tripartite cooperation. However there was a problem insofar as neither the Greek nor the
Turkish contingents were in their camps. The Turkish troop contingent had withdrawn from their
barracks on Christmas day,45 and had been involved not only in fortifying Turkish Cypriot positions, but
had also actively engaged in battles with Greek Cypriots, most notably around the village of Ortakoy to
the north of Nicosia. 46 However, the Greek forces, which had also taken part in clashes, were soon
persuaded to return to their barracks.47 Yet this did not, however, mean that the Greeks were now willing,
or necessarily able, to engage in the Truce Force operation. Greek participation in the force without a
corresponding Turkish presence was seen as politically unacceptable. With the start of operations only
hours away, it was clear that the force would begin its duties comprised solely of British troops.
3. The Joint Truce Force Begins Its Operation
Despite this drawback with regard to the numbers available for the task in Cyprus, in the early hours of
the morning of 27 December the first British units serving in what was called the 'Joint Truce Force'
(JTF) left their bases to take up their positions in Nicosia. In a ministerial statement released later, it was
announced that the three regiments deployed for the task were the 1St Gloucesters (the Glosters), the 3rd
Green Jackets, and the RAF Regiment.48 Almost immediately the new role undertaken by these troops
placed a severe strain of the personnel requirements for the SBAs which were primarily British military
establishments. The manpower requirements of the SBAs meant that the units deployed with the JTF
were replaced, in the first instance - and in accordance with previous plans - with the 1st Foresters who
were flown out from the Strategic Reserve in Britain the same day. 49 At the same time, an armoured
squadron of l4th/2Oth Hussars flew into Cyprus from their headquarters near Benghazi in Libya.
The same morning as the soldiers left the SBAs, The Cyprus Mail led with the headline 'Police
Action to Restore the Peace', 5° under which it wrote: 'Britain, Greece and Turkey have decided to
intervene jointly in Cyprus, with the full approval of both President Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk [sic], to
enforce a ceasefire and restore peace and order in Nicosia.' 5 ' In addition to widespread newspaper
coverage, throughout the morning an announcement was broadcast, in Greek, every fifteen minutes on
the state radio station stating:
'General Young, commanding forces which will assist the Government of [the] Republic in its
efforts to preserve the cease fire and restore peace had a meeting with His Beatitude and Minister
of Interior late last night when view[s were] exchanged on best way to deal with situation. [It
order to minimise any confusion, I will henceforth refer to 'Greek Cypriots' and 'Turkish Cypriots',
rather than the 'Government of Cyprus' and the 'Turkish Cypriots'. However Cypriots - both Greek and
Turkish - who had been Govemment ministers will retain their titles.
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was] Agreed that forces under General's command will start patrolling in certain areas today.
The public is called upon to be helpful so that task of forces assisting in restoration of law and
order may effectively be achieved.'52
However, for the Greek Cypriots the matter of the acceptance of the tripartite intervention was a
potentially explosive political issue. After the initial announcement of the deployment of the British
troops in the Republic, Dr. Dervis, the leader of the staunchly anti-Treaty of Guarantee opposition
Democratic Union Party, 53 cabled Makarios with the following statement:
'We are astonished that you have accepted intervention of Guaranteeing Powers, while the other
day you declared that the Treaty of Guarantee was invalid.. .Acceptance of such intervention is
a direct blow to the recourse to the Security Council and creates even greater dangers for the
present and future of the Cypriot people. The only correct solution is recourse to the United
Nations demanding self-deteination.'54
Yet despite this minority voice of concern, 55 there can be no question that the fact that the majority of
Greek Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriot leadership - worried that events had got out of hand and were
posing a serious risk of Turkish action - supported the British/Tripartite action in Cyprus.56
Within hours of the green light from Makarios, all the units marked for duty had arrived in
Nicosia and were in place at various points in the city. In addition to its function as a tool by which to
maintain peace and order, the Truce Force was also detailed to develop a humanitarian function.
Evidence of this could be seen almost immediately after the JTF deployed, when a British medical team,
under an RAF Group Captain, entered into the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia to treat the large
number of wounded57 that had accumulated during the six days of bloody fighting in which both
communities had suffered significant casualties. 58 Yet on the first day the dangers on the island were
graphically highlighted to the Force by two particular incidents. In the first case a patrol that was ferrying
a Greek Cypriot woman to hospital was stopped by Turkish Cypriot irregulars and the woman's husband
was kidnapped. 59 The second incident occurred when a British patrol in Larnaca wandered into the firing
line of a battle between Greek and Turkish Cypriot irregulars, with the result that one British soldier was
wounded in the cross fire.6°
However, hopes that the Force might expand and develop along tripartite lines, thus relieving
the burden on the United Kingdom, did not seem to have any foundation. Only a few senior Turkish
officers were available, and, despite orders to obey the command of General Young, it still appeared to
be the case that the commander of the Turkish contingent was referring everything back to Ankara. 6 ' In
addition, the continued absence of the Turkish contingent prevented the integration of the Greek
contingent into the Force. Although the intervention had resulted in an 'immediate sense of relief within
the Greek Government that Cyprus had been 'pacified', 62 the general political support for the tripartite
intervention,63 and the Greek Government's commitment to steering as restrained course as possible, 64
was being endangered by the failure of the Turkish contingent to report back to their camp. With this in
mind it was decided that any remaining Turkish and Greek troops either available, or able, would act as
liaisons officers and interpreters between the Truce Force, combatants, and civilians. Yet even this
reduced participation could only be implemented when an opportunity for such an integration availed
itself.
Despite this drawback of numbers, within hours of the Truce Force's deployment the situation
on the island had improved. Although there were still reports of a number of sporadic incidents of firing,
and that Greek irregulars were continuing to fortify places that had previously been abandoned, there was
nonetheless a feeling of optimism detectable in British communications.ÔS On 28 December, the day
following the appearance of the Force, General Young assessed the situation:
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'Except for one or two regrettable incidents today, the overall situation has greatly
improved...The Greek Cypriot side have moved out of certain areas and British troops are now
located in these positions.. .Further posts will be taken over tomorrow as part of a general
measure for the relaxation of tension.'66
In view of the risk of Turkish military action, a public comment from Prime Minister !nönü about this
change for the better must have come as a relief to the Greek Cypriots as well as the Governments of the
United Kingdom and Greece. 67 In addition, and perhaps more importantly in light of the operational
environment within which the JTF was working, the Greek Cypriot leadership had accepted the military
value of the British action. Indeed, within a day of the British troops having begun their operation, the
Greek Cypriots stated that they, '[c]onsidered the first days activity as designed by Commander Joint
Forces was excellent and they would like to see a gradual enlargement of the patrol activity based on the
first days pattern.'68
With this positive development, General Young called for an exchange of prisoners, refugees,
and hostages, as well as the negotiation of an accord for daily contact to be made between Greek,
Turkish, and British Force commanders. This finally led to the partial integration of Greek and Turkish
troops into the Joint Truce Force, although this was, as stated above, only at the liaison level. However,
even with this improvement, the dangers inherent in the situation were once again impressed upon the
British troops that same day as they came under fire from Turkish Cypriots. Although there were no
reported injuries, it served once again to emphasise the difficulties that were being faced. At the same
time as this was occurring there were a number of reports reaching the Greek Cypriots that warships of
the Turkish Navy were between fifteen and twenty miles off the Cyprus coast.69
4. The First Security Council Debate
On the 27 December, rumours began to filter through that the Cypriot Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, Zenon Rossides, was trying to involve the United Nations in the events in Cyprus, with
a view to the possibility of a United Nations peace-keeping force being put together. Indeed, Rossides
had even approached the Secretary-General of the Organisation, U Thant, with such a suggestion. In a
report sent to London by Sir Patrick Dean, the British Permanent Representative to the Organisation, the
main points of the Rossides-Thant conversation were cited as follows:
'Rossides' first proposal was that a contingent from UNEF should be transferred to Cyprus. U
Thant had told him that this was quite impossible. UNEF had a particular mandate and the troops
could not be transferred elsewhere without (gp undec) [sic] authority and it was in any case very
unlikely that those countries from which the contingents were drawn would agree. Rossides
appeared to accept this, but then suggested a United Nations presence. U Thant told him that this
could take one of two forms, either something on the lines of the Graham Mission in Kashmir
following a Security Council resolution, or a presence like that of Spinelli in Yemen, which had
been made possible after informal consultation with members of the Security Council but mainly
because the parties concerned were prepared to meet the cost...0 Thant had then asked Rossides
what the United Nations representative would be supposed to do. Rossides had in mind that he
should study the constitution and presumably report on its implementation. He had been told,
however, that this, too, was quite impossible and that the most a United Nations representative
could properly do would be to observe the general situation and report to the Secretary
General...0 Thant told me at the end of our discussion that he personally was against the whole




However the reported Turkish military build-up finally moved the Greek Cypriot Representative to
decide to have the matter of Turkey's military actions addressed by the Security Council. 7 ' At four
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1963, Rossides, acting on his own initiative, 72 addressed a letter
to the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson - the President of the Security Council -
in which he wrote of, 'intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus by the threat and use of force against
its territorial integrity and political independence.'73
The Turkish Government expressed immediate concern about this move. After summoning the
British Ambassador, Sir Denis Allen, to his office, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin, made
clear that the letter 'was impossible to reconcile with the present situation in which Turkey was one of
the three powers invited by the Cyprus Government to restore order there.' 74 In writing back to London,
Allen stated that,
'The Turkish Government earnestly hoped we would use our influence to persuade the Cyprus
Government to withdraw the letter as no longer consistent with the existing situation. Failing
that, the second best would be to avoid any meeting of the Security Council, in which case
Turkish Government would no doubt have to make an answer in writing to M. Rossides charges
but open debate could be avoided.'75
The United Kingdom, choosing to accept the Turkish point obviously viewed the Greek Cypriot
allegations as being without merit. This was especially so given latest reports on the position of Turkish
naval vessels, which were shown not to be in a threatening position. 76 With this in mind a British official
approached the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, in an attempt to have him call off the
Security Council meeting. Kyprianou, however, seemed less than sure as to whether this could be done.77
Therefore the British Government informed Dean, that in the event that the matter came before the
Security Council and that he was required to take a line, his position '...should be that there is no (repeat
no) evidence that the Turkish naval force is making for Cyprus. There is a Turkish port at Iskenderun and
ships making for there would have to pass close to Cypriot coast.'78
Despite this, the Greek Cypriots held to their position and the debate was eventually scheduled
for that night. When the meeting began, the Turkish permanent representative at the United Nations,
Adnan Kural, denied aggressive intent. 79 The fact that the vessels in question were travelling away from
Cyprus seems to have convinced the Council, and the meeting was adjourned without producing any
specific plan of action. 8° With this, the United Nations option was, at this stage, closed. Yet despite the
Turkish account - and the earlier views of the United Kingdom - there were a number of telegrams sent
to London at the end of December 1963 that expressed serious concern at the extent to which the Turkish
armed forces were mobilising. 8 ' For example in a secret United Kingdom Security Warning, the situation
was reported as follows:
'1. The following appear to be indications of a Turkish build up on the South Coast. General
Tural Martial Law Cdr Ankara but also Cdr 2nd Army went to Iskenderun 23rd and is still
believed to be there. He inspected units 39 Inf Div and addressed Senior Officers.
(b.) 39 Inf Div is reported to be at readiness and to have been issued with maps of
Cyprus. Twelve to fifteen truckloads of soldiers passed through Adana to Iskenderun at 2100
hrs. 25th
(c.) At 1455 25th fifteen F84s and three C47s arrived Incerlik from Diyarbakir. They
had no unusual armament eleven were parked and four placed on alert. On 26th two F86s and
two more C47s arrived. Five F84s were then placed on alert each armed with nose guns and four
rockets The programme for sorties is extensive including Cyprus area.
(d.) Reputed small concentration of Naval vessels at Mersin. Unconfirmed reports of
72
Chapter III
Naval movements have been received. Of these most credible are that five submarines are near
Cos Island and that two destroyers are off the South Coast of Turkey.
(2) Most Turkish Officers invited to a party by US AMA on 26th turned up, my US colleagues
got the impression that Turks are still determined on unilateral action in Cyprus if they consider
it necessary.'82
Turkey, apparently realising the concern, engaged in a number of diplomatic moves to make it clear to
the United Kingdom that despite the fact that it was conducting certain precautionary military build-ups
in Iskenderun it was not necessarily going to proceed with a military intervention, but was instead aimed
at providing 'moral support' for the Turkish Cypriots. 83 However the thought that Turkey might act
unilaterally if the situation deteriorated had raised some interesting questions. In a meeting between Sir
Denis Allen and Foreign Minister Erkin in Ankara on 29 December, the Turkish Foreign Minister raised
the question as to whether an action taken by one of the Guarantor Powers in Cyprus would have to be
opposed by another.84 The Turkish view was that,
'They [the Turkish Government] considered that the reservation in the Treaty of the right of
individual action by any one of the guaranteeing powers implied a clear obligation on the part
of the other guaranteeing powers not to obstruct that action. Otherwise the provision was
meaningless.. .Happily, with the agreement on the tripartite force, the necessity for such action
had not arisen. But it nevertheless seemed to him urgently necessary...to clarify the matter, which
risked creating serious misunderstandings between us. He hoped we agreed with the Turkish
Government's interetation.'85
The United Kingdom interpreted this statement as a dangerous signal. A decision was therefore taken
that from this point on '...all communication with our Ambassador [is to be] done through the Foreign
Office because we know how sensitive the Turks are... [it] would be healthy.. .1 think to make a further
offer through the Private Office that we are always available at any hour of the day or night to make
communications to the Greeks or Turks.'86
5. The Arrival of the Commonwealth Secretary
It what appeared to be another signal of the importance attached by the United Kingdom to the
developments in Cyprus the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, arrived on the island on
28 December. And following separate meetings with both President Makarios and Vice-President
KUcUk, 87 as well as meetings with both the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors, Sandys was able to
announce the formation of a political liaison committee. 88 This arrangement was arrived at in order to
facilitate intercommunal cease-fire agreements and to try to ensure future cooperation between the Truce
Force, the Greek and Turkish army contingents, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was decided that
the members of the Committee would be the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors - Delivanis and Ozkol -
both of whom would be assisted by a counsellor. For the Greek Cypriots the President of the House of
Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, and a Greek Cypriot Minister, Polykarpos Yiorgadjis, would attend.
For the Turkish Cypriots Osman Orek, the Minister of Defence, Rauf R. Denkta, the President of the
Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, and Halit Ali Riza, a member of the House of Representatives
would be present. Furthermore, General Young and the commanders of the Greek and Turkish
contingents were also invited to attend. It was also decided that the first meeting would be chaired by
Sandys personally, later sessions would be chaired by Cyril Pickard, an official from the Commonwealth
Relations Office.
The first meeting of this Committee took place the next day. At ten in the morning of 29
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December the Committee met at the British High Commissioner's residence in Shakespeare Street just
within the Turkish quarter of the city. At the end of a twelve hour session a seven point plan was arrived
at that consisted of:89
1. Arrangements to ensure the complete freedom of movement of British patrols in both sectors
of Nicosia.
2. The withdrawal of Greek and Turkish Cypriotfightersfro,n strongpoints on either side of the
cease-fire line and their replacement by British troops. Thereby creating a neutral zone.
3. Arrangements for the removal of Turkish dead and wounded from the Omorphita area.
4. The exchange of refugees and hostages by both sides.
5. The re-establishment of the telephone system between Nicosia and Kyrenia, thought to have
been cut by Turkish Cypriots.
6. The re-establishment of postal services in the Turkish sector of Nicosia.
7. The possibility of restarting Turkish broadcasts, and steps to secure more objective
presentation of news in both languages.
Following another discussion with Greek and Turkish Cypriot military commanders, 9° Sandys also
managed to gain the official and working acceptance for the second point - the creation of an officially
recognised cease-fire line manned by British troops. 9' In line with the fourth point, the next day the Truce
Force supervised the exchange of a large number of hostages in Nicosia, at which the Greek Cypriots
released five hundred and forty six Turkish Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots released twenty six
Greeks that they had been holding. This was further supplemented on 3 January when the Turkish
Cypriots released another thirteen Greeks.92
Considering the successes of the Truce Force in reducing tensions on the island, another attempt
was made to try to induce the Turkish contingent to return to barracks and come under the command of
General Young. Indeed, following a meeting in Ankara between Erkin, Inönü, and General Sunay, a
telegram was sent to the Commonwealth Secretary, via London, in which the Turkish Government
assured Sandys,
'that they all agreed that the Turkish unit must accept the orders of General Young. Moreover,
they are prepared to agree that Turkish unit should move from its present situation but only when
a British unit is ready to take over from them. Reason for this is fear that if any incidents against
Turks took place after move of Turkish unit reactions here would be very severe and confidence
in ourselves [British] badly shaken. In present state of Turkish opinion there is truth to this.'9
Therefore further British troops were needed in order to maintain an adequate presence and hopefully
persuade the Turkish troops to return to their camp. On 1 January 1964, six hundred men of the 2nd
Artillery Regiment left for duty in Cyprus as infantry leaving their field guns behind in the UK. 94 In
addition to this, the headquarters of the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade was moved to Cyprus as was
a battalion of parachute troops. 95 Already, however, there were concerns expressed that the manpower
stretch being imposed on the British army by undertaking the operation in Cyprus would result in a need
to draw in extra troops from the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). 96 A factor made all the more
difficult due to the fact that Britain was also committed to a military presence in both Aden, and in
Malaysian Borneo.97
Attempts made by President Makarios to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee
However, no easing of the British presence in Cyprus could be envisaged until the overall political
situation was addressed. As if to highlight the need for intercommunal dialogue over the future of
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Cyprus, a potentially dangerous situation was created when, on the evening of the 30 December, Foreign
Minister Kyprianou laid out a three point plan for future Greek and Turkish Cypriot relations. First he
made it clear that the majority must rule, second, that this must include a means by which to safeguard
the minority. The third, and perhaps most controversial point, was a plan to cut the treaty links with
Greece and Turkey, and confine any future treaty links to the United Kingdom alone. 98 Justifying this he
made mention of the fact that Cyprus, as a Commonwealth country, should naturally look to the United
Kingdom - 'the leading country.'99
This idea, in which the original Treaty of Guarantee would be abrogated and a new treaty
negotiated between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom without either Greece or Turkey
being included, had first been put forward by Kyprianou during a meeting with the Duke of Devonshire
on 23 December 1963.100 However, this time the proposal was made by Makarios personally, but was
rejected by the British Government. The reasons are explained in an internal British Government
101
'(a) A bilateral treaty enshrining any form of guarantee of the internal regime in Cyprus would
in the event of future disturbances between the communities impose on us the sole responsibility
for intervening to restore law and order and protect innocent lives. This would clearly be a most
unsatisfactory position.
(b) The Turkish Government would almost certainly regard such a solution as providing an
insufficient safeguard for the protection of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Since the beginning
of the dispute we have been hard put to it to convince the Turks that the measures we were
taking were adequate to meet the requirements of the situation and in particular to safeguard
Turkish lives. In these circumstances they would almost certainly think that they could not in
every case count on us in any future dispute, if the responsibility for preserving the internal
regime rested on us alone, to intervene effectively. Any appearance on our part of favouring a
bilateral treaty would therefore almost certainly be interpreted as support for the position of the
1eek Cypriot community, and, as a result, damage our relations with the Turkish Government.'
Nevertheless, Makarios seemed intent on following the path of abrogating the Treaty. To this end he sent
a telegram to all the world's heads of state, except those of the three Guarantor Powers, in which he
stated that the Treaty of Guarantee had henceforth been abrogated.'° 3 Sandys, on receiving this news,
immediately went to see Makarios and told him that should he be serious in this statement then he could
expect to bear the consequences of the Turkish reaction. Following a two hour meeting,'° 4 Makarios
clarified that due to a translation error from the Greek the term 'abrogate' should have read: 'desire to
secure the termination of these Treaties by appropriate means'.'° 5 A crisis was therefore averted.
However, the continuing matter of the integration of the Turkish contingent into the JTF was still
a major source of friction between the Guarantor Powers. Although the United Kingdom had been
attempting to handle the matter by diplomatic means, the Greeks seemed to want a more forceful
approach. To them it was a subject of considerable importance, even to the point that if the Turkish
contingent were not forced to come under British command then neither could the Greek contingent be
expected to obey General Young - a fact communicated by the Greeks to the British Military Attaché in
Athens.' 00 (However, the Greek Chief of Staff, General Pipilis, later withdrew this threat.) It was
obviously the case that both the Turkish military build-up in Iskenderun and the failure of the Turkish
contingent to come under the effective military control of General Young rankled with the Greek
Government. However, and despite this grievance, the Greek Government did choose to cooperate fully
with the British Government on the question of the scheduled relief of Greek soldiers serving with the
Greek contingent in Cyprus. This operation, due to have taken place at the end of December, was delayed





On 3 January, the day following Sandys departure, Archbishop Makarios gave his first press conference
since the outbreak of intercommunal violence thirteen days beforehand. The questions at the session were
mainly focussed on the approach that was going to be adopted by the Greek Cypriots in London. Despite
a generally positive atmosphere about the prospects offered by such a meeting, Makarios made it clear
that should the Conference fail, then he would again bring the matter to attention of the United
Nations." 9 Yet thoughts on the Conference were not just limited to Cyprus. In Ankara there was a
meeting of the Turkish Cabinet during which instructions to their delegation to London were planned.
At the end of the meeting, the Minister for Tourism and Press, Au thsan Gogug, announced that a
ministerial committee had been formed, and Foreign Minister Erkin would head the Turkish
delegation.'20
At the same time there was a similar meeting in Athens at which King Paul chaired a joint
session of the new caretaker government under Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos.' 2 ' At the end of the
meeting - which was also attended by George Papandreou, leader of the Union of Centre Party (EK), and
Panayiotis Kannelopoulos, the leader of the Radical Union Party (ERE) - it was announced that the new
Foreign Minister, Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, would fly to London that weekend where he would
confer with Greek Ambassador Melas.'22
Meanwhile, the JTF continued trying to ensure that the general island wide cease-fire was being
observed. The movement of the troops earmarked for duty had by this point been completed, and with
fifty nine transport sorties having been completed since 26 December the number of troops in Cyprus
lay at around five battalion sized units which, in amongst the established units, had been bolstered by the
arrival of two hundred and fifty army technicians, eighty men of the Royal Pioneer Corps, as well as a
number of helicopters that had arrived in order to assist patrolling.' 23 With such a significant presence
established in Cyprus the Ministry of Defence took the opportunity to state that 'no further moves were
contemplated so long as situation remained calm.' ''
Within Nicosia the Truce Force continued its all important role of keeping a close watch on the
situation, as The Times put it, the British troops were now 'out on foot, patrolling roads and showing the
uniform at important junctions and roofs." 25 And General Young had by now established in his
headquarters on the top floor of the Cornaro hotel on the outskirts of the city.' 26 By this point however
there had been an official extension of the JTF's area of activity beyond the confines of Nicosia, and
British troops with the aid of a number of jeeps, twenty Ferret armoured cars, and four helicopters began
to collect information on Turkish Cypriot and mixed villages.' 27 Indeed, under the supervision of the
Truce Force, Greek and Turkish community leaders met in Lamaca and Famagusta. In the latter case,
the meeting had positive results in returning the city to normal after a few intercoinmunal skirmishes had
disrupted what had otherwise been good Greek-Turkish relations within the city.' 28 In Kyrenia a possible
clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was averted when an RAF patrol interposed themselves
between the fighters.'29
Such actions were undoubtedly of considerable benefit in fostering peace between the
communities in a number of areas. Yet such support was not universal. While most of the Turkish
Cypriot leadership viewed the JTF favourably,' 30 almost all remained firmly of the opinion that Turkey
remained their ultimate guardian.' 3 ' In addition the Turkish Cypriot leadership, like the Greek Cypriots,
viewed the JTF as a temporary measure. For example on 8 January, Rauf Denkta stated that 'we hope
[the JTF] will hold the line while the talks are on but we do not visualise them staying forever."12
However, suspicions were growing that the Turkish Cypriot leadership were actively engaged in trying
to realise their old political aim of taksim (partition).
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The Spectre of Partition
Any discussion on the issue of the physical separation of the two main communities of Cyprus into
separate autonomous areas necessarily reaches into the heart of the Cyprus Problem. Over the years there
has been a strong debate about whether the violence that occurred in December 1963 was engineered by
one or other community in an attempt to achieve wider political aims. While there has been a tendency
to view Makarios's proposal for an amendment to the constitution as the final manifest cause of the
intercommunal fighting, the evidence seems to suggest that both communities had been engaged in a
gradual process of building up arms supplies since the first days of the establishment of the Republic of
Cyprus.' 33 The Greek Cypriot Akritas plan was but one side of the coin, as it seems to be the case that
certain elements of the Turkish Cypriot community had been planning for partition as a response to this
idea for the realisation of enosis.' 34 While the intercommunal fighting represented the reason for calls for
partition by some of the Turkish Cypriots, the actual process of the formation of two separate entities was
an equally important consideration. That the Greek Cypriots would oppose such an action was expected.
However, there were a number of Turkish Cypriots who also appeared to be against partition.
Following the first outbreak of intercommunal violence on 21 December, almost all of the
Turkish Cypriots civil servants in Nicosia had, by midday 22 December, withdrawn from their
government posts. Furthermore, the withdrawal from the government was also matched in some areas
by the congregation of Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. Although there is evidence to suggest that in some
areas this was forced by the Greek Cypriots,' 35 even today the Greek Cypriots insist that this withdrawal
by the Turkish Cypriots from their government posts was entirely voluntary.' 36 The Turkish Cypriots, on
the other hand, are adamant that they were forced out.' 37 The final answer is perhaps midway between
the two, i.e. that some Turkish Cypriots deliberately withdrew from the Government, while a number of
others did not go to work for fear of planned attacks that they felt would be made on them, by Greek
Cypriots, as they travelled to work.' 38 In either case the defacto situation was that by this time the central
government of the Republic of Cyprus was almost wholly Greek Cypriot, and that although the Turkish
Cypriots' chief delegate to London, Rauf Denkta, made a statement with regard to the Conference that
the Turkish Cypriots were not necessarily aiming at partition but wished to see a movement of peoples,'
it was becoming ever clearer that there were strong separatist tendencies at play. One of the most
disturbing pieces of evidence that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was actively seeking to disestablish
itself from the Greek Cypriot community came on 7 January when the Turkish Cypriots put on trial the
Chief of the Gendarmerie, Mr. Niazi, and the Deputy Commander of the Police Force, Mr. Refik. These
two had been amongst the last of the Turkish Cypriots to leave the Greek Cypriot areas of Nicosia and
Niazi had been the one to read the appeal for calm from Makarios and Kiicuk. At the opening of the trial
at what was called a 'Turkish Special Court' the two were charged with failing to obey the orders of the
Turkish Cypriot leadership to set up an independent Turkish Cypriot police force.' 4° Although both were
eventually acquited' 4 ' - perhaps on the grounds of political expediency to show a united Turkish Cypriot
position' 42 - the outcome of this case nonetheless highlighted the fact that there did appear to be a number
of Turkish Cypriots who still saw the entity of a bi-communal Republic of Cyprus as being a valid and
living entity. Even at this point the main locations of the fighting were still around Nicosia and Larnaca.
In a number of other areas, most particularly around Famagusta and Limassoi, there were numerous
instances of Turkish Cypriots continuing to engage in intercommunal commerce and work alongside the
Greek Cypriots.'43 Indeed, in Famagusta, the Turkish Cypriot civil servants, under the District
Commissioner continued working in their Government posts. However, it certainly appears to be the case
that there was a concerted attempt by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to engage in a policy of partition
between the two communities. Vice-President KUçuk, in an interview with Le Monde on 10 January,
went as far as to openly say that he wanted partition,' a call that was repeated in his newspaper Halkin
Sesi when he stated that it had now become impossible for the two communities to live ogether.4S
(However, and to be fair, it is perhaps worth remembering that Makarios had also challenged the status
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of the Republic of Cyprus by making claims in favour of enosis in the period since independence.'46)
Despite the many successes of the Truce Force in ensuring intercommunal peace across much
of the island, there were, nonetheless, allegations made by certain elements of the Greek Cypriot
community that the JTF was taking what could be construed as too impartial a role and that they were
not adequately protecting those Turkish Cypriots who had remained loyal to the Government.' 47 Luckily,
such reports did not seem to result in any bacldash against the Truce Force, who maintained their position
in a number of places. Indeed, General Young noted the way in which the widened area of JTF
operations was leading to greater freedom of movement, and that food and medical supplies were now
being distributed to areas of need.' 48 In order to meet these demands for food the Greek Cypriots went
so far as to allow a number of Turkish warships to dock at Famagusta where, under the auspices of the
JTF and Greek Cypriot police, they brought several large consignments of aid for the Turkish Cypriots.'49
Preparing for the London Conference
With the physical separation of the communities becoming more entrenched the Greek Cypriots decided
to formulate their approach to the London Conference. It had by this point been decided by the Greek
Cypriots that - in line with previous Turkish Cypriot concerns - they would have two groups at the
Conference - a group representing the Government of Cyprus, and another which would represent the
Greek Cypriot community. What was not clear, however, was whether or not the Greek Cypriots ever
made an attempt to include Turkish Cypriots in the delegation representing the Government of Cyprus.
From the evidence available it appears to be the case that the decision was made by the Council of
Ministers, which, by this point, consisted solely of Greek Cypriots. In any case it was now decided that
the delegates representing the Republic of Cyprus should be Foreign Minister Kyprianou and the
Attorney-General, Criton Tornaritis. For the latter group, those representing the Greek Cypriot
community, Glalkos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Stella Soulioti (the Minister of Justice) were
chosen. In addition the Greek Cypriots would be accompanied by Paschalis Paschalides, the
Government's economic advisor, and Sir Panayiotis Cacoyannis - an eminent lawyer from Limassol.'5°
With these appointments decided, Makarios called together all the delegates at a meeting of the
Council of Ministers.' 5 ' During the discussions the Greek Cypriots proved to be divided between those
who appeared willing to negotiate on the Constitution and those who felt that the Treaties of Alliance
and Guarantee should be abrogated and the Turkish Cypriots given minority status.' 52 Makarios was
apparently committed to the more hardline point of view, and, perhaps realising that this would never
be agreed to in London, the Greek Cypriots began to prepare themselves for a recourse to the United
Nations on the basis that all peace-making had failed.'53
The Turkish Government's main representative, Foreign Minister Erkin, arrived in London on
11 January, and soon thereafter he met with Sandys and R.A. Butler, the Foreign Secretary. During the
meeting Erkin took the opportunity to stress the importance Turkey attached to the Greco-Turkish
alliances, but that any attempt by the Greek Government to side with Makarios would constitute a
significant threat to that relationship.' 54 In addition he sought to absolve the Turkish Cypriots from any
guilt in the recent events in Cyprus. In dealing with a question from Erkin regarding the British position
at the forthcoming talks, Sandys stated that the British Government was not going to present a proposal
at the beginning.' 55 However, when Sandys asked Erkin about the aims of the Turkish Government at
the Conference, the Turkish Foreign Minister proved unwilling to reveal any substantive pointsY'6
With the start of the Conference just a couple of days away, the British Government presented
the following appraisal of the strategies that would be adopted by the various parties to the London talks:
'...2. The attitude of the Turkish Cypriots. Dr. Kutchuk has called for partition. This however
would be a drastic solution of the problem and, because of the distribution of the Turkish
population over the whole of Cyprus, extremely difficult to implement.
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3. The attitude of the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government have all along been
primarily concerned to secure the safety of the Turkish community in Cyprus. Their military
build-up at Iskenderun was undoubtedly undertaken in order to save Turkish lives. M. Erkin said
that new and better safeguards for the Turkish community must be worked out but the Turkish
Government has so far avoided calling for partition or taking any formal attitude. They have also
been careful to maintain the tripartite approach and they are undoubtedly fully alive to the
dangers of any clash with Greece.
4. The attitude of the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots have said that they want a conference
to agree upon a unified administrative system for Cyprus which will be free from the possibility
of outside interference. They have also said that if partition is suggested they will leave the
conference.
5. The attitude of the Greek Government. The Greek Government are anxious to maintain their
friendly relations with Turkey and have so far done their best to restrain the Greek Cypriots. But
the present Greek Government is only a caretaker and will probably be unwilling and unable to
take any final decisions. It may also be too weak to exert any effective pressure on the Greek
Cypriots. It is always possible that the Cyprus issue will become an element in the Greek
electoral campaign.
6. The attitude of Her Majesty's Government. Our principal objective is to arrive at a solution
which will preserve our own good relations with the Turkish and Greek Governments as well
as those between Turkey and Greece themselves. We do not at the moment wish to exclude any
solution which will be satisfactory to all the other parties concerned."57
7. The London Conference
With these seemingly irreconcilable differences looming on the horizon, the London Conference
officially opened on 15 January 1964, with representatives present from the United Kingdom, Greece,
Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus, and the two Cypriot communities. The Conference, held at Marlborough
House, began with Sandys as chairman. In his opening speech the Commonwealth Secretary referred to
the events in Cyprus and the way in which the United Kingdom had become involved:
'In accordance with the Treaty of 1960, we consulted the other two Guaranteeing Powers and
jointly offered to help in the task of restoring order. Our offer was readily accepted by the leaders
of both communities and the Joint Force was created. Britain has provided over 2,500 troops for
this job. They have so far been successful in their peace-keeping because they enjoy the
confidence and good will of both races.. .But if, for any reason, we were to lose the co-operation
of the people, we would no longer be able to discharge this task. Nor should we feel justified in
exposing our men to the dangers involved. Britain cannot, of course, go on acting as police man
in Cyprus indefinitely; nor, I am sure, would you wish her to do so. The Joint Force has a
specific task to perform, namely, to help separate the combatants and to hold the ring while a
settlement is being worked out. Our action has given Cyprus a breathing space, but that must be
used for something more than breathing. It must be used with a sense of urgency to find an
honourable and workable solution to the problems out of which the troubles arose."
At the end of the speech the floor was given to the Turkish Foreign Minister, who emphasised the
historical 'separateness' of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, and noted the strategic
importance of Cyprus to Turkey as a 'continuation of the Anatolian Peninsula' )59 After these remarks
Erkin began to offer a number of examples of speeches made by Greek Cypriot politicians which, he said,
indicated their total disregard for the Cypriot Constitution. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister
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stopped short of calling for the outright partition of the island.
In reply, the Greek Foreign Minister, Christian Palamas - after thanking the United Kingdom for
its action in Cyprus - referred to the situation in Cyprus as one that had arisen from the complexities of
the Constitution. Complexities that had led the Greek Cypriots to 'the point of seeing in their Turkish
compatriots their opponents, their Palamas, clearly aware of the delicacy of the issue,
proceeded by stating,
'On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot community felt it was under constant threat from the
majority.. .the Governments [of Greece and Turkey] tried in Zurich to make a synthesis of the
existing opposing views of the two Communities and produced as a compromise the Cypriot
constitution... [however] we should in all fairness add that if the texts were lacking in efficiency
their application by the Cypriots did not make things easier."6'
After these speeches came the turn of the Cypriot delegates. Thanking the British Government for their,
'human interest in the tragedy of Cyprus as one of the Guaranteeing Powers', the Turkish Cypriot
Representative, Rauf Denkta, avoided stating the case for complete partition by presenting the argument
for some form f	 In his address he noted that as far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned:
'We are ready to live in Cyprus with the Greeks but we cannot, from henceforth, afford to live
amongst them. We must find a solution so that we can live in peace and security side by side
with them as good neighbours. There can be no better real guarantee for us than this after having
witnessed these atrocities.. .We must save those Turks who are trapped in Greek areas. There
must be complete physical separation of the two communities who should undertake to live in
Cyprus, I repeat, side by side as good neighbours in peace and harmony on the basis of a
political framework to be agreed upon. But this principle of separation is fundamental."
Clerides, speaking on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community, stated,
'We are prepared to reach agreement on the form of a democratic constitution, the essence of
which must be that, in accordance with all accepted democratic principles, all citizens shall have
equal political rights and consequently the government of our Republic shall be controlled by
the will of the majority of its citizens.. We wish to see incorporated in our constitution
universally accepted provisions about human rights of the citizen of the Republic irrespective
of race, religion or creed, and in this respect we are prepared to consider all reasonable proposals
with an open mind; but we are not prepared to accept any system whereby rights are conferred
on each community separately in the form of checks and balances which create insuperable
obstacles to the smooth and effective functioning of the State, raise artificial barriers between
its citizens, divide our people and bring about frustration resulting in conflict and destruction.lM
The final delegate to speak at this opening session was Foreign Minister Kyprianou. As the representative
of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, he presented the more hard-line view favoured by
Makanos:
'The causes for the recent tragic events.. .are to be found in the Agreements and the Constitution.
The Constitution of Cyprus contains not only unworkable and undemocratic elements, but
also...it has as its main feature the division of the people, which is the main source of the
friction... [a] point which has been mentioned is that physical separation is the only way of
safeguarding the citizens. Three mixed villages were mentioned, yet there are 250 other mixed
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villages in which not a single incident occurred. Turks and Greeks in the majority of these
villages still live together peacefully in spite of some efforts by other quarters to move them
forcibly.' 165
The next day, at the start of the committee session, a major row broke out as the Turkish Cypriots
protested about the fact that part of the Greek Cypriot delegation present at the table were attempting to
present themselves as the Government of Cyprus. Threatening to walk out of the Conference the Turkish
Cypriots declared that the Greek Cypriots must be recognised as a community and not the Government
of the Republic.' 66 Yet, this was not the first time that this issue had threatened the Conference. Osman
Orek, a member of the Turkish Cypriot delegation had actually wanted to walk out at the beginning of
the Conference as he had sneaked into the Conference chamber prior to the start of the proceedings and
had seen that there was a place for the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as well as for the two
communities. After this he claims to have warned Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin that by accepting this
arrangement the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots would be acquiescing to the aims of the
Greek Cypriots. However, Erkin persuaded the Turkish Cypriot delegation to stay and participate.'67
Now, on this second occasion, it was on the basis of efforts made British officials, desperate to keep the
Conference together at this early stage, that a negotiated agreement was reached whereby the Greek
Cypriots would have a community representation as well as a separate delegation to represent the
Government of the Republic. Likewise, the Turkish Cypriots could have some form of representation
within the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, and that the Minister of Defence, Osman Orek, could
be the delegate. t68 Although this offer was never taken up, the Turkish Cypriots eventually agreed to this
idea and the Conference proceeded as planned. Yet, this decision of the Turkish Cypriots not to walk out
was important insofar as it has been, in subsequent years, seen by the Turkish Cypriots as amounting to
a defacto recognition of the supremacy of the Greek Cypriots as the Government of the Republic of
Cyprus.' 69 However, and possibly of greater significance, it is worth noting that this arrangement had
been reached not only with the agreement of Turkey, but as a result of direct Turkish pressure.
The Decision to send an United Nations Observer to Cyprus
One piece of news that arrive on the second day of the Conference was that, following an approach made
by the United Kingdom to the United Nations Secretary-General, made on 3 January and accepted by
both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots,' 70 a decision was made to appoint a United Nations Observer to
the island. The various parties to the Cyprus dispute, including the three Guarantor Powers, had all
agreed that the appointed observer should have freedom of movement and communications over the
island and that his personal security would be secured. However, the one proviso to this plan was that
the observer would not be able to receive any individual complaints on cease-fire violations.' 7 ' Thus, on
16 January 1964, U Thant announced that his nominee for the position had fallen on the former
commander of both UNEF and UNYOM, Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani of India.' 72 In addition Senor
José Rolz-Bennet of Guatemala, the Secretary-General's deputy Chef de Cabinet, was appointed by the
Secretary-General to be his personal representative in Cyprus. Almost immediately Rolz-Bennet flew to
London in order to confer with the leaders of the various delegations,' 73 before flying to Cyprus for a
thirty-six hour trip during which both he and Gyani met with General Young and went on a tour of the
Nicosia and its suburbs in order to view the situation at first hand.'
The Conference reaches deadlock
However, the sending of both the Observer and the Special Representative did not constitute a significant
movement forward in terms of creating an effective political solution for the island. In London the
situation was proving to be as difficult as ever. The divergence of views between the parties as was
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expressed at the opening session of the Conference was not easing. In the committee sessions of the
conference that were held between the Cypriots, without a Greek or Turkish Government presence, the
intransigence had remained. In an attempt to overcome these problems there were separate meetings held
that weekend (18-19 January) between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and Sandys,
Carrington, Devonshire and Sir Arthur Clark.' 75 However, the parties refused to yield on their original
demands.' 76 In an attempt to break the deadlock the British Government presented to the parties a
document entitled 'Points for Further Discussion' which was made up of two alternative proposals. The
first of these was the movement of Turkish Cypriots into one or two large areas which would then be
administered on the basis of a 'territorially divided Cyprus'.' The second proposal put forward the idea
of an international peace-keeping force, with the suggestion that NATO countries could be persuaded
to participate. In addition, this second alternative envisaged a limited, voluntary population movement
with the formation of local Greek and Turkish administrative arrangements with a maintained 70/30
arrangement at the national administrative and political level.'78
Both these arrangements proved to be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots who responded by
sending a draft memorandum outlining their own views on the future structure of a unitary Republic of
Cyprus. Once again the United Kingdom tried to find common ground between the parties and presented
three alternatives that were a synthesis of Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and British comments on the
previous proposals.' 79 This time the communal differences came out even more strongly. The Greek
Cypriots held their line on a unitary state, and the Turkish Cypriots made clear their desire to see physical
separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The British for their part suggested, once again, the formation
of a peace-keeping force, this time omitting the word NATO from the text, but in all other ways
presenting a half way house between full integration as suggested by the Greek Cypriots and complete
separation as demanded by the Turkish Cypriots. On 22 January the Greek Cypriots rejected these latest
proposals.' 8° From this point forward, the London conference existed in name only.'8'
Yet right up until this last moment the Greek Cypriots obviously still felt that there was a part
to be played by the United Kingdom. Evidence for this comes from the fact that two days before the final
Greek Cypriot rejection of the British proposals, Kyprianou once again went to the Commonwealth
Relations Office where he met with the Duke of Devonshire. Again he pushed for the idea of an Anglo-
Cypriot bilateral treaty to replace the Treaty of Guarantee. In addition Kyprianou also pressed for a
Commonwealth force.' 82 Once more he found himself being rebuffed by the British Government on the
first of these two issues, and the plan for a Commonwealth force was also rejected. From this point
forward a rift would develop in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots.
No longer would the Greek Cypriots consult closely with the British Government, a marked change in
the international politics of the Cyprus situation would now develop.
Yet in addition the deadlock meant that the intercommunal situation in Cyprus changed
noticeably for the worse. The irreconcilable political differences of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as
well as between the Greek Cypriots and the United Kingdom, being experienced at the London
Conference now began to pose a threat to the actions of the British troops. Because the United Kingdom
had not taken a direct view on the issue and come out on the side of the Greek Cypriots, feelings within
the certain parts of the Greek Cypriot community were running high. In a number of editorials over the
previous days before the Greek Cypriots rejected the British proposals, the Greek Cypriot newspapers
began openly to question the motives of the British Government with regard to their handling of the
Conference.' 83 One of these commentaries even went so far as to state that 'British partiality for the Turks
is hardly concealed.' 18'I Yet in amongst these accusations the situation on the ground was proving to be
less than clear as to where, if at all, the United Kingdom's loyalties lay. On 21 January several members
of the Truce Force were assaulted by Turkish Cypriot police as they attempted to escort two Greek
Cypriot policemen to investigate a water leak in a village. Despite the on site protestations of the British
troops, the two Greeks were then taken away to the local Turkish Cypriot police station where they were
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held.' 85 In addition to this dangerous event, the overall intercommunal situation took a turn for the worse
when it was reported that the Armenian community in Nicosia had become a target for Turkish Cypriot
militias who were alleged to be attempting to force them out of their traditioiial area.' 86 Furthermore, in
what amounted to one of the most serious, if only symbolic, attacks of all, the minaret of the historic
Bairaktar Mosque in Nicosia was ripped off when a series of bombs placed near to it exploded.'87
By now an all-out civil war appeared to be looming with attacks across the island increasing.
Once again there were reports of a Turkish military mobilisation. Yet the United Kingdom's room for
manoeuvre with regard to a further manpower expansion of the Truce Force was at this point limited due
to the fact that it had been forced to respond urgently to a number of incidents in the east African
countries of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya where local troops had mutinied against their British
officers.' 88 Given the deteriorating situation both in Africa and Cyprus, as well as the troop requirements
for Aden and Borneo, the question of creating a new, international peace-keeping force was now of
utmost and immediate importance. At the moment when the Greek Cypriots finally rejected the United
Kingdom's proposals at the London Conference a possible solution was now offered by the Greek
Government.
On 22 January the Greek Foreign Minister, during a meeting with Sir Ralph Murray in Athens,
put to the British Ambassador the suggestion that should the London Conference show 'signs of breaking
down or of being very prolonged...He would put to (the Foreign Office] the idea of an allied police force
to undertaking pacifying duties in Cyprus at considerably greater strength than the force which had
hitherto provided." 89 This idea was expanded on as follows:
'[Palamas] explained that by allied he meant our own force with the addition of a substantial
American contingent, possibly an Italian one and perhaps French. He thought that if there was
anything in this idea it should be negotiated in the capitals concerned rather than in the NATO
Council.. .He envisaged a force strong enough to "impose" disarmament upon the irregular
organisations of both sides in Cyprus and to bring about an elimination of auxiliary police.. .and
eventually a reduction and so a withdrawal of Turkish and Greek
The reaction of the Foreign Office to this news was extremely positive, 'M. Palamas' idea of sending an
"allied policing force" to Cyprus to keep the peace is very much in accordance with what our own first
preference would be." 9 ' Indeed, the options for peace-keeping by this point had seemed closed, and the
Greek Foreign Minister's suggestion appeared to present a way forward.
8. International Peace-keeping Options Appraised
Despite outward appearances, over the first month of the Cyprus Crisis the issue of the creation of an
international peace-keeping force had been a major issue in the corridors of Whitehall. On the very day
that the Joint Truce Force took up positions, a telegram was sent by the Foreign Office to Ankara which
noted that 'the tripartite intervention may succeed in restoring law and order. If so, our next problem will
be how the Guaranteeing Powers are to disengage from their peace-keeping role. We are naturally
anxious to do this as quickly as possible." 92 This was no doubt affected by the large number of
newspaper editorials across the political spectrum that saw British involvement in the Cyprus Crisis as
being either dangerous or without merit. For example The Daily Express wrote on 28 December:
'It is deplorable that British troops should be used for police action in Cyprus. It is in no sense
a proper part of their duties to interfere in troubles between one part of the population and the
other in a foreign land."93
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With disengagement in mind, and a political solution unlikely, the British Government began looking
for possible alternatives available to replace the operation. Several newspapers saw perhaps the most
obvious way in which to replace the JTF was by the creation of a United Nati pns' force.' 94 However this
was opposed by the Government for a number of reasons, namely:
'(a.) Experience of the Congo suggests that the despatch of United Nations military contingents
might have unfortunate consequences. Observers might be another matter;
(b.) We would lose virtually all control over future developments. Hitherto our position as the
neutral among the three Guaranteeing Powers has given us considerable influence.
(c.)The United Nations may start suggestions that our occupation of the Sovereign Base areas
is undesirable and has a disturbing effect. The Afro-Asian element in the United Nations would
probably seize any opportunity which might arise to try to oust us altogether from the island;
(d.) The Turkish government would almost certainly be opposed to any invitation to the United
Nations. In view of the fact of the Greek majority on the island and of the fact that they enjoy
much better contacts in United Nations circles, the Turks would almost certainly regard any
United Nations initiative as most unlikely to favour the Turkish community."95
However, the Government's public opposition to a United Nations presence was stated in somewhat
different terms to this behind the scenes objection. Indeed, the subject of some form of United Nations
action had first been brought-up by the Labour Party when Gordon Walker met with the Prime Minister
on 26 December, and a letter written to the Foreign Secretary by the Labour MP Tom Driberg on 29
December said,
'although it was natural and inevitable that our troops, being on the spot, should have been
called in to help, if the emergency should unfortunately be prolonged it would be better that the
'peace-keeping force' should be organised through the UN and should be supplied by nations
that have not been involved directly in the Cyprus troubles in recent years.
This is obviously an international, not a domestic, issue; the presence of Greek and
Turkish troops could be a constant provocation, in a way that a UN 'presence' consisting of, e.g.,
Swiss or Norwegian troops would not be; I don't see why our troops should sustain further losses
and attract the odium so lavishly available in Cyprus."96
To this Lord Carrington, replying on behalf of Butler, presented the public opposition to the plan by the
Government when he wrote,
'I agree with you that keeping the peace in Cyprus is a thanldess task and that the use of British
troops for this purpose does carry the risk of incurring odium from both sides as well as the
possibility of casualties. But I think you will agree that the presence of British troops has
prevented a full-scale war between the two communities backed by Greece and Turkey. Their
presence is likely to be required for a while yet and we could not very well withdraw them unless
a satisfactory alternative existed. To do so would be quite irresponsible.
The United Nations Charter of course provides for regional attempts to resolve problems
before their submission to the Security Council. We have nevertheless considered whether, and
if so how, we should bring the United Nations into the crisis. One possibility is of course a
United Nations peace-keeping force; but this would raise a number of serious difficulties. No
doubt on account of his experience of the financial and other problems caused by earlier peace-
keeping forces, for example in the Congo, the Secretary-General is evidently reluctant to take
on another commitment of this kind unless it were absolutely necessary. It is also plain from the
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debate on the Cyprus complaint last Saturday morning that the Security Council has no
immediate wish to get involved in the Cyprus problem. Even more important is the fact that a
further debate in the United Nations, which would be necessary before a peace-keeping force
could be established, would inevitably stir up controversy between Greece and Turkey, and
consequently between the two communities in Cyprus, which could easily jeoparclise the present
uneasy truce."97
This reply seemed not only to encapsulate the stated policy against some form of United Nations peace-
keeping action but also closed the door on the idea of any United Nations involvement at any level. In
the event, the fact that U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, was opposed to the force -
as seen in his earlier conversation with Rossides - certainly helped the Government's case.' 98 However,
the British Government seemed to close every other door to a potential role for the United Nations. Even
an early request made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he be allowed to have a
representative present at the London Conference was turned down on the basis that it might be opposed
by Turkey.' 99 However, Sir Harold Caccia, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, had at the
earliest stages stated his concern about the British Government's fear of United Nations involvement and
the United Kingdom's overall position with regard to the Truce Force in Cyprus. In a letter, dated 5
January, to Lord Carrington he said, 'I do not think it is worth trying to retain prime responsibility for
handling the crisis as a long-term British interest.' 2 He continued the letter with his view of the role of
the United Nations:
'The Secretary-General of the United Nations has already asked whether his representative
should attend the London conference and we have said no. But I trust that this is not an
irrevocable decision. I realize that certain kinds of United Nations involvement, particularly
those for which Archbishop Makarios is working, may lead to a position where the Sovereign
Base Areas are called into question. But if our attempts to resolve the crisis on the present basis
fail, this may happen anyhow and the shape of United Nations involvement be less at our
discretion than it is now.'201
Despite this accurate warning, the British Government still remained opposed to such a course of
action.202
Instead it chose to focus on a possible NATO peace-keeping role. Yet even this idea had actually
been opposed at first by the British Government. In a telegram to Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh dated 30
December 1963, the Foreign Office asked that Shuckburgh, '...emphasise to General Lemnitzer [Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR)] that [the British Government] think the best means of
restoring law and order lies in continuing the tripartite intervention undertaken by the three guaranteeing
powers at the invitation of the Cyprus Government.' 203 The General, apparently pleased with the
Commonwealth Secretary's efforts agreed that the tripartite action 'should be left unmolested in their
efforts to calm the situation down and subsequently to find a settlement.'204
However, on 7 January, another telegram was sent to the British representative at the NATO
Council. After mentioning that, '...one obvious solution would be to propose the dispatch of a United
Nations peace-keeping force. But there is a good deal to be said for avoiding this', the telegram asked
for Sir Evelyn's opinions on the possibility of a NATO force being sent to Cyprus. 205 In his reply, Sir
Evelyn stated,
'It should in theory be possible for Her Majesty's Government to ask her NATO allies to relieve
her of some of the military responsibilities in the Island or at least to supplement the forces under
British command already engaged in maintaining law and order there. ..I am afraid, however, that
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I do not regard prospects in this respect to be very favourable. Our NATO allies would, as you
say, be very reluctant to become involved in the dispute and still more to send forces to the
Island. Moreover, I cannot at present see which NATO country could provide troops whose
presence would contribute to pacification and which have the necessary aptitude and training for
internal security duties. Certain nationalities (notably Mediterranean ones) would surely have
to be ruled on political grounds. Others (Scandinavian) would not be likely to agree. One is soon
left with the Americans, Canadians and Germans. If we are to invite American help we might
do better to do so direct and if Canadian, as a Commonwealth rather than a NATO country.'206
At this point the British High Commission in Nicosia, which had been informed of such an idea,
dispatched a reply in which they noted that although the idea of a NATO force would be popular with
the Turkish Cypriots, '...the Greek Cypriots would plump for a United Nations and probably resent, if
not resist, NATO intervention.' 207 Foreign Minister Kyprianou in his 20 January meeting in London with
the Duke of Devonshire had stated that:
'He [Kyprianouj was opposed to an international force being set up under a NATO umbrella.
His reasons were that Greece and Turkey were both members of NATO; that he feared other
members of NATO would leave "things to them" and that the result would be perpetuation of
what he regarded as the undue influence of Turkey in Cypriot affairs. He did [sic] consider
that the pro-Communist leanings of some Greek Cypriots would be a major factor in rendering
undesirable a NATO force. His own preference was for a Commonwealth force to undertake
whatever peace-keeping duties were necessary.'208
Therefore, if a United Nations force was out of the question to the British Government, and a NATO
force was likely to be opposed to the Greek Cypriots, the idea of a Commonwealth force presented a third
way forward. There had been several mentions made of the possibility of such an action. Indeed, when
the idea was first put to the Greek Cypriots that a tripartite action be taken, both Kyprianou and Makarios
had remarked, 'that they would be far happier if one or two other unbiased Commonwealth countries
were invited to assist.' 2°9 However, it does not appear as if the British Government took them altogether
seriously. Makarios, throughout January, had made numerous comments referring to the desirability of
this course, a position that culminated with Kyprianou's meeting with the Duke of Devonshire of 20
January at which the idea was once again mooted. However, on this occasion the British Government
finally responded to the idea. In the conversation the Duke stated that,
'[the British Government] preferred Australia and New Zealand to send troops to Malaysia rather
than Cyprus whatever forces they could send abroad; among white Commonwealth countries
therefore that left only Canada which was already engaged in a number of international peace-
keeping roles and which might not be able to make a major contribution to Cyprus; India had
her hands full with China and Pakistan was Muslim; that left only African Commonwealth
countries as likely contributors on any significant scale and Mr. Kyprianou intimated that they
would not be welcome. However he hoped that the Irish and the Swedes might be willing to help
too.'21°
Although the argument against the Commonwealth looked superficially convincing, it is less than clear
as to whether the United Kingdom actually made any attempt to sound out Commonwealth countries as
to the extent to which they would be interested in such a proposal. In any case the idea put forward by
Palamas that a force consisting of individual NATO members rather than NATO itself came at a time
when the United Kingdom considered it necessary to find a means by which to limit its burden with
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regard to the Truce Force in Cyprus. Given that all other options seemed closed, this suggestion was
welcomed by the British Government as providing the only realistic way forward.
9. The Decision to Approach the United States
The fact that the British Government had been unsure as to what reception such a request to the United
States would meet in the weeks preceding this suggestion did not stop them from seizing the opportunity
at this point to approach the United States with the plan for a NATO-based force. In a telegram to
Washington the Foreign Office stated,
'Hitherto we had assumed that it would in fact prove impossible to persuade any NATO
countries to contribute troops for a peace-keeping force.. .If there is any likelihood that they
wouki in fact be prepared to give such an idea their active support we should like to pursue the
possibility further.. .Please therefore ask the State Department urgently for their views on Mr.
Pajamas' suggestion.'21'
However, it appears as if the British Government was not sure as to what would be the reaction of the
United States. Indeed, it had seemed as if there were only two real concerns that the United States had
over the issue of Cyprus, (a) the danger to NATO, and (b) the danger of having the matter brought before
the United Nations. Nonetheless, throughout the first month the United States had taken a remarkably
low key approach, preferring to see the matter handled directly by the United Kingdom whom it no doubt
considered to be more influential in the situation given its historic position in the island. Despite their
NATO concerns, the United States seemed to disassociate itself from the issue as far as was possible.
Prior to the opening of the London Conference, a telegram from the United Kingdom's Ambassador in
Washington stated that the idea of a British move to suggest that the United States might consider being
involved as a participant in the London Conference would, in all likelihood, be met by a cool response.
He felt that the United States wished to avoid an emphasis on the NATO interest and a suggestion was
made by the US that perhaps a move be made to have a Commonwealth country attend in the role of an
external participant, thereby avoiding an overt NATO interest. 2 ' 2 Even in early January when the United
Kingdom was first considering the idea of a NATO force this was still seen as being the prevalent attitude
of the Johnson Administration. 2t3 Indeed, the public face of US thinking was neatly captured in a
statement made by the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk:
'We feel that we should not inject ourselves into the substantive matters under discussion, but
rather use our maximum influence to urge moderation upon the two communities and upon the
governments most directly concerned without taking sides.'2'4
Therefore, if the Palamas idea was to work it would require a far more substantial input from the United
States than had been the case up until this point. Despite this concern about the level of the United States'
interest in becoming involved in Cyprus, on 25 January 1964 the United Kingdom's Ambassador in
Washington, Sir David Ormsby Gore, officially asked the United States for its assistance in forming a
force made up of contingents from NATO countries in order to help maintain peace in Cyprus.215
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Summary of Chapter III
The outbreak of intercommunal fighting in Cyprus posed a real danger tq all three of the Guarantor
Powers. For the United Kingdom, any serious disturbance in Cyprus could endanger British lives and
had the potential to overspill in such a way as to threaten directly the strategically important Sovereign
Base Areas. For Turkey, the domestic political situation was such that any perceived attempt by the
Greek Cypriots to pursue a policy of either reducing the rights of the Turkish Cypriots or to target them
systematically in an attempt at - to use a currently fashionable term - 'ethnic cleansing' would necessitate
some form of intervention. Yet for the Greek Government any such Turkish intervention would, in turn,
require some sort of reprisal to assist the Greek Cypriots. With the ramifications of such a descent into
regional conflict in mind, the three Guarantors approached the Government of Cyprus with a proposal
for tripartite intervention in order to pacify the warring parties.
This approach was, somewhat reluctantly, accepted by President Makarios who, aware of Turkish
sensitivities over the Cyprus issue, agreed to the joint intervention on the condition that it be commanded
by a British officer. This was accepted by the Guarantors and the Joint Truce Force came into being on
the morning of 27 December 1963. However, the Greek and Turkish contingents which had been
allocated duties with the Force were never able to take up their places for a number of reasons which
meant that in the end the JTF was simply a British action.
Nevertheless, once the Truce Force was in place the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan
Sandys, flew to the island where over the course of several days he succeeded in calming the situation
and was able to negotiate several notable agreements between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities. However the delicate political situation required considerable manpower in order to be
maintained, and the United Kingdom was forced to increase steadily its commitment to the island at a
time when there were a number of other pressing international problems at hand. With this in mind
several new options were explored in an attempt to widen the Force. Of these, the United Nations was
discounted on the basis that any recourse to the Security Council would be open to manipulation by the
Soviet Union, and the Sovereign Base Areas could be threatened. Furthermore, the United Nations itself
proved to be less than willing to undertake any such commitment. The next option, that of a proposal for
a Commonwealth force was rejected as being unworkable, but was not, I believe, full explored by the
British Government. With these two ideas proving less than viable, the final choice lay with some form
of NATO action. However, this was known to be contrary to the wishes of the Greek Cypriot community.
The situation was therefore put on hold while the political situation at the root of the problem was dealt
with.
To this extent, a conference was called in London to investigate means by which to address the
continuing political difficulties. However, these talks failed due to the intransigence of the various parties
attending - in particular the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the Government of Turkey. With the
effective breakdown of the London talks, the Greek Government proposed that a peace-keeping force
be formed with contingents drawn from NATO members. The British Government, desperate to extricate
itself from Cyprus, therefore presented this idea to the United States in an attempt to relieve this burden.
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The Cold War and Cyprus
(25 January-15 February, 1964)
Introduction
Whereas international involvement during the first month of the Cyprus situation had been almost wholly
limited to the Guarantor Powers, the period after the United Kingdom's approach to the United States
of America in the search for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus threw the doors open to wider international
involvement. The proposal put forward by the British Government envisaged the creation of a force made
up of contingents drawn from a number of NATO member states. It was a NATO-based proposal, and
was never a plan for a NATO peace-keeping force per Se. However, the idea was wholly opposed by
Archbishop Makarios on the basis that he felt that any force based on a NATO structure would
automatically be biased in favour of Turkey. Therefore, after several days of consideration, the
Archbishop formally rejected the plan. This rejection was made easier by the fact that in his opposition
to such a force he was supported by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Soviet Government even went so far
as to make clear their feelings over the issue through the international distribution of a letter that outlined
their position in no uncertain terms.
This important action by the USSR effectively stalled plans to widen the force. With a potentially
dangerous East-West split now beginning to become apparent the plans for a NATO based force were
again put to Makarios in such a way as to try to make them more palatable. However, the Archbishop
proved to be implacable. Indeed, the backlash resulting from the wider Greek Cypriot community as a
whole to the idea of any form of NATO involvement was such that it made the United Kingdom's
military position in Cyprus untenable. Unable to replace the JTF as planned, the options for the British
Government, and for the western alliance as a whole, were now extremely limited. With this in mind the
British Government approached the United Nations Security Council, on 15 February, and asked for the
Security Council to be convened.
1. The United States Becomes Involved
It is clear from the events in the period leading up to the end of the London Conference that the United
Kingdom was far more concerned about the Cyprus Crisis than the United States. However, the military
pressures on the British Government arising from keeping the Truce Force at a size necessary to meet
its requirements meant that some alternative arrangement had to be found. If the NATO-based option
were to be an option then the United States would have to be encouraged to take a more positive role than
had hitherto been the case. Realising this, the British Government highlighted the possibility of wider
organisational problems for NATO arising from a Greco-Turkish split as their main tactic to try to
encourage the United States' participation in the plans as presented at the end of January. However, as
United States Undersecretary of State George Ball wrote in his memoirs:
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'[1] stated emphatically [to the British] that the United States did not want to become involved;
we [the US] already had far too much on our plate.. .But the British were adamant. They would
no longer carry the Cyprus burden alone, even though involving the United Nations risked
giving the Communist countries leverage in that strategically placed island. The United Nations
would dither and the Turks would not wait; tired of continued outrages against Turkish
Cypriotes [sic], they would invade. Then we would have a full-scale war between two NATO
allies in the eastern Mediterranean."
Although this threat to go to the United Nations was in all likelihood a bluff by the British Government,2
there is evidence that the United Kingdom was ready to follow the United Nations path if the United
States declined to assist in the formulation of a NATO-based peace-keeping force. 3 The United Kingdom
had, by this point, a considerable number of troops engaged in the operation in Cyprus, and given both
the apparently open ended nature of the operation and the manpower difficulties, such a role could not
continue indefinitely. If the United States chose to neglect the issue on the grounds that it was not vital
to the West, then the British could not be expected to adopt a hardline attitude on the issue simply for
the sake of NATO. Although such an approach could constitute a threat to the SBAs both politically and
militarily, this would have to be risked if the United States declined to become involved directly.
It therefore was now clear to the United States that it would have to take notice of the British
threat to leave Cyprus to its own devices, as this move by the United Kingdom could pave the way for
a Turkish intervention and thus lead to a Greco-Turkish war. Indeed, the British threat seemed to set the
alarm bells ringing in the State Department, and Undersecretary Ball, seeking advice from colleagues,
met with the United States' Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson.
Stevenson's reaction proved to be strongly in favour of United States' intervention in the crisis stating:
'the only way to deal with Makarios...was by "giving the old bastard absolute hell".' 4 This meeting was
followed by a discussion between Ball and the United States' Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara,
that same afternoon, 25 January. McNamara although expressing his concern at the widening of US
responsibilities was nonetheless able to appreciate the seriousness of the situation in the Mediterranean.5
Perhaps on the basis of these two opinions expressed to Ball, President Johnson, later that evening,
directed the Undersecretary to come up with, 'an acceptable solution.' 6 Although this did not amount to
a firm agreement to the British proposal, it undoubtedly represented a sign of hope that the United States
was by now taking a serious interest in the difficulties presented by the evolving Cyprus situation.
The next day, 26 January, the British Government took another chance to outline its position to
the United States' Government when Prime Minister Douglas-Home, as well as the Foreign, Defence and
Commonwealth Secretaries met with the visiting US Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, at Chequers.
At the meeting Sandys again outlined the initial British reasons for intervening in Cyprus referring to the
United Kingdom as the 'closest fire brigade available.' 7 He went on to explain that by this point,
however, the intercommunal situation was such that a total military presence of around ten thousand
troops was needed in order to continue to preserve order:
'Britain was not prepared to undertake this commitment alone, some form of international force
would be necessary. No one was very keen on encouraging the United Nations to take too
prominent a role and the most promising idea was perhaps not a NATO police force, but a force
comprising contingents from individual NATO countries.'8
At this point Sandys specifically mentioned the role of the United States stating: 'if the United States
agreed, other NATO powers, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany for example, will be prepared
to play their part.' 9 Kennedy responded to this by asking a number of questions about the force, for
example: how the British saw the situation developing in the long term? and how long did the British
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expect the force to remain in place?
Without answering either of these questions directly, Prime Minister Douglas-Home responded
using the threat to NATO's organisational coherence once again, stating: 'if violence got out of hand,
the British troops had orders to return to the Southern [sic] Base area. When they withdrew there would
undoubtedly be a war. Unless therefore we constituted something like an international force a war would
be inevitable. As to the end result, no one could see with any certainty; but it looked as if partition would
be the only answer."° At this point the conversation on Cyprus ended with Kennedy promising, 'to take
the matter up with the President on his return to Washington'."
Indeed, the idea must have been of concern to the United States, as the next morning the group
assembled once again, this time in London. At the meeting the Foreign Secretary told Kennedy that,
following a request from the State Department, the British Government was sending the Vice-Chief of
the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Harding Baker, to Washington to discuss a
number of questions relating to the structuring of an international police force to be sent to Cyprus.' 2 In
addition, the Prime Minister noted that by all accounts the Turkish Government were moving for defacto
partition of the island, a move that would be wholeheartedly opposed by Makarios: 'since he wished to
control the whole island."3
Despite a number of contacts between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United
States over the previous few days, the initial public reaction to the proposal by the Johnson
Administration was non-committal.' 4 However, a further Turkish threat - substantiated by another
military build-up at the port city of Iskenderun - given on 28 January by Prime Minister !nönU to US
Ambassador Hare seemed to set alarm bells ringing. In reporting back to Washington, Hare stated: 'that
the Turks were going to invade unless [given] some kind of answer [to the proposal] by the next
morning'
With this renewed threat by Turkey and the British threat to withdraw, President Johnson
decided to call a high-level meeting attended by Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, Undersecretaries of State George Ball and Averill Harriman as well as several
Congressmen.' 6 At the end of which the President had reached a decision. The next morning, 29 Januaiy,
the British government was told that United States did have an interest in participating in the NATO
force. However, this offer was presented on the condition that two important provisions be met: (1) that
the Cyprus Government approve of such a force, and (2) that the three Guarantor Powers suspend their
rights of intervention for three months. Perhaps in order to give weight to this Johnson sent General
Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), to both Athens and
Ankara to warn the governments of both countries of the danger that a Greco-Turkish split over the issue
of Cyprus could have on the NATO alliance as a whole.'7
The fact that the plan for a peace-keeping force made up of contingents from NATO countries
had been approved behind the scenes meant that there were press rumours that Turkish Government had
begun seriously to consider withdrawing from the ailing London Conference. However, the Turkish
Foreign Minister went to see Butler at the Foreign Office to explain that, contrary to the media reports,
no firm decision had yet been made by Prime Minister tnönii. However, Erkin did state that a stand
would be taken on the basis of the conversation he would now have with them.' 8 At this point Butler
asked Erkin about whether Turkey had accepted to join the proposed international force. In replying to
this Erkin laid down two conditions. In the first instance he stated that the Turkish Government believed
that the Turkish contingent to the force should be numbered between 2,000 and 2,500 men, and that the
Greek contingent should also be raised. The second was that the commander-in-chief of the force would
have executive powers to handle military matters given the fact that these were at present being 'held up
by the Cyprus Government [sic]'.'9 Butler responded to this by making it clear that both these proposals
would be extremely difficult to meet, at which point the Turkish Foreign Minister attempted to introduce
a third condition, 'namely that some indication should be given of the nature of the constitutional
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settlement before the force was created.' 2° Butler made it clear that this demand would be impossible to
meet, at which point Erkin asked whether the British Government might prove to be sympathetic to the
idea of federation. In his reply, Butler stated that the United Kingdom had not discounted any idea as far
as a solution to the continuing situation was concerned. At the end of the meeting Erkin left without
indicating his decision on whether to continue in the Conference, but in any case he stated that he would
be staying in London a few days longer. 2 ' Yet, given the rejection of many of the demands made by
Erkin, it came as little surprise to the British Government that the next day, 29 January, the Turkish
delegation decided to withdraw from the Conference. 22 This was officially cited by the Turks as having
been done on the grounds that there had been no significant movement forward on the various
constitutional problems that had been put before the delegations. 23 An interesting statement indeed if one
considers that an equal degree of the intransigence leading to this had been as a result of the wish of the
Turkish Government not to move on its proclaimed demands.
2. The Greek Cypriots Oppose NATO Involvement
The plan for an international peace-keeping force, as introduced by Palamas, was in fact first discussed
with the Greek Cypriot leadership on 24 January when Palamas urged the Greek Cypriots to accept the
idea on the basis that should Turkey decide to act then Greece would be unable to defend the island.24
At the same time the Greek Foreign Minister: 'warned the Cyprus delegation that Turkey was threatening
to take unilateral military action and that it would do so even if we made a recourse to the Security
Council.' 25 Although the matter had been brought up as a proposal by the United Kingdom earlier and
rejected by the Greek Cypriots, the fact that Greece was now seriously considering the whole subject
made the issue all the more important. However, the Greek Cypriots were opposed to the NATO option
for precisely the reason why Greece was in favour of it, i.e. because Turkey was militarily stronger than
Greece. In other words, Greece, realising that it was militarily weaker and that any war between itself and
Turkey would be catastrophic, therefore decided that NATO would prove to be the best available
framework within which to work. As for the Greek Cypriots, the case against NATO is explained by
Glafkos Clerides, the then President of the House of Representatives, who states:
'There was a school of thought and certainly there are still certain people who believe that the
proposal for the establishment of a NATO peace-keeping force and its stationing in Cyprus
should have been accepted. They believed that if Cyprus became a NATO country or, after the
events of 1963, invited a NATO force into Cyprus, the objective of Enosis could have been
realised and Turkey would have been prevented from intervening.
This view is erroneous. If Enosis had been declared unilaterally, NATO would not have
used its forces to prevent Turkey from landing forces in Cyprus. Its role would have been
confined to preventing war between Greece and Turkey and by pressing Greece to offer Cypriot
territory to Turkey. This would have led to partition. If, after the events of 1963, a NATO peace-
keeping force had been stationed in Cyprus, non-aligned and Eastern Bloc support would have
been reduced to a bare minimum. NATO interests in Turkey, which were always stronger than
NATO interests in Greece, would have continued to be so.'26
Despite this concern, the Greek Government pressed the Greek Cypriots to accept the plan, and, if not,
then at least to reconsider the British proposal presented at the London Conference (which had been
rejected by the Greek Cypriots on 22 January): 'as an agenda for discussion.' 27 However, the Greek
Cypriots refused to discuss the idea of accepting the British proposal on the basis that the Turkish
Government had, by this point, declared partition to be the only solution, and had left the conference.28
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The Greek Cypriot Backlash to the Rumours of NATO Involvement
The final failure of the London Conference caused by Turkey's withdrawal coupled with considerable
speculation over the United Kingdom's move to seek the support of the United States - although at this
point still publicly unconfirmed - resulted in an almost immediate and vehement backlash from within
much of the Greek Cypriot community. Indeed, there had already been a considerable revision of opinion
about the whole nature and agenda of the Conference, with considerable media energy being expended
on claiming that the United Kingdom had deliberately set out to deceive the Greek Cypriots. For
example, Makhi, a right wing pro-enosis newspaper stated: 'the West has betrayed us. We have waited
long enough. Our warnings have gone unheeded. We shall not commit suicide in the smothering embrace
of the so-called free world.' 29 The liberal newspaper Eleftheria went even further in its criticism of
British, and Western, political action. Although taking pains to defend the actions of the British peace-
keeping troops with the comment: 'the British Army cannot be blamed for its mission. It simply executes
its duties assigned to it, and let this be understood by all' 30, it nonetheless went on to say that: 'those
guilty are the politicians. Let us invite the protection of France, even of Russia, since those on whom we
have reckoned are denying it to us.' 31 As rumours about a NATO-based force spread, the Greek Cypriot
press continued to oppose the idea vehemently. Using vast amounts of editorial commentary the press
made numerous references to NATO being a means by which to allow Turkey to intervene, comments
that persisted despite the fact that there was a rumoured acceptance for the 'NATO force' idea from the
Greek Government - an accusation made by the communist party. 32 As the days went on the increased
anti-NATO rhetoric33 was matched by a corresponding increase in active support for the option of
developing a role for the Soviet Union in the continuing Cyprus situation. A view favoured across all
sections of the political spectrum, including the political right for whom Greece was 'the Motherland'.
Although rejected by the wider Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot reaction to the
rumoured proposal appeared to be favourable as Turkey, the most likely to use these powers, had already
announced, through deputy-Prime Minister Satir, that NATO troops were on their way. 35 Indeed, the
wider NATO support of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States to the idea would,
under other circumstances, have almost surely have meant that the danger of an escalation beyond Cyprus
to Greece and Turkey would have diminished. Yet the Greek Cypriots under President Makarios were
not so easily led. With it becoming ever more clear that the decision over some form of NATO force
would be officially announced at any moment the situation took a turn for the worse. Makarios, speaking
at a news conference, on 30 January, insisted that if troops were to be placed in Cyprus they should come
from the UN. 36 In his statement he said:
'The stationing of troops in Cyprus from Nato or any other countries with the object of
preventing possible clashes between the island's Greeks and Turks is not necessary at all. I think
that, on the contrary, the presence of Cyprus of these troops would complicate the situation and
lead eventually to many adventures. Turkey can greatly contribute to the internal pacification of
the island and the return to normality if she stops her threats of intervention, which constitute
a constant encouragement to the Turkish Cypriots to resort to provocative acts and disturbances.
If the presence of troops is required, these troops must be United Nations troops whose main
object should be to repel outside intervention.'37
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3. The Soviet Union Becomes Involved
As if to add further weight to this, the Soviet Union suddenly became involved. The Soviet Government,
like that of the United States, had seemed curiously detached from the events in Cyprus at the beginning
of the fighting. In looking at statements made by the Soviets during the first month following the start
of the Cyprus situation there are two things that are immediately stnki.... (1) the general lack of comment
on the subject, and, (2) the relatively low level that these comments came from. For example, on 31
December the Soviet Ambassador in Nicosia, Mr. Yermoshin, in a meeting with Foreign Minister
Kypnanou stated that the Soviet Union rejected external intervention in the situation and that Turkey had
been made aware of this feeling. 38 Thus perhaps indicating that while the Soviet Union supported Cyprus
in its attempts to prevent Turkish intervention, it did not take a direct stand on the formation of the Joint
Truce Force. 39 Following this comment, the Cyprus Public Servants Trade Union sent a cable to
Yermoshin expressing thanks to the Soviet Union, and AKEL, the Greek Cypriot communist party, sent
a telegram to Moscow in which it congratulated the Soviet Government for, 'its expressed unreserved
support towards the Government and people of Cyprus.'4°
Yet somewhat embarrassingly, the reply from Moscow to these was that the statement from
Ambassador Yermoshin was from the Soviet Union's Embassy in Nicosia and did not reflect hard and
fast policy on the part of the Government of the Soviet Union. 4' Indeed, in terms of the decision-making
hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, was not even
a member of the all-important Politburo.42 It was therefore likely that a variance had thus arisen between
Soviet Foreign Ministry and the party on the issue which thus forced the Foreign Ministry to recant
somewhat on their earlier statement.43
The only other direct voice of support from the Soviet Union in this period was a statement
released in Nicosia by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which, purporting to speak, '[un the
name of millions of Soviet people', accused 'some NATO members' of armed intervention in the internal
affairs of Cypms. In addition, it declared its solidarity with the, 'courageous and peace-loving people
of Cyprus who are fighting selflessly for the abolition of unequal treaties and for complete
independence.' 45 Yet, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee was not strictly an organ of the Soviet
Union's Government. It was in fact a non-governmental, anti-colonial wing of the Non-Aligned
movement which had affiliates in a number of countries. 46 The role of such an organisation was therefore
not to present official Soviet foreign policy, but may instead be seen as a mechanism by which to send
out feelers as to the extent to which possible foreign policy options would be acceptable. As such any
statement made by it emanating from the Soviet Union must be regarded with caution if used to interpret
Soviet foreign policy on Cyprus. Indeed, the Soviet Union seemed more than a little touchy about any
inference of involvement with Makarios at this point. When Denkta made a claim in January that the
Soviet Ambassador had a meeting with Makarios on the evening of 28 December, at which the
constitutional issue had been discussed, the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia was quick to reply with the
following statement.
'The Embassy of the Soviet Union considers it imperative to state that the statement of Mr.
Denktash constitutes a big slander and is the result of imagination from beginning to end.. .this
provocative statement aims at taking away the attention of the public opinion from the real
causes of the bloody facts in Cyprus.'47
However, on 13 January, the same day as the Butler-Erkin meeting was occurring in London prior to the
opening of the Conference, Denkta made another statement in which he played on the West's fear of
communist expansion in the region, stating that once the 'Turkish factor' had been removed, there would
be, 'a communist coup in Cyprus and it would be a communist base. That is why Cyprus is a Cuba in the
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Eastern Mediterranean.' In addition, he once again claimed that Makarios had the backing of the
Communists in his proposal to amend the constitution. 48 Indeed, Denkta had been noted as saying that
Makarios deliberately worked to bring the Soviet Union into the Cyprua Crisis. The main point of interest
surrounding this argument is the release of a statement to the press condemning any moves made by
NATO in Cyprus.
On 29 January the official Soviet TASS newsagency, released a statement in which the
Government of the Soviet Union noted that the, 'tense situation that has lately developed around Cyprus
is a matter of acute concern to the international public.' On the subject of the London Conference, the
statement continued by stating that,
'They [the Western Powers] are aiming at an encroachment on the freedom and independence
of Cyprus.. .They are busy on a plan for some kind of an international force allegedly to protect
Cypriots from Cypriots. The force is presented as an international one, but in reality it proves to
be a force of the aggressive military-colonial Nato grouping.. .It is the major Nato Powers which
intend to send the troops to Cyprus, primarily those who are already accustomed to using their
troops against the national liberation movement of the peoples.. .It is claimed that these troops
would bring order to Cyprus, protect Cyprus and Cypriots. Do they think in certain western
capitals that people.. .become so obtuse as to believe that a force of this kind could serve such
a purpose? Commonsense indicates that a State which for decades sought to subjugate Cyprus,
to suppress its population, to maintain its military base there and hence to threaten the
neighbouring Arab States is least suited for protecting the people of Cyprus.. .Certain participants
in the London conference on Cyprus are aiming to bring the situation to the point of
incandescence.. .to say that only machineguns, guns and aircraft are the means which can be used
for ensuring order on Cyprus.'49
In addition a letter was addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Dr. Fedorenko, the
Soviet Union's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, which berated U Thant for having sent
an observer to Cyprus, and stated: 'It is the Security Council which, under the charter, is responsible for
taking practical measures to maintain international peace and security.'5°
With regard to Denkta's allegations that Makarios encouraged the Soviet Union to become
involved in Cyprus, there have been many arguments presented discussing whether the Soviets took an
interest in the issue out of pure opportunism or whether such opportunism was encouraged by Makarios.
There are pros and cons to both views, and answers to this point do not seem to present a split along clear
communal lines. Although most Turkish Cypriots assert that Makarios approached the Soviet Union,5'
there are those who see it in terms of each approaching the other at the same time. 52 And although there
are those, including one prominent communist figure on the island, 53 who have stated that they believed
that Makarios went to the Soviet Union, 54 many Greek Cypriots deny this. 55 But like the Turkish Cypriots,
there are those who see the diplomatic process as being two-way in nature.56 It is this blurred middle
ground which seems to present the most convincing answer. If one assesses the debate by incorporating
other pieces of evidence then it would seem to be the case that, on balance, Makarios encouraged the
Soviet Union, which had itself become interested in the discussions about a possible NATO force. The
emphasis must however remain on the fact that Makarios encouraged the Soviet Union, rather than the
argument that the Soviet Union deliberately pressured Makarios. Further evidence for this was the fact
that the TASS statement had noted that 'the Government of Cyprus had informed the Soviet Government'
[emphasis added by the author] that there was now 'a serious danger of aggression against Cyprus.'57
This fear on the part of the Greek Cypriots could well have been expressed at what was described as a
'long meeting' between the acting-Cypriot Foreign Minister Araouzos and the Soviet Ambassador




favourably to the plan.67
Needless to say, the plan was almost immediately rejected by the Cypriot Foreign Minister,
Spyros Kyprianou. 68 In this Kyprianou was backed by five of the main Cypriot labour organisations,
including the Civil Service Association, which denounced any NATO activity in Cyprus and held true
to Makarios's line by insisting that the United Nations alone should be responsible for such a force.69
However, President Makarios initially chose to remain silent on the matter. This was diplomatically
achieved by the release of a statement that noted that the Archbishop had not been officially presented
with the plan. 7° Yet this was obviously a delaying tactic as Makarios had by this point already made up
his mind on the substantive points of the plan. Evidence for this comes from a meeting of the Greek
Cypriot Cabinet, held on the morning of 1 February, when the plan was reported to have firmly rejected
as being 'totally unacceptable'. 7 ' Despite this, the next morning acting-British High Commissioner
Pickard paid a visit to Makarios at which he officially presented the President with a full set of the draft
proposals for the establishment of a peace-keeping force.72
With it now looking likely that Makarios would formally reject the proposals, the military
position of the Truce Force, which was considered to be very fragile within the overall political situation,
was once again highlighted, and the United Kingdom attempted to use this weakness as a bargaining tool
with Makarios in order to persuade him to accept the peace-keeping plan. Indeed, Cyril Pickard, by now
the acting-High Commissioner in Cyprus, went to see Makarios to deliver a message in which the
following appraisal of the situation and plans for action were presented:
'1. I wish clearly to state that in the view of the British military authorities the situation in the
island is such that it is urgently necessary to augment the peace-keeping force. Any delay will
be dangerous to the maintenance of peace in the island.
2. Any negative response will add to the already tense situation.
3. I therefore formally request that in no circumstances should any indication be given to the
Press that the Government of Cyprus will reject the proposals now being mutually considered
in London. The Government of Cyprus bears a heavy responsibility for the continued
maintenance of peace in the island. Its responsibility is not only to the people of Cyprus
themselves but also to Britain as the country providing the peace-keeping force.'73
Despite the urgency of the appeal no answer was forthcoming and so US Ambassador Wilkins and
acting-High Commissioner Pickard made another, joint visit to the President. 74 Yet still Makarios refused
to give his answer and therefore several days of tension and speculation began as a formal reply was
awaited. Once again the Greek Cypriot press took to attacking the Governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom. 75 One newspaper even went as far as to invoke the spirit of Suez and called upon
the Soviet Union to come to the assistance of the Republic of Cyprus. 76 However, and in contrast to the
attitude of President Makarios, Vice-President KUçiik announced that the Turkish Cypriot community
accepted the peace-keeping plan 'in principle', and that a firm reply would be given soon.77
Greek Cypriot Political Violence Against the Peace-keeping Proposal
The next day there was a demonstration held in Nicosia by thousands of Greek Cypriot students.
Marching past the Embassies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, they chanted anti-NATO
slogans, and protested about the proposed allied force by carrying banners proclaiming, 'Down with
Nato', 'Shame on Nato', and 'Wir Wollen kein neues Berlin' (We do not want a new Berlin). 78 Although
the group was later broken up by Makarios himself, these tensions naturally gave way to further
intercommunal fighting. Indeed that day there was another serious incident in Nicosia as a number of
Greek Cypriot police crossed the Green-Line near the Paphos gate to the east of the old town. Almost
immediately the Truce Force went to the scene where a lieutenant of the Parachute Regiment assisted by
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troops of the Royal Artillery managed to disarm the Greek Cypriots all the while trying to prevent the
Turkish Cypriots from firing upon the Greeks as they retreated. 79 In what proved to be an unfortunately
realistic appraisal, The Times stated that following this incident 'concern was being expressed in Nicosia
tonight that the growing tension may lead to incidents involving the British Truce Force.' 8° Indeed, the
next day, editorials in the Greek Cypriot press stated that the United Kingdom had 'collaborated' with
the Turkish Cypriots.8'
These demonstrations further exemplified the extent to which the Greek Cypriots were adopting
a pro-Russian, anti-NATO line in order to have the issue of peace-keeping taken to the United Nations
Security Council. In order to counter this, the State Department informed the Foreign Office that they
had developed a six-point warning to present to Makarios (as well as Cypriot Permanent Representative
Rossides in New York) in order the try to dissuade him from following the recourse to the United
Nations. The threats - and that is not too contentious a word in this case - were as follows:
'(a) if the Archbishop goes to the United Nations the United States Government will take the
position that the question is not one of a threat to the territorial integrity and political
independence of Cyprus but of a dispute between two groups within the state.
(b ) The United States will insist that both parties to the dispute should be heard by the Security
Council (Mr. Eilts [the US State Department official who communicated the message] said that
Mr. Rossides could therefore expect company!).
(c) In any debate the United States will place the full blame for the situation on Archbishop
Makarios personally and contrast his attitude with the constructive attitude shown by Dr.
Kutchuk.
(d ) The United States will ask the Security Council to instruct the Secretary-General to mediate
the dispute and will express the hope that he will choose a European mediator.
(e ) The United States will oppose any United Nations peace-keeping operation. They will do
this on the grounds that in the past it has fallen on them to finance by far the largest part of most
U.N. operations of this sort and that the Russians have not so far paid for any.
(f) If unrest develops in the island and the Turkish Government decide to intervene, the United
States Government will take the line that they are perfectly within their rights under the Treaty
of Guarantee.'82
This particularly strong approach found favour with the British Government who felt that it went a
considerable way towards communicating to Makarios the need to avoid any recourse to the United
Nations. 83 However the United States soon sent another message through in which they stated that they
had dropped point (d) on the basis that this is probably what Makarios would like to see happen, and
instead had chosen to include a further point in which they would state that,
'If the Cypriots and the Russians try to take the Cyprus question to the General Assembly the
American Government does not think that they can get very far because of the liability of the
Russians to lose their vote in the General Assembly under Article 19 by reason of their arrears
in payment of financial contributions.'84
Whether Makarios was given this warning is unclear. 85 In any case on the following day, 4 February,
Makarios finally returned his answer. Stating that he had accepted the plan in principle, he nonetheless
maintained his position on the question of some form of overall United Nations' Security Council
responsibility for the force. 86 Despite the superficially positive aspect of an acceptance, the continued




Despite the fact that Makarios had agreed to accept the plan in principle, popular feelings against
the United States took a drastic turn for the worse. That evening, in a move reminiscent of the EOKA
years, two bombs exploded outside the US Embassy in Nicosia. 87 Makarios, in a public statement, stated
that, 'the culprits are the worst enemies of Cyprus...they have betrayed their country.' 88 Indeed, the extent
to which the Greek Cypriot community was by now relying on the Soviet Union to protect its interests
was perhaps beginning to worry the Greek Cypriot leadership. In London, Foreign Minister Kyprianou,
in conversation with the Greek Ambassador, allegedly spoke of the fact that he had got the impression
that back on the island the Greek Cypriot leadership was 'increasingly worrying about the increase of
communist pressure, and the bomb incidents yesterday had clearly scared them.' 89 In addition Kyprianou
noted that while 'he was now rather more optimistic, he was depressed by the way in which pro-
Communist and pro-Russian sentiments were now being used indiscriminately by all shades of Cypriot
political opinion.' 90 Indeed, there were now signs that some factions of the Greek Cypriot media were
engaged in trying to moderate the fiery tone of their compatriots. 9' Perhaps with a perception of the need
to draw some sections of the Greek Cypriot leadership back towards the West, the United Kingdom and
the United States responded to Makarios' s conditional acceptance with a statement in which they agreed
to UN Security Council authorisation, but only on the condition that the composition and instructions of
the force be decided on beforehand.92
With this attempted movement forward on the issue of the political control of a peace-keeping
operation there was at last a feeling that a credible force might soon be put in place. Yet, a questionable
signal as to how much the United Nations Secretariat wanted to avoid a further commitment on its part -
thus defacto favouring the Anglo-US proposal - came with a statement made by the Secretary-General
which made it clear that the Organisation could not afford to foot the bill for any proposed operation even
if it did nominally come under United Nations auspices. 93 Indeed, in a highly important move that seemed
to indicate the personal support of the United Nations' Secretary-General for the ideas put forward by
the United Kingdom and the United States, U Thant deliberately set on record his thanks to the United
Kingdom for its efforts since the beginning of the crisis and noted that the 'British actions were fully
in accordance with Article 33 of the U.N. Charter - dealing with peaceful settlement of disputes
and were "very appropriate".' [special emphasis added by the author] 94 This was followed the next
day by meetings between Thant (assisted by his advisor on Cyprus, Ralph Bunche) and the
representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union at which, 'a lot
of ground was covered.'95
However any such optimism at the diplomatic level was being tempered by the continuing
intercommunal violence across the island which the British troops of the Truce Force had to deal with.
For example a press report noted: 'British Parachute troops today [5 February] set up a neutral zone in
the village of Ktima, near Paphos, where the situation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was "very,
very tense", a British military Spokesman said.' 96 Nearer Nicosia the situation was just as bad, if not
worse. The village of Ayios Sozomenos, about fifteen miles south of the city, experienced some of the
worst intercommunal fighting of the entire period when a number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were
killed or wounded before troops of the 16 Parachute Brigade were able to establish a cease-tire in the
village. In spite of this agreement the situation in the village, like Ktima, remained on the verge of
another outbreak of violence. Indeed, the intercommunal fighting on the island was getting so bad that
there were renewed fears that Turkey might take the opportunity to intervene, in which case certain
elements of the Greek armed forces had made it clear that they would make a concerted effort to react.97
Yet at this point there was another important consideration to be taken into account with regard
to the formation of a NATO-based force: the extent to which NATO members were willing to participate.
In the initial plan, as put forward by Greece, the idea was that the force would be made up of
contributions from the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy and France. However, the French had
maintained a certain degree of disinterest in the proposals, even though the idea for a NATO-based force,
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as opposed to a NATO force had been pushed precisely because it was felt to be more favourable to the
French.98 However, on 5 February, the French Government announced that it refused to send troops to
participate in the Anglo-US proposed force for Cyprus. 99 The reasons for this were officially cited by M.
Peyrefitte, the French Information Minister, as being the result of a lack of desire on the part of France,
'to become involved in an operation based on the Zurich statute, in whose elaboration she did not
participate, and which moreover does not seem to her to be capable of lasting
Two days prior to this, a special conference of the West German Cabinet - that had included the
Chief of the Bundeswehr'°' - called to discuss some form of participation had adjourned without reaching
a decision.'°2 By this point the situation was appraised as follows:
The following Governments have agreed in principle to participate; Denmark, The
Netherlands, and Belgium. The following have said that they will probably participate and have
agreed to start military planning with the War Office through their attaché in London without
commitment; Canada.
2. The following have agreed to start military planning with the War Office without
commitment; Norway and Italy. The following have said that they cannot send troops; France,
Portugal and Luxembourg.
3. This leaves only the Germans outstanding from the point of view of military
planning."°3
It was by now clear that there was a degree of interest in the plan being shown by various members of
NATO. Despite the fact that France had refused to participate, it looked as if a credible force might yet
still be formed. However, the any plans to institute the force was still reliant on a firm acceptance from
Makarios, who was against the idea. With pro-Russian sympathy rife in the Greek Cypriot community,
if not the Greek Cypriot leadership, the Soviet Union finally took a stand on the issue of a NATO-based
force for Cyprus.
5. Khrushchev's 'Offensive' Letter
On 7 February, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko summoned the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom,
the United States, France, Greece and Turkey to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. There he presented each
of them with a letter from Chairman Khrushchev. In the letter Khrushchev warned each of the countries
that NATO should not interfere in Cyprus. This was in turn backed up with statements expressing both
support for Makarios, and for the Cypriots, as well as a clear statement of Soviet backing for United
Nations Security Council action.'°4 The long Soviet letter to Douglas-Home outlined, in considerable
detail, the Soviet position on the Cyprus Issue. In summarising the text, it can be seen as containing the
following main points:' (105)
That the situation in Cyprus is essentially a problem between the majority Greek population and
minority Turkish population, and that this difference is being exploited by other countries to become
involved in the internal affairs of the independent Republic of Cyprus.
That those outside powers are, 'trampling on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
the universally accepted norms of International Law', in the search for a solution that suits them, and
not the Cypriots.
That this "solution" is an attempt aimed at the 'factual occupation by the anned forces of N.A.T.O.
of the Republic of Cyprus'.
The full text of the letter can be found in Appendix C.
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• That a small state such as Cyprus, even though it may not possess atomic weapons, is as important
as those states that do, and that the Cypriots alone should be the ones to sort out their problems.
• That open discussion of the Cyprus issue in the UN Security Council is being directly opposed, even
in the face of Cypriot requests, and that everything is being done to intimidate and threaten the
Republic of Cyprus in an attempt to pressure it to drop such proposals.
• That the Soviet Government condemns such actions and asked that the US and Great Britain show
restraint in their actions, and consider the effects and consequences of a 'military invasion'.
• That, 'the area of the Eastern Mediterranean... [is] an area which is not so far removed from the
Southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R., especially if account is taken of how the concept of distance has
changed in our time.'
• That the various international Statesmen involved in the Cyprus issue would be far better employed
if they put their best efforts to prevent further outside intervention in the affairs of the Republic of
Cyprus.
This action clearly went beyond the boundaries of trying to embarrass the NATO alliance. It was a clear
show of the Soviet Union's political intention to force a recourse to the United Nations over the issue.'°6
The fact that they had so pointedly accused NATO of trying to manipulate the situation to gain ground
for military purposes threatened to have severe consequences for the British troops engaged in the Truce
Force. The United Kingdom, furious about the allegations, claimed that not only had Khrushchev totally
misrepresented the situation, but that by doing so had made matters worse. Although the press were not
infonned as to whether Douglas-Home would reply to the letter,'° 7 the Prime Minister did in fact respond
quickly, sending his reply the next day, 8 February. The decision to reply so quickly was made because
'the Prime Minister and I [possibly Butler] consider that this requires a quick and plain reply. We do not
think it is worth taking Khrushchev up in detail but prefer to drive home the simple fact that he is
mischief making and that we are not prepared to take this sort of thing from 108 Without consulting
with the United States Government,' 09 Douglas-Home in his letter of reply stated:
'Dear Mr. Chairman,
I will not conceal from you that I have been surprised and disappointed to receive the
message which you sent me on February 7 about the situation in Cyprus. I am surprised that the
Soviet Government should have formed a view of this question which is so divorced from reality
and I am disappointed that, on the basis of that view, you have seen fit to make charges which
are as offensive as they are unfounded.
Her Majesty's Government have one object in Cyprus. This is to help maintain peace
and security of the island. This was why we acceded to the request of the Government of Cyprus
for the help of British troops in maintaining order. This is why, in consultation with other
governments whose interest in a peaceful solution of the island's problems is beyond question,
we have been seeking agreement of all concerned on further measures to assist the Cypriots in
the task of preserving their security. In all this there is no question, as you claim, of infringing
the sovereignty, independence and freedom of a small state. I must say frankly, Mr. Chairman,
that this is a matter on which the British Government and people consider that they know
without prompting how they should conduct themselves in accordance with their Commonwealth
traditions and in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.
I sincerely hope that you will, on reconsideration, understand that the motives and
actions of the British Government are not the motives and actions described in your message.
I share entirely your view that the situation in Cyprus can only be made more difficult if passions
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are roused, especially when this is the result of external influences. This view has governed and
will govern the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) Alec Douglas-Home"°
6. The JTF Begins to Break Down
The fact that Douglas-Home had replied so swiftly to the communication from Khrushchev did not
reduce the damage incurred from Khrushchev's letter. Though a statement on the search for a NATO-
based force, and not a direct reference to the Truce Force, the letter nonetheless put the British troops of
the JTF in a position of potential danger. For example there was an incident soon thereafter between the
Force and local Greek Cypriot police in Larnaca when the police questioned the rights of the Truce Force
to conduct checks and searches." This led to Greek Cypriot criticisms of the political guidance that was
been given to the JTF. I2 Indeed, the next day at a rally in Nicosia Dr. Dervis stated that the intention
of the United Kingdom and the United States was, 'to invade Cyprus under the cover of NATO."3
In order to counter the problem of a possible Greek Cypriot backlash the British Government,
despite the extreme manpower pressures already being felt, decided to increase further their troops
numbers in Cyprus by sending the 1st Battalion Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment from their position
in Malta."4 In other words, the United Kingdom was being forced to send more troops in an effort to
ensure the operational security of the Truce Force. However, this simply made Greek Cypriot perceptions
of British attempts to influence the situation by overt military means even worse. A spiral of escalation
was now fully in place, and would need to be broken quickly.
With such an increase in violence, the fear that Makarios, now bolstered by Soviet support, might
reject the slightly revised peace-keeping plan now forced the British Government once again to
reappraise the options for the creation of a peace-keeping force. By this point the United Kingdom
seemed to have become increasingly weary of its unilateral action in Cyprus and old options were dusted
off within the corridors of Whitehall. Once more two proposals of specific peace-keeping plans stood out
- both of which had been rejected on a number of other occasions - (a) a Commonwealth force, and (b)
an United Nations force. Of the two the British Government seemed to be more interested in the idea of
a Commonwealth force, an idea that had been rejected on numerous occasions in the previous month.
In a draft policy document on the subject it was stated that this idea could be acceptable as,
'Archbishop Makarios has himself all along said that he would welcome a Commonwealth force.
One means of procedure might therefore be to say to him that, since he has refused the offer we
have put, he must make his own arrangements to obtain the sort of force he wants. If this is to
be from the Commonwealth it is up to him to make approaches to those countries from which
he would wish to obtain troops. We would undertake to support his request in the
Commonwealth capitals concerned and would offer to provide the commander and command
structure for a Commonwealth force, on the understanding that a force sufficient for the
requirements of peace-keeping could be produced. The Archbishop could either ask the Security
Council to take note by consensus of its formation or alternatively he could ask the Security
Council to pass a resolution approving its despatch to Cyprus. Although the Americans have
been opposed to this idea in respect to the allied force, we would have no particular objection
to it ourselves. Insofar as it could possibly be argued that the effect of such a resolution would
be to increase the degree of United Nations responsibility for the force, this would seem a good
thing.
The principal difficulty with this solution is the likelihood that it will in fact prove
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impossible to assemble a sufficiently large or sufficiently varied Commonwealth force (on the
latter point it would seem desirable that there should be a minimum of three other participating
countries in addition to ourselves."5
Although Canada looked to agree to participate given the fact that it had shown some desire to become
involved in the NATO-based peace-keeping force, the problems that had been outlined before with
regard to other participants in a Commonwealth force still seemed to remain. To this extent the pragmatic
option of a United Nations Force needed to be examined once again. On this subject of discussion the
British Government considered there to be a number of organisational problems facing this option, of
which the main practical obstacle was by now the difficulty of financing the force." 6 If the Greek
Cypriots did make a move to the United Nations, then it was more than likely that the United States
would, in line with their earlier statement to Makarios, refuse to finance any resulting force, in which case
the financial burden would be borne by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus." 7 The next
problem would be that of structuring the force. If the matter was put before the United Nations then any
such structure would most likely be undertaken by the Secretary-General," 8 and that would mean that
the doctrine of universality with regard to potential contributors would be applied. However, the British
Government by this point considered that the presence of Eastern European countries, or Afro-Asian
bloc, would, likely as not, be prevented by Greek Cypriot prejudices." 9 The final problem was that, under
the rules set in place by Hammarskjöld during the Suez Crisis, the United Kingdom would in all
probability be wholly excluded from such a force, not least because the United Kingdom had a direct
interest in the problem.' 2° In perhaps the most telling words of the general feeling within the British
Government on the subject of peace-keeping at this point it was stated:
'It would therefore seem to be in our own interests to go for a Commonwealth
force...should this prove impossible to produce, however, it would seem preferable to
accept a United Nations force rather than continue to bear the whole burden of
peacekeeping on our own."2'
However, any such decision to advance on a plan to institute peace-keeping by an international
organisation other than the United Nations was not solely limited to the issue of British acceptance. More
importantly, the Turkish Government had to be persuaded to accept it. Yet possible deadlock to the plan
arising from Turkish intransigence over the introduction of a United Nations force was broken when
Turkey announced, on 10 January, its acquiescence to a plan to link the idea of an international force
with the United Nations rather than specifically to NATO countries. The only provision attached to this
was the Turkish Government's insistence that there be Turkish troops in the Despite this change
on the part of the Turks, the United States was still judged to be less than likely to accept any move away
from the suggested NATO-based peace-keeping plan towards a United Nations force.' 23 In any case, the
genesis of a United Nations peace-keeping force as a serious proposal had now come about.
Indeed, the Greek Cypriots remained firm in their intention to see a peace-keeping force that was
solely under the authority of the United Nations. Therefore even the 'improved' plan of a peace-keeping
force sanctioned, though not controlled, by the United Nations had fallen short of their expectations.
Although it omitted the term NATO, it had in fact only mentioned the vague term of seeking a
"consensus of approval" from the Security Council for the plan.'' Unaware that the British Government
was itself looking seriously at the creation of a United Nations force, the fact that five NATO members -
Canada, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway' - had already come forward to state publicly
their intention to send contingents to join an United Nations force if it were put in place must no doubt
have worried President Makarios, as it was now increasingly looking as though a United Nations force
would, by default of the contingents ready and available to participate, present a NATO based force even
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if the term NATO was omitted. Perhaps with this in mind he once again suggested, in an about turn, that
the previously rejected idea of creating a Commonwealth force be investigated further.
7. The United States Takes the Lead in Diplomacy
Although the British Government was becoming ever more in favour of both the Commonwealth and
the United Nations options as possible means of extricating itself from its role in Cyprus, the United
States remained intent on pursuing the original plan for a peace-keeping force. With the United
Kingdom's support obviously wavering, the United States now took the prominent role in trying to get
Makarios to accept the proposal. To this end, President Johnson despatched an envoy - Undersecretary
George Ball of the State Department - to the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, such was this change in the
attitude of the United States, that The Economist saw fit to comment that: 'Not much is now seen of the
initial American irritation that the British should have needed American help at all. What remains is an
air of harassment."26
On 11 February, Ball met with Prime Minister tnonü, who insisted that in his opinion federation
remained the best solution to the continuing situation in Cyprus.' 27 This was followed immediately by
a trip to Greece where the Undersecretary discussed the Cyprus Crisis with Prime Minister
Paraskevopoulos. In the event, this round of shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara seemed to
provide lop-sided results. Although the Turkish Government expressed their continued acquiescence to
the Anglo-American plan, this was being tempered by a lack of commitment on the part of the Greek
Government who by now refused to accept any plan without prior approval from Makarios.' 28 With this
in mind Ball now went to Nicosia.
Noticeable in amongst this round of shuttle-diplomacy was the fact that a representative of the
British Government was absent. George Ball had in fact invited the Commonwealth Relations Secretary
to join him on the trip, but the offer had been declined. This refusal was attributed by Ball to be, '...out
of a desire to limit Britain's responsibility." 29 Indeed, the British Government, evidently concerned that
the end of the road may have been reached in attempting to keep the matter out of the United Nations
Security Council, at this point approached the United Nations' Secretary-General for consultations. On
12 February, Foreign Secretary Butler paid a personal visit to UN Secretary-General Thant in New York.
Once there, he reportedly discussed a course of action to be adopted in the event of a further rejection
by Makarios of the peace-keeping plan after his meeting with Ball, due to take place the next day.'3°
The Ball Mission to Cyprus
When Undersecretary Ball arrived on the island, the situation in Cyprus was extremely tense as there had
been a large-scale outbreak of intercommunal violence in the major coastal city of Limassol - which had
previously been calm - over the preceding three days. This situation had developed after a number of
Turkish Cypriot irregulars had made several attempts to capture Limassol castle as well as set up fortified
positions in and around the Turkish quarter of town.' 3 ' The fighting had eventually been stopped after
members of the Truce Force took Mr. Veniamin, the District Officer, to meet with the town's Turkish
Cypriot leader, Ramadan Djemil, and a cease-fire agreement had been reached.' 32 Despite the fact that
the main bout of fighting appeared to be over by the time of Ball's appearance, this serious event had in
many ways set the stage for his meeting with Makarios, scheduled for the next day.
At about one in the afternoon (Cyprus time) on 13 February Ball contacted Rusk back in the
United States to discuss the course of action to be taken with Makarios. Noting that the situation in
Cyprus was 'deteriorating', and that the cease-fire agreement in Limassol had just broken down,' 33 Ball
stated that: 'our one hope of salvaging much from the present situation is for me to take a very tough
Rusk, agreeing with this decision, praised the continuing role of Cyril Pickard, the British High
Commissioner, in presenting the Anglo-US position. However, it by now appeared as if Makarios had
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'delivered himself into the hands of local gangsters and that even a large force might be insufficient to
restore order so long as Government does not want to maintain its responsibilities." 35 Ball responded by
stating: 'the real difficulty of course is that he does not want an intemati9nal force and his bloody minded
colleagues would much prefer to leave situation as it is so that they can conduct their murderous activities
with impunity. However, I shall hit him hard on this this afternoon."36
At the two meetings between Makarios and Ball, which were also attended by Pickard, the
Undersecretary took a very hardline position As he notes in his memoirs:
'[I described] in lund detail the consequences if he [Makarios] persisted in his cruel and reckless
conduct. The Turks, I said, would inevitably invade, and neither the United States nor any other
Western power would raise a finger to stop them. Though Makarios tried to conceal his
discomfiture, I had the odd feeling as we left the room that, as I reported to the President, "even
his beard seemed pale"."37
In a report sent back to London, Ball notes that he had called on Makarios as a man of God as well as
a Head of State to accept the plan, however,
'at the conclusion of my speech he said sadly and emotionally that he has to go to the SC
[Security Council because of commitments that had been made. Otherwise, he made clear, his
government would be not only out but dead -- in fact, he said later in the presence of certain of
his ministers, that, if he does not go to the Security Council, "some of those present in this room
will not have their heads on their shoulders." Nobody 	 138
It was by now obvious that the Greek Cypriots had made their minds up that the Security Council was
the only viable option left open. However, the Undersecretary proved to be unfazed by the reaction.
Instead, Ball improvised another set of proposals for a peace-keeping force which he immediately put
to Makarios. In a report to London he explained them as follows:
'1. The GOC [Government of Cyprus] would hold up going to the SC until the latter part of next
week.
2. Meanwhile the US, and hopefully the UK would put their full energies to the establishment
of a force drawn from the UK, India, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland -- arid, "if necessary",
Sweden.
3. The Greek and Turkish contingents would not be included in this force, but they would
remain on the island.
4. The terms of reference of the force would be to "assist the Cypriot Government in restoring
law and order and normal conditions". We shall insist dropping out the words "the Cypriot
Government."["]
5. We had long hassle on the mechanics for guidance. The best proposal I could evolve with
him was that guidance would be under chairmanship of the representative of the UNSYG
[United Nations Secretary-General] who is now on the island or of some other representative of
the UNSYG who would be sent for this purpose.
6. We had a major argument on the last point. Makarios insisted that he be the chairman of the
It is important to note that this statement seems clearly to indicate that the United States had
by this point recognised the Greek Cypriot leadership as the Government of Cyprus, and that the threat
to withdraw this recognition was being used as a stick to get them to agree to the proposals. (Rather than
the promise to recognise them being used as a carrot for such a purpose.)
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committee providing political guidance; otherwise he could not explain it to his people.
Alternatively, he would accept his own Minister of Justice. I made it categorically clear that any
plan was impossible if his government provided the chairmanship of the committee."39
Although Makarios at this point called in three senior members of the Greek Cypriot Government who
had a legal training - Glafkos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Spyros Kyprianou - to discuss the plan,
the situation did not look hopeful. Indeed, Makarios called Ball back to his office later that evening and
presented the Undersecretary with a new set of counter-proposals that had been drawn up by the three
ministers.' 40 In the document the Greek Cypriots made clear their intention to seek a recourse to the
United Nations Security Council to obtain a resolution: 'calling upon all states to refrain from any act
of aggression or from the use of any threat of aggression against, or from any action which may tend to
undermine, the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Cyprus." 4 ' Once this
had been done a force, according to the principles outlined by Ball, would be created. 142 Ball, in an
attempt to change their minds, called on them all to sleep on the various plans before meeting again the
next morning to discuss them.'43
However, it was now more than obvious that the Ball mission had failed. Although the
Archbishop's final answer was still pending, the United States now saw there to be two further options.
Either Ball could return to Ankara and Athens for further consultation, or Sandys could call a conference
in London.' President Johnson supported the latter option as did Douglas-Home and Butler who both
agreed to support Sandys if he went ahead in arranging such a conference between the Turkish and the
Greek Governments.' 45 However, the hopelessness of the situation was summed-up in a message received
from Undersecretary Ball. In it he said that he would now visit Ankara, in order to prevent the Turks
from invading, and not to try to sell them a new plan, and that afterwards he would visit Athens, 'for
reasons of politeness." 46 With this, the United States now seemed to have accepted the inevitability of
a Greek Cypriot recourse to the Security Council. To this extent the State Department explained that if
this came about '[the United States w}ould resist any resolution which undermined the Guarantor Powers
or the Zurich Agreement. The Americans did not mind a "waffly" resolution (e.g., a resolution calling
for no aggression against Cyprus) since nobody would pay attention to it."47
8. Makarios Rejects the Ball Proposals
On the morning of 14 February Makarios told Ball that he had decided to reject the new proposal.' 48 The
Archbishop had decided - in light of the domestic political situation within the Greek Cypriot community
- that it was imperative that he pursue a debate at the United Nations Security Council.' 49 Once the
rejection of the proposal became public Dr. KucUk again stated his belief that Turkey had a duty to
intervene to protect the evermore beleaguered Turkish Cypriot community on the island. This comment
aroused considerable concern as Turkey was reported to be once more gathering its Navy at the port of
Iskenderun.' 5° Indeed, the situation was now such that a full-scale civil war seemed to be looming large
and that such intervention would become necessary. The renewed fighting in Limassol to which Ball had
referred to in his telegrams of 13 February had been intense, and although it fortunately had not resulted
in large-scale casualties,' 5 ' it did nonetheless prove to be a source of concern. Furthermore, political
negotiations between Minister of the Interior Yiorgadjis and Ramadan Djemil, a Turkish Cypriot leader
in the city, had meant that in the difficult political climate that existed by this point the Truce Force had
been forced to sit back and watch until a cease-fire agreement could be negotiated in the early evening.
However, this agreement was broken by Greek Cypriot fighters in the early hours of the morning of 14
February. Deeply concerned about the continuing situation in Limassol, especially after the
announcement that the Ball-Makarios meetings had now failed in entirety, the British High
Commissioner, Cyril Pickard, sent a note to Makarios that indicated his thinking on the events. Laying
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the blame firmly at the door of the Greek Cypriots, the letter stated:
'I propose now to make certain recommendations to my Government as to its future course of
action. Despite reiterated assurances by the President that the forces of the State would not fight
even if provoked, and a specific assurance by the Minister of the Interior last night of a cease fire
in Limassol, at 6 a.m. this morning the Government of Cyprus forces launched a heavy attack.
So far 150 casualties have been reported. Although a cease fire is now precariously maintained,
we cannot ensure peace unless we occupy certain posts, in particular the Turkish Community
Centre, the Castle and the Keo factory, and have the right to patrol. These arrangements have
been refused by the Cypriot authorities. This, taken together with the reluctance of the
Government to agree to the necessary peace-keeping forces and its policies as now explained,
leads me to the conclusion that despite all assurances it is the policy of the Government of
Cyprus to attempt to suppress the Turkish population by armed force. This makes any attempt
at peace-keeping quite impossible. Unless I now have categorical assurances to the contrary, and
these assurances are translated into immediate and public action, I propose to make
recommendations to my Government on the basis of this conclusion.'152
General Carver becomes Commander of the Truce Force
The outbreak of serious fighting in Limassol and the inability of the JTF to handle such intercommunal
strife had profoundly demonstrated that the Truce Force's ability to counter any outbreaks of fighting had
diminished significantly. This had no doubt been assisted by the numerous attacks made on the Force
in the Greek Cypriot press.' 53 Indeed, three days earlier, in what amounted to one of the most serious
incidents concerning the Truce Force, a British soldier had been forced to fire a number of warning shots
over the heads of demonstrators in what was the first incident of its kind since the troops had first been
deployed in December.1M The viability of the Truce Force was now seriously in doubt. If the force was
to regain the initiative it would have to be restructured to meet the organisational pressures that had now
developed as a consequence of island wide fighting.
With this in mind, and despite the tacit threat to withdraw the British forces as indicated in
Pickard's note to Makarios, the British Government replaced Major-General Young as Commander of
the Joint Truce Force. Returning to his duties as GOC Cyprus District, General Young - who had in fact
been well regarded by the Greek Cypriots' 55 - was replaced by Major-General Michael Carver who
arrived on the same day as the Pickard note was delivered. Almost immediately, Carver aroused the
suspicions of the Greek Cypriot leadership as he attempted to change the Truce Force from an ad hoc
humanitarian action into a full-scale military force.' 56 Indeed, with General Carver came the divisional
headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division - the principal operation army headquarters of the United
Kingdom Strategic Reserve. Although there were some comments that tried to link Young's replacement
to criticisms about the way in which he had handled the Limassol fighting,' 57 the official reason for this
change-over of command was cited as follows:
'The urgency of establishing the Joint Force made [the appointment of General Young]
necessary as a short-term arrangement, but it was recognised that if, in the absence of an early
political solution, the life of the Joint Force had to be prolonged, it would be essential to appoint
a full time commander. This has now been done."58
The replacement of General Young by Carver was done in order to facilitate a general restructuring of
the force needed in light of the events of the previous few weeks. Throughout the month of February,
there had been a steady increase in the number of troops arriving in Cyprus and this had seen a
corresponding increase the number of men participating in the force. In addition to the battalion from
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Malta, two armoured car squadrons of the Life Guards, the 26th Regiment; Royal Artillery, the 1st
Battalion, Royal Inniskiffing Fusiliers, and a squadron of the Royal Dragoons had by now arrived for duty
in the island. With these new troops the total number of men in Cyprus participating in the Truce Force
now lay at around 7,000. 159 Although General Carver was not due officially to replace General Young
until the 19 February, 160 on his arrival Carver began the process by which the force was restructured in
such a way as to place two intermediate headquarters between Carver's Divisional HG and the troops
in the field carrying out operations. To this extent the island of Cyprus was divided into two areas; the
Eastern and the Western Tactical Headquarters. According to defence commentators writing at the time,
this change meant that British troops serving on the island would now be able to react more quickly to
local disturbances.' 61 However, this expansion of operations in Cyprus placed Britain in a very tight
position as regarded its overall worldwide position. As The Times noted: 'with the departure of the HQ
[3rd Division], the UK Strategic Reserve is now, for all practical purposes, totally committed to
operations outside the United Kingdom." 62 With the departure of this important part of the United
Kingdom's military structure Britain would now be unable to counter any new threats that could arise
elsewhere on the international stage.
9. The United Kingdom Moves to the Security Council
In light, or even despite, of this pressure on Britain's military capabilities Undersecretary Ball made a
final last-ditch attempt to secure a peace-keeping force within the bounds of the West. Under a new plan
put to the British Government, the United States suggested that Makarios and the Greek Cypriot
Government be bypassed. Instead, the Guarantor Powers would form a new tri-partite peace-keeping
force in Cyprus. Ball, explaining the operational mechanics of the proposal, stated:
'All patrols would be organised on the pattern followed in Vienna during the four-power
occupation after World War II - only this time, three, rather than four, men in a jeep - and all
operations would be conducted together. The force would stay in Cyprus until an effective
international force, within the framework of the United Nations, had not only been created but
was actually on the Ground, or until a political settlement had "been reached and translated into
a viable organic document.".. .If the British went along with my scheme, I had no doubt that
Inonu would accept it. But the British wanted above all to divest themselves of responsibility for
Cyprus; my scheme would reinject them into the mess."63
However, by this point the difficulties inherent in peace-keeping in an increasingly unfriendly, if not
hostile, environmentiM ensured that the British Government had had enough. On 15 February 1964, the
British Government, in a policy shift that surprised most external parties, took the step of addressing a
letter to the President of the Security Council in which it presented an overview of the situation in the
island and noted:
'[S]ecurity in the island of Cyprus has seriously deteriorated and tensions between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot communities has risen gravely. This deterioration culminated in a serious act
of violence in the town of Limassol on 12 February 1964. In these grave circumstances, I have
been instructed by my Government to request that an early meeting of the Security Council be
called to consider this urgent matter and to take appropriate steps to ensure that the dangerous
situation that now prevails can be resolved with a full regard to the rights and responsibilities of
both the Cypriot communities, of the Government of Cyprus and of the Governments party to




thereby securing for the United Kingdom the procedural advantage.
Endnotes to Chapter IV
1. Ball, George; The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs; (London: WW Norton & Company, 1982)
p.340
2. In a Cabinet meeting held on 28 January 1964, the Commonwealth Secretary noted 'if it becomes
impracticable to create a force drawn from member countries of NATO, it might become necessary to
move to the United Nations to establish a military presence in the Island, in order to maintain law and
order and to enforce the political solution, whatever it might prove to be. This course, however, was open
to certain objections.' Cabinet Meeting, C.M. 7(64), 28 January 1964, CAB 128/38
3. The two options were by now being discussed in tandem. See, inter alia, 'Cyprus: Action should
Conference Fail', 24 January 1964, FO 371/1 74 746 and 'Cyprus', FO 371/1 74 746
4. Ball, op.cit., p.341. This is substantiated by a telegram sent from the UN Headquarters to the Foreign
Office in which Sir Patrick Dean stated 'Stevenson has just told me that he has been kept fully informed
about the conversations between Sir D. Ormsby Gore and Mr. Rusk, and that he entirely agrees with our
proposal for an early dispatch of a force drawn from individual NATO countries is by far the
best.. .Stevenson is therefore urging President Johnson (or so he says) both to accept our proposal and also
to consider sending, with us if we agree and possibly with the Turkish and Greek Governments also,
strong messages to Makarios to support our proposal without delay and to agree to receiving
reinforcements drawn from individual NATO Governments to help in keeping the peace and lessening
tension.' Telegram from UKMIS UN New York to FO, No.122, 25 January 1964, PREM 11/4 704
5. Ball; The Past has Another Pattern; op.cit., p.341
6. Ibid., p.341
7. 'Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the United States Attorney-General, Mr.





12. 'Extract from a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the United States Attorney-General,
Mr. Robert Kennedy, at 10 Downing Street, at 11.00 a.m. on Monday, January 27 1964.' PREM
11/4704. See also The Times, 28 December 1963
13. Ibid.
14. The New York Times, 28 January 1964. When a US State Department official was asked if the United
States had already agreed to take part in the action, the reply noted that although the US was reviewing,




15. Ball; The Past has Another Pattern; op.cit., p.341	 -
16. The New York Times, 29 January 1964
17. Reuter, 28 January 1964. See also Adams, Thomas W. & Cotterill, Alvin J.; Cyprus Between East
and West; Studies in International Affairs Number 7, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, p.61
18. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.475, 28 January 1964, FO 371/1 74747. This seems to contradict
the Minister's statement outside the Foreign office made to waiting reporters. 'Turkey has decided "in
principle" to withdraw from the present London Conference on Cyprus, Mr Erkin, Turkey's Foreign
Minister, said here today. The Foreign Minister was speaking when he arrived at the Foreign Office
before a meeting with Mr Butler, British Foreign Secretary. Asked about reports that Turkey would
withdraw from the Cyprus Conference, he replied: "There is a decision in principle to withdraw"...Asked
if he would have anything further to say after his talks with the Foreign Secretary, he replied: "It all
depends".' Reuter, 28 January 1964
19. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.475, 28 January 1964, op.cit. The role of the commander-in-chief
had in fact been a central item of discussion in Washington, see 'Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Force', in FO 371/1 74 747 and telegram from FO to Washington, No.1325, 27 January 1964, FO
371/174747
20. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.475, 28 January 1964, op.cit.
21. The Times obviously took this to mean that the Turkish Delegation would be staying, as it reported
as such in its edition the next morning. The Times, 29 February 1964
22. The New York Times, 29 January 1964
23. The Cyprus Mail, 30 January 1964
24. Clerides, Glafkos; Cyprus: My Deposition; Volume 1 (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing) pp.314-315
25. Ibid., pp.300-301
26. Ibid., p.323. Although Clerides stated that there was a 'school of thought and certainly there are still
people who believe that the proposal for the establishment of a NATO peace-keeping force' there appear
to be few who would admit to such a sentiment. In my discussions with a number of people,
commentators and politicians alike, I have been presented with the universal view that NATO would
have always favoured Turkey for the same organisational reasons presented by Clerides.
27. Ibid., p.305
28. Ibid.
29. Makhi, 28 January 1964




32. Haravghi, 29 January 1964
33. 'Only UN can solve the problem' Eleftheria, 29 January 1964. 'UN over NATO' Phileleftheros, 29
January 1964. See the general Greek Cypriot press on 30 January 1964. In addition, 'NATO force a
'Trojan Horse' for Turkey' Phileleftheros, 31 January 1964, and Eleftheria spoke of a NATO
'conspiracy', Eleftheria, 31 January 1964.
34. The right-wing pro-enosis newspaper Makhi stated that Turkey would face another Suez if it tried
to invade Cyprus and that 'Russia will be better able to provide its support to Cyprus than it was in the
case of Suez', Makhi, 29 January 1964.
35. However, at this point the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, in
an oral answer to the House of Common on 30 January 1964, House of Commons, Official record of
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964,
p.51 8. However, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations declined to go into greater detail
about the exact composition of the force, or what countries, including Commonwealth, had been
consulted.
36. The New York Times, 31 January 1964
37. The Cyprus Mail, 31 January 1964
38. The Soviet Union delivered a letter to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow on 31 December 1963 in
which the Soviet Union 'considered the disagreements between the two communities in the island were
an internal affair of Cyprus, that any intervention would be a violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus and
would create a grave situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.' British Embassy covering letter to the
official Turkish reply to the Soviet letter submitted to the Foreign Office, FO 371/1 74 747. The Turkish
reply amounted to a restatement of Turkish aims and rights with regard to the Turkish Cypriot minority
in Cyprus. Letter to the Soviet embassy in Ankara, FO 371/1 74 747
39. The relative unimportance attached to this message by the British Government can be seen from the
fact that although the Prime Minister thought that a reply might be in order he was advised against doing
so as, 'there is nothing surprising in the Soviet message; it is an entirely standard statement of the attitude
which the Soviet Union can be expected to adopt in situations of this kind.. .There might be considerable
disadvantage in giving the Soviet Union a pretext for opening a round of correspondence on an issue with
which they are not really concerned.. .Since the Soviet attitude has so far been reasonably restrained we
would be wiser to give them no opening which might encourage them to interfere.' FO 371/174745. This
advice was accepted by the Prime Minister in a letter dated 3 January 1964, ibid.
40. The Cyprus Mail, 3 January 1964
41. Ibid.
42. At this point I would like to thank Professor Richard Sakwa at the University of Kent at Canterbury
for his very helpful advice and comments with regard to general aspects of Soviet Foreign Policy decision
making during this period.
127
Chapter IV
43. Gromyko later stated that: 'From the very beginning the Soviet Union came out in defence of the
inalienable rights of the state of Cyprus.' [emphasis added by the author] Gromyko, A.A.; Only for
Peace; (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), p.130. On evidence, as we have seen, this statement was not
entirely true. However, this may stand as a vindication of Foreign Minister Gromyko - and by default the
Soviet Union - as he had in fact shown an interest from the earliest point in the crisis.
44. The Cyprus Mail, 15 January 1964
45. Ibid.
46. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, former Vice-President of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, personal
interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.
47. The Cyprus Mail, 19 January 1964
48. Reuter, 13 January 1964
49. Reuter, 30 January 1964
50. 'Letter dated 29 January 1964 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Secretary-General', United Nations Security Council Document, S/5526
51. Rauf R. Denkta, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. Dr. Necati Ertekün,
personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.
52. Osman Orek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. Zaim Necatigil,
personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.
53. Andreas Ziartides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 20 September 1996.
54. Among the more prominent writers on Cyprus who have supported this view see Coufoudakis, Van;
'United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy'; in
Attalides, Michael A. (ed.); Cyprus Reviewed: The Result of a Seminar on the Cyprus Problem Held in
June 3-6 1976 by the Jus Cypri Association and the Coordinating Committee of Scientific and Cultural
Organisations; (Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association, 1976), p.1 12. Joseph, Joseph S.; 'The UN as an
Instrument of National Policy: The Case of Cyprus'; The Cyprus Review, Volume 1, Number 2, Fall
1989, p.49. Perhaps the most important comment on the issue comes from the former Greek Consul-
General in Cyprus during the EOKA years who goes as far as to identify when the approach was made:
'On 27 January 1964 the Archbishop - bearing in mind that Greece has very limited possibilities of acting
effectively not only for bringing the situation under control but also for warding off worse developments -
makes a serious mistake. The Acting Minister of Foreign affairs in Cyprus, Araouzos, seeks from the
Ambassador of the USSR in Cyprus the assistance of Moscow.' See Vlachos, Angelos; Deka Chronia
Kypriakou; (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem), (Athens: Estia Publishing, 1980) English translation
cited in Reddaway, John; Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection; (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1986), Appendix V, p.222
55. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides stated that he, "did not believe that Makarios would approach the Soviet
Union", personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996. Tassos Papadopoulos stated
that, "Makarios was not a communist...and would not approach the Soviet Union as a Castro." Personal
interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.
128
Chapter IV
56. Christodoulos Veniamin noted that, "immediately after the clashes Makarios sent diplomatic missions
everywhere, including the Soviet Union", personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September
1996. Chris Economides states that it is difficult to say whether Makari9s approached the Soviet Union,
or the Soviet Union approached Makarios. Chris Economides, personal interview with the author, 26
March 1996.
57. Reuter, 30 January 1964.
58. The Cyprus Mail, 28 January 1964
59. Elefiheria, 1 February 1964.
60. These ideas are in line with the thinking of Thomas Adams, a former US State Department official
who has been a commentator on communism in Cyprus for over thirty years (see Bibliography for
examples). Dr. Thomas Adams, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 30 March 1995. Mr.
Andreas Ziartides, a member of AKEL's politburo at the time, stated that these three points were, "in
direct relation to the Soviet Union's Cold War policy." Personal Interview with the author, Nicosia, 20
September 1996. Osman Orek also concurred with this assessment, personal interview with the author,
Nicosia, 23 September 1996.
61. Perhaps the most telling point as to how little the Americans regarded the seriousness of this threat,
was the commissioning of a US Army Area Handbook for Cyprus. This handbook was put together in
three months by one author (instead of the usual eighteen months by five or more contributors ), this
shows how sure the US Army was that they were about to take up peace-keeping duties. Dr. Thomas
Adams, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 30 March 1995. See Adams, Thomas; US Army
Area Handbook for Cyprus; (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1964)
62. The Times, 31 January 1964. From a survey of available British Government documents it does not
seem to be the case that there were any important unstated elements to this plan. Obviously the entire
operational details would not have been known at this point, but it certainly appears to be the case, on
the evidence available, that the US intended to be forthright in their intentions and not pursue some form
of hidden agenda.
63. As stated by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. R.A. Butler, in an oral answer to the House of
Commons on 3 February 1964, House of Commons, Official Record of Parliamentary Debates
(Hansard), Fifth Series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964, p.815
64. The New York Times, 1 February 1964, a full reprint of these proposals can be found in Stegenga,
Op.cit., pp.41-42
65. The New York Times, 1 February 1964
66. Ibid.
67. Reuter, 1 February. It was also stated by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. R.A. Butler, in an oral
answer to the House of Commons on 3 February 1964, House of Commons, Official Record of
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964,
p.8 15
68. The New York Times, 1 February 1964
129
Chapter IV
69. The Cyprus Mail, 1 February 1964. The other four organisations were; the Old Trade Unions, the
Independent Trade Unions, the Democratic Trade Unions, and the Army Civil Service Union.
70. The Cyprus Mail, 2 February 1964. This despite the fact that the Cyprus Mail had reported (with a
front page photograph) that Makarios had been visited by Pickard and Wilkins, and that during the course
of his two hour meeting with them the plan had been presented. The Cyprus Mail, 1 February 1964
71. The Cyprus Mail, 2 February 1964. The meeting was attended by Clerides and Kyprianou, amongst
others.
72. The Cyprus Mail, 3 February 1964
73. derides; Cyprus: My Deposition; (Volume 1), op.cit., p.310
74. Ibid.
75. Elefiheria, Philelefiheros, Haravghi, 2 February 1964
76. 'We must ask Russia to guarantee our territorial integrity in the same way as Russia did for the UAR
during the Anglo-French invasion.' Ethniki, 3 February 1964
77. The Cyprus Mail, 3 February 1964
78. The Cyprus Mail, 4 February 1964
79. The Times, 4 February 1964
80. Ibid.
81. The Cyprus Mail, 4 February 1964. There were numerous allegations made to this effect. In an
interview with a Greek Cypriot ex-militia fighter who had been involved with the events of the time, I
was told that he had actually witnessed British troops assisting Turkish Cypriot militia in their attempts
to forcibly move a Turkish Cypriot community from their mixed village into a Turkish Cypriot enclave.
Diometis Kyprianou in personal interview with the author, Nicosia, January 1996. This allegation was
denied by Rauf Denkta, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996.
82, Document dated 3 February 1964, and contained in FO 371/1 74 747
83. At the bottom of the document the Permanent Secretary, Sir Harold Caccia wrote 'This is the sort of
stuff that Lord Palmerston would have rejoiced to use or to hear from an Ally. Perhaps the P.M. as well
as Commonwealth Secretary should be told.' Butler in turn wrote 'Prime Minister, As Sir H. Caccia
suggests you may find some comfort from this.' Beneath this comment, and written in the Prime
Minister's own hand were the words 'Good Stuff'. Ibid.
84. Document dated 3 February 1964, and contained in FO 371/1 74 747
85. In the document it was stated that Eilts had said that Ambassador Wilkins would not 'seek a special
interview' with Makarios in order to tell him these points but that the United States might approach
Kyprianou in London to convey the message, or that Rusk may give it to Rossides in New York. Ibid.
130
Chapter IV
86. The New York Times, 5 February 1964
87. The Cyprus Mail, 5 February 1964. The newspaper noted: 'Two bomb explosions last night damaged
a side-entrance of the United States Embassy in Nicosia in an unprecedented attack on a foreign
diplomatic mission.', ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Note written by J.O. Rennie, 5 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747
90. Ibid. Kyprianou cannot, however, remember having had this conversation. Spyros Kyprianou,
personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. Dr. Lyssarides noted the way in which
Khrushchev's name elicited applause whenever it was used at political rallies at the time. Personal
interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.
91. See Makhi, 4 February 1964
92. The New York Times, 6 February 1964. Indeed, this was a more than desirable turn of events as the
NATO epithet was doing considerable harm, as Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh noted 'I hesitate to intervene
from this post but I have been struck by the following combination of facts:- (a) Nobody wants a NATO
force, and indeed the misleading but unavoidable NATO label is becoming an increasing handicap to the
current proposal.' Telegram from UKMIS NATO Paris to FO, No.85, 6 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747
93. The New York Times, 7 February 1964. The Economist, 15 February 1964, p.581
94. Reuter, 7 February 1964
95. Reuter, 8 February 1964
96. The Times, 6 February 1964
97. Telegram from Athens to F, No.220, 7 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747. The actual text of the
telegram read 'Although Greek military hierarchy are breathing fire and [? Grp. omitted] politically
conscious minority will do their utmost to avoid a major conflict for the sake of Greek-Cypriots, whom
they dislike, and the vast majority of Greeks would have no stomach for such a conflict if it actually
arose. What is involved is an issue of Greek pride (filotimo) over [? Grp. Omitted] against the Turks
rather than a {grp. Undec ? National] interest. I think a substantial military gesture rather than a conflict
would be welcome to everyone here.'
98. Telegram from UK DEL NATO Paris to FO, No.5 1, 24 January 1964, FO 371/1 74 746 (?)
99. The New York Times, 6 February 1964
100. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 13-20 1964, p.201 16
101. The Times, 4 February 1964
102. Ibid. 'The Germans would like to help over the peace-keeping force but do not want to engage
German soldiers.' Telegram UKDEL NATO Paris to FO, No.85, 6 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747. In
fact, it had been noted that the prominent West German newspaper Frankfurter Aligemeine had warned
131
Chapter IV
the Bundeswehr and Bonn to avoid police action in Cyprus. The Times, 4 February 1964
103. 'The International Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus: Military Planning', FO 371/1 74 747
104. The New York Times, 8 February 1964
105. The text of the letter was published as a written answer produced by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on behalf
of the Prime Minister in response to a question put by Mr. Warbey in the House of Commons Official
Report of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Fifth Series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February
1964, pp.107-11 1. The text can also be found in the 'Letter dated 8 February 1964 from the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council', United
Nations Security Council Document, S15534
106. 'They are trying to stiffen Greek Cypriot opposition to the proposals of the London Conference, to
bring the whole question to the Security Council and secure an outcome which will increase their
influence in Cyprus and strengthen their demand for the withdrawal of the British bases.' Telegram from
Moscow to FO, No.235, 7 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747
107.The details of how the Government decided to handle the issue with regard to the media is contained
in 'Mr. Khrushchev's Message on Cyprus: Guidance to the Press', 7 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747
108. Telegram from FO to Washington, No.2146, 8 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747
109. For the texts of the later replies from the United States, Greece and Turkey see Appendix C.
110. 'Text of a letter from the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, to Mr. N.S.
Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.', 8 February 1964. Contained in the
House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series-Volume 689,
Period from 1 Oth-21 st February, 1964, p.1 11 (Written Answers). The text can also be found in the 'Letter
dated 11 February 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the President of the Security Council', United Nations Security Council Document, S/5537
111. The Cyprus Mail, 8 February 1964
112. Eleftheria, 9 February 1964
113. The Cyprus Mail, 10 February 1964
114. The New York Times, 9 February 1964
115. 'Cyprus: Action should Archbishop Makarios not accept the revised Four-Power proposal', 8









122. The New York Times, 10 February 1964. However, if the comments of Ambassador Küneralp
(Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom) are correct, it appears as if Turkey may have accepted
some form of United Nations involvement three weeks prior to this. See comments in a memorandum
dated 22 January 1964 in FO 371/1 74 746
123. 'Cyprus: Action should Archbishop Makarios not accept the revised Four Power proposal', op.cit.
124. The Economist, 15 February 1964, p.580
125. The New York Times, 12 February 1964. The Governments of Denmark, the Netherlands and
Belgium had stated their agreement in principle to become involved by 9 February. As had Canada which
had agreed to begin planning with War Office through their Military Attaché in London. In addition
Norway and Italy had agreed to start military planning without commitment, and France, Portugal, and
Luxembourg had said that they cannot participate. See 'The International Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus:
Military Planning', 9 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr. Joseph Luns,
on a visit to London in late February 1964, at which he had a meeting with Butler, stated that the Dutch
Government had agreed with the Anglo-US plan for a force made up of NATO troops for Cyprus.
Indeed, it had accepted to send between 700-800 men. The Cyprus Mail, 28 February 1964. However,
on the issue of a United Nations force Luns stated that 'we are reserving judgement until we see what
is going to happen at the UN. It is not certain the Dutch will take part in any force sent by them', Ibid.
126. The Economist, 15 February 1964, p.591
127. The Cyprus Mail, 12 February 1964
128. Ibid., p.343
129. Ball; The Past hasAnother Pattern; op.cit., p.343
130. The Cyprus Mail, 12 February 1964, The New York Times, 12 February 1964. The Economist refers
simply to a meeting between U Thant and Mr. Butler, 15 February 1964, p.580
131. Christodoulos Veniamin, District Officer of Limassol at the time, personal interview with the author,
Nicosia, 10 September 1996.
132. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.
133. Mr. Veniamin notes that the cease-fire agreement collapsed after a decision was taken, in Nicosia
and without consulting him, that certain Turkish Cypriot positions were to be retaken. Personal interview
with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.
134. 'Following is a report of a Telecon conversation between Mr. Rusk and Under-Secretary Ball at





137. Ball; The Past hasAnother Pattern; op.cit., p.345
138. 'Following is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Ball in Nicosia (U.S. Embassy, Nicosia, telegram no.
736) received by the State Department in the early hours of February 13', P0371/174747
139. Ibid.
140. 'Record of a Teletype Conversation Between the Under-secretary of State, Mr. George Ball in
Nicosia, and the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Rusk in Washington, D.C. at 12.30 p.m., Thursday, February
13, 1964.', in FO 371/174747. Ball notes that: 'the paper had obviously been drafted by his three young
Ministers (unhappily all lawyers) of whom he is a prisoner. From time to time he glanced uneasily at
them to see if they gave him the nod. It was clear that they are calling the tune and that he fears both for
his job and his life.' Ibid.
141. 'The Views of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus', 13 February 1964, FO 371/1 74 747
142. Ibid.
143. 'Record of a Teletype Conversation Between the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. George Ball in
Nicosia, and the Foreign secretary and Mr. Rusk in Washington, D.C. at 12.30 p.m., Thursday, February
13, 1964, in FO 371/1 74 747
144. 'Note of a Telephone Conversation between the Secretary of State [Butler] and Mr. Duncan Sandys
2.30 p.m., Thursday, February 13, 1964.' FO 371/1 74 747
145. President Johnson, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary all met at the White House that
day. See 'extract from the Record of a Conversation held at the White House on Thursday, February 13,
1964 at 11.00 a.m.' in FO 371/1 74 747. The meeting was also attended by Sir Harold Caccia, Sir David
Ormsby Gore, Sir Burke Trend, Sir Timothy Bligh, and, for the United States, Dean Rusk, Averill
Harriman, David Bruce, McGeorge Bundy, and William Tyler.
146. 'Note of a Telephone Conversation...2.30 p.m.', 13 February, op.cit.
147. Ibid.
148. The Times, 15 February 1964
149.Dr. Lyssarides notes that Makarios had told Ball about his intention to move the issue to the Security
Council in a way that seemed to indicate that he had no other option. He was not belligerent in his tone,
instead it was said in a very matter of fact way. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author,
Nicosia, 25 September 1996.
150. The New York Times, 15 February 1964
151. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.
152. Contained in Clerides; Cyprus: My Deposition; (Volume 1), op.cit., pp.320-321
134
Chapter IV
153. Ibid. See also The Economist, 15 February 1964, p.580
154. Reuter, 11 February 1964
155. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996. Tassos
Papadopoulos states that he both liked and got on well with him. Tassos Papadopoulos, personal
interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.
156. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996. Tassos
Papadopoulos notes that while General Young was not in Cyprus to, "enforce a long-term policy",
General Carver has, "a lot to answer for". Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author,
Nicosia, 27 September 1996. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand liked General Carver. Osman
Orek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.
157.As The Times stated 'Although there was no question of General Young being formally relieved of
his command, there is little doubt that the incident in Limassol last week, when the General accepted
assurances of a Greek Cypriot official that an attack about which intelligence warning had been given
would not in fact take place, persuaded the Minister of Defence that the time had come to set up a
stronger command structure on the island.'The Times, 17 February 1964
158. The Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in a written answer to the House of Commons. House
of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series-Volume 689, Period from
lOth-2lst February 1964, pp.185-186 (Written Answers). The decision to do this was taken at a meeting
between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington,
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir Arthur Snelling, and Sir Harold Caccia at a meeting
held at 10 Downing Street at 7.00 p.m. on 5 February. PREM 11/4704. At the meeting there was,
however, some concern that this change might be construed as being some form of prelude to the creation
of an international force and the Commonwealth Secretary asked if it could be delayed as 'our threat to
withdraw was one of our trump cards with President Makarios.'ibid. On the matter of General Young,
the MOD also denied that he had been dismissed or had failed in his duty. The Times, 15 February 1964
159. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 13-20 1964, p.20118
160. Carver, Michael; Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshal; (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p.316
161. The Tunes, 17 February 1964
162. The Times, 14 February 1964
163. Ball; The Past hasAnother Pattern; op.cit., p.348
164.As Carver notes:' [t]his reinforcement coincided with increasing signs of anti-British feeling, which
was developing in the press and being shown not only by the local population, especially the Greek
Cypriot irregulars, but also by the Regular police.' Carver; Out of Step; op.cit., p.317
165. 'Letter dated 15 February 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and




Involving the United Nations:
The Road to Resolution 186
(15 February-4 March 1964)
Introduction
The differences that had developed between the Greek Cypriots and the Governments of the United
Kingdom and the United States continued at the United Nations. The United Kingdom, desperate to have
the matter of the introduction of peace-keeping force to replace its own troops dealt with at the first
opportanity, maintained a position in the Security Council that sought to have any such force created in
such a way as to avoid the risk of a challenge to any of its strategic interests - especially the Sovereign
Base Areas. To this extent the talks at the Security Council proved to be less than easy. The Greek
Cypriots held the discussion of the 1960 Treaties as a central tenet of their policy. In order to counter this,
a means had to found that would minimise the role of the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian bloc in such
a way as to ensure that the Soviet Union did not become obstructive in its approach to the matter. To this
end, the British Government maintained its relationship with the United States, although, as will be seen,
the United States once again retreated out of the spotlight, preferring instead to play a more private part.
Indeed, during the negotiations in New York, the United Kingdom seemed to take the public lead in the
proceedings.
The Greek Cypriots, realising that they had, in no small measure, won a victory in having the
matter taken to the Council, were nonetheless faced with the fact that the United Kingdom maintained
the procedural advantage, and was, as a Permanent Member, a major force to be reckoned with inside
the Chamber. In order to counter this difficulty, the Greek Cypriots tried to lobby the other members of
the Council. However, most of the other members of the Council were content to play the role of
interlocutor in order to reach an outcome that was broadly acceptable to all the parties. Indeed, this
chapter will attempt to show that once the matter had been taken to the United Nations, the Cold War
element that had played an important part before took less of a role as the matter developed along two,
more bi-lateral lines: firstly, between the Greek Cypriots on the one hand, and the United States and the
United Kingdom on the other, with a vocal, though substantively minimal Soviet interest being displayed,
and secondly, between the Greek Cypriots and the Government of Turkey. The former proved
substantially more productive than the latter, which appeared to be an opportunity for the two parties to
vent their anger at one another. The end result of this period of bargaining was United Nations Security
Council Resolution 186, which, although imperfect in many ways to all parties, put in place a United
Nations peace-keeping force.
1. The Move to the United Nations
The United Kingdom's recourse to the Security Council, although opposed by the Turkish Cypriots who
felt that the United Nations did not have the power that the Guarantor Powers had,' was nonetheless done
with the acceptance both of the United States 2 and Turkey.3 However, the Greek Government was not
so impressed as it had 'constantly been advised by her allies in recent weeks to persuade President
Makarios to abandon the idea of resorting to the Security Council.' 4 Yet the United Kingdom and the
United States seemed to have little room to manoeuvre with regard to the Cyprus situation once Makarios
rejected the final Ball plan, a fact they communicated to the Greek Government. 5 In any case, the
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decision by the British Government to pursue the Security Council option moved the search for a peace-
keeping force into a new period. 6 Indeed by now it was regarded by the United Kingdom as being a
necessary move considering that the continued intercommunal situation in Cyprus was draining the
resources of the entire British military establishment and cracks were now appearing in the operational
effectiveness of the Force. British troops were unable, despite their significant numbers on the island,
to be everywhere at once - a deployment that was required in order to prevent the situation from
becoming totally out of hand. As this became more obvious the Turkish Government had once again
appeared to be mobilising in preparation for an intervention. 7 However, the British move to the United
Nations forced Turkey - albeit with pressure from the United States - to state that they would hold moves
for intervention in abeyance subject to the condition that renewed heavy fighting did not occur in the
meantime. 8 As if to emphasise the importance of maintaining wider peace in the Eastern Mediterranean,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, issued a statement in which he specifically called
on the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey to avoid taking any action that could aggravate the situation
on the island.9
Upon receiving the news of the British request for a meeting of the Security Council the Foreign
Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, flew
to London in order to confer with Commonwealth Secretary Sandys and other British Government
officials.'° And when asked about the British application for a meeting Clerides, somewhat stoically,
replied:
'"Presumably they wanted to put their own point of view ahead of ours". The basic difference
between the two recourses, he said, was that the British seemed to refer more to the internal
situation, and also underlined the Treaty of Guarantee rights, whereas the Cyprus resolution
"will be based on the external threat which we consider of paramount importance."
Despite this less than antagonistic tone,' 2 the delegates had nonetheless left Cyprus amid bitter allegations
by the wider Greek Cypriot community of British treachery in attempting to out-manoeuvre the Greek
Cypriots at the Security Council by taking the procedural advantage.'3
Yet, in an attempt to counter this, Ambassador Rossides decided to make an application for an
emergency convening of the Council in the face of the perceived imminent Turkish intervention. In his
letter to the President of the Security Council, Rossides stated that, '[un the vital interest of the people
of Cyprus as a whole as well as in the interest of international peace and security, I.. .request Your
Excellency to convene urgently an emergency meeting of the Security Council under rule 3 of its
provisional rules of procedure in order to consider the matter and take appropriate measures under the
relevant Articles of the Charter."4
Within hours the various representatives to the Security Council had been informed of the two
requests, and that same afternoon, 15 Febmary, they all met in the room adjoining the Security Council
chamber in closed session - without any officials of the UN Secretariat present' 5 - to consider both the
British and Cypriot applications.' 6 Opening the discussions, the President of the Council, Señor Carlos
Bernardes (the Brazilian Permanent Representative) noted that Rossides had been to see him to ask for
the Council to be meet that same evening. Upon asking for the opinion of the Council, the British
Permanent Representative, Sir Patrick Dean, suggested that it would be better if the Council met on the
Monday in order to allow the assembled representatives from the other member countries to seek advice
from their respective governments.' 7 However, the Soviet Representative, Nikolai Fedorenko
immediately took the side of the Greek Cypriots and supported their application for an emergency
meeting, citing the fact that the previous meeting held in December 1963, had simply been adjourned
and therefore, '[ut was the clear duty of the Council to take the question up again at any moment when
the Cyprus Representative brought to its attention facts which threatened the security of his country."8
When asked, the Chinese Representative took the same position as the United Kingdom. However, the
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French Representative noted that without having seen the letter from Rossides he could not make a
decision, and therefore asked that Rossides be allowed to address the Council to present his case. This
was duly accepted and Rossides proceeded to repeat, 'more or less the same speech which he had made
at the Council on December 27 in which he claimed that at the very moment Turkish naval forces were
approaching Cyprus' 19, stating:
'On the last occasion it was only the timely action of the Security Council in bringing these
Turkish intentions before the eyes of the world that had at the last minute deterred them from
actual aggression. The Council should meet at once before it was too late. The world would
never forgive it if it did not rise to its responsibility. Monday would be too late. If the council
could not meet at once, then it should meet at latest that night in order to pass a resolution
designed to prevent or deter aggression by Turkey.'2°
Once again Fedorenko called for an emergency meeting. However, Adlai Stevenson, the Permanent
Representative of the United States, noted that Rossides had not, 'added in any way to what he had
already told the Council on December 27...[therefore] [h]e took the same view as Sir Patrick Dean.'2'
Indeed, by this point several other representatives - France, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Norway -
seemed to be coming around to support the United Kingdom's view that a meeting be delayed until
Monday. However, the Bolivian Representative took the Cypriot position, as did the Czechoslovak
Representative who, 'repeated almost verbatim the remarks which had been made earlier by the Soviet
Representative.' 22 The figure now stood at four in favour of an emergency meeting and six against.
Bernardes therefore proposed that the meeting beheld on Monday. However, he noted that, '[h]e would
remain in close touch with the situation through the Secretary General [sic] and would be at the disposal
at the shortest possible notice of other members of the Council so that a meeting could be held if
necessary within a matter of an hour or so.'23
At this point Fedorenko accused the Council of acting irresponsibly and that Cyprus was entitled
to bring the continuing matter to the attention of the Security Council. Despite this outburst the broader
membership of the Council had made its decision and therefore the meeting would take place, as
scheduled, on Monday 17 February. Not content with this outcome Rossides addressed another letter to
the President of the Security Council the next day in which he stated: 'In view of the urgency of my
request, I respectfully submit that [the Cypriot] urgent request [S/5545] should take priority over the
request for an early meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom [S/5543]'. Despite this further
appeal, Bernardes remained firm on the decision. The Security Council would meet on 17 February to
discuss the Cyprus situation.
2. Planning the Debate
Meanwhile, in London, the Greek Cypriot delegates had by now had the opportunity to discuss the
Security Council meeting with the British Government. Speaking to the press prior to his departure for
New York, Foreign Minister Kyprianou noted that the Greek Cypriots were, 'in agreement with the
British Government that an early meeting of the Security Council is necessary.' 24 However, there
appeared to be major differences on the approach that the two were going to take with regard to the
Security Council debate. Nonetheless, it seemed clear that now that the matter had been referred to the
United Nations, the issue of whether a resolution would be passed was less of a question as compared
with the form that a resolution would take.
When the Greek Cypriot delegation landed in New York later that same day, they were
immediately joined by Zenon Rossides, as well as Tassos Papadopoulos, the Minister for Labour, who
had been in New York for the previous month following his departure from the London Conference.25
Soon thereafter they were visited by Dimitri Bitsios, the Greek Permanent Representative at the United
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Nations. In the private discussions that followed the Greek Cypriots, seemingly contrary to their public
statements, not only allegedly expressed their bitter feelings about both the British and Turkish positions
with regard to the events in Cyprus, but also took the chance to complain about the lack of support they
had received from the Greek Government throughout the preceding period. 26 However, as Bitsios noted
in his account of events, the Greek Cypriots were nonetheless nervous about forthcoming events at the
United Nations, and asked the Greek how he saw their chances in the Council. 27 Having been the Greek
Representative to the United Nations since 1961, Bitsios was well aware of the more delicate intricacies
of the workings of both the Organisation as a whole and of the Security Council in particular. 28 In
affording assistance to the Greek Cypriot delegates the Greek Representative raised a number of points
regarding the wording of a possible Greek Cypriot draft resolution that might be presented to the Security
Council. 29 He explained that any draft prepared by the Greek Cypriots would have to be put to the
Security Council through the representative of a friendly state. 3° With regard to the wording of a possible
text, he specifically warned Clerides and Kyprianou about the danger inherent in the use of the word
'recognise' in respect of the Government of Cyprus, informing them that the term 'respect' immediately
made the issue of recognition redundant and therefore unlikely to be a discussion point.3'
Yet this role taken by Bitsios is certainly confusing. As the representative of Greece, a Guarantor
Power, with whom the United Kingdom had worked closely, Bitsios was certainly presenting a confusing
picture of the exact nature of the position of the Greek Government. Despite the fact that there was a
certain irritation in Greek political circles that the United Kingdom had unilaterally moved the issue to
the Security Council, it would appear unlikely that this irritation would have resulted in an immediate
directive issued to Bitsios to begin assisting the Greek Cypriots in their planning. On the basis of
available evidence one can perhaps conclude that the Greek Representative was, at this point, acting as
a free agent with minimal political guidance from the Government of Paraskevopoulos - a government
that had been markedly pro-Western - i.e. supportive of the United States and the United Kingdom - than
pro-Greek Cypriot in its overall orientation. 32 Although this criticism is somewhat mitigated by the fact
that Greece had gone to the polls that very same day, and that political guidance would have been sparse
anyway, one would assume that he would have taken a neutral course until such time as new orders came
through.
While the Greek Cypriots formed their own strategy - albeit with the assistance of the Greek
Representative - the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States were involved in
planning their course of action. Given the success in the gaining the procedural advantage, the British
Government was in a fairly strong position. It had the outward support of the United States, as well as
a declaration on the part of the Johnson Administration that it would respect Makarios's wishes and not
send troops to Cyprus as part of a force. 33 (It is perhaps worth noting that the pressures exerted on the
Truce Force had by this point made British interest in participating in a future United Nations force less
than certain.34) In any case, the main aim now was to try and ensure the best political result with regard
to any United Nations' resolution. In this the British Government's position was considerably
strengthened with the announcement by President Gursel of Turkish support for the United Kingdom at
the Security Council. 35 With these two important endorsements it was by now clear that the next move
was to try to isolate Makarios as much as possible diplomatically, and thus try and ensure the easiest
passage of an acceptable resolution through the Security Council.
The Greek Cypriot Negotiating Position
By the day of the first session the political tactics of the two main camps were becoming more apparent.
On the morning of the first debate Clerides and Kyprianou met with the Secretary-General, Dr. Ralph
Bunche, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (who, incidentally, was to decide upon
the acronym UNFICYP36), and José RoIz Bennet, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative
to Cyprus. The latter two attended the session to explain in detail the exact provisions as laid down in
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the Secretary-General's proposals. 37 Indeed by this point the Greek Cypriots were able to articulate their
position on a number of questions. Finding that U Thant was very interested in what they had to say,38
the ensuing discussion covered, inter alia, the perceived threat from Turkey, and how the Turkish
Cypriots were, in the opinion of the Greek Cypriot leadership, being manipulated by the Turkish
Government. 39 In return they were presented with a copy of an aide-memoire pertaining to Thant' s plans
for a peace-keeping force in Cyprus.4° In brief the plan presented six points, the key elements of which
were as follows:4'
1. A plan should be submitted to the Security Council by the Governments of Cyprus,
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for approval by the Council. A plan should be
envisioned which would give full weight to the primary responsibility of the Government of
Cyprus and of the three other Governments principally concerned, while providing for an
appropriate United Nations participation
2. A force to be stationed in Cyprus for not more than three months would be established
by agreement among the Governments concerned.
3. The purpose of the force would be to preserve international peace and security and to
that end prevent intercoinniunalfighting
4. The appointment of a mediator, designated by the Secretary-General, with the approval
of the four Governments.
5. No costs arising out of the foregoing arrangements would be chargeable to the United
Nations.
6. The Security Council would by resolution endorse the foregoing arrangements, call
upon all Member States to respect the independence and territorial integrity and unity of
Cyprus, and appoint an advisory group of three of its Members to be consulted by the Secretary-
General on matters pertinent to the resolution.
However, in a telegram to Makarios submitted by Clerides the same day, the Secretary-General's plan
proved unsatisfactory on four counts, namely:
(a.) The terms of reference are not adequate. it does not specficalIy state that the force is for
the purpose of assisting the Government to restore law and order, which is very material, and
to bring about conditions of normality.
(b.) Although it gives a hint that the force will also be entrusted with the defence of the Republic
from external attack, it does not make that object sufficiently clear.
(c.) The provisions about a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General still leave out
the terms of reference of the mediator.
(d.) No direct reference is made to the question of the of the Treaties as forming part of the
dispute.42
Despite the unsatisfactory nature of the aide-memoire on these four points, it was now becoming obvious
to Clendes that at least some of these main points of issue would have to be open to negotiation on the
part of the Greek Cypriots if a resolution on the introduction of a United Nations force was to come
about.43
The Security Council Meets
When the eleven members of the Security Council convened later that day, the session was, on the basis
of a Norwegian motion, almost immediately adjourned for twenty-four hours.' This was done to allow
Thant to seek further agreement from the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on his proposals
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for a force.45 With this delay Clerides sent another memo to Makarios in which he once again outlined
his thoughts on events at the United Nations and laid out his views as to the course of action that should
be followed. Makarios, in his reply, proposed that a delineation be introduced between the matter of the
recognition of Cyprus' territorial integrity and the issue of the introduction of a force. 46 Jn countering this
proposed separation of the issues, Clerides replied that, in his view, any such attempt to distinguish on
the matters without a full agreement of the issues overall would be doomed to failure as it would be
opposed by the western powers. 47 Makarios, responded by stating his belief that it was, nonetheless, a
risk worth taking.48
It was perhaps with this in mind that George Ball, Adlai Stevenson, the United States's
permanent representative, and two more under-secretaries at the State Department, namely Phillips Talbot
and Harlan Cleveland paid a visit to the Greek Representative the same afternoon as the postponement
of the Security Council meeting. 49 In the ensuing discussions it soon became apparent that the United
States' intention was to try to use the Greek representative to lean on the Greek Cypriots to approve a
draft resolution that they had drawn up in conjunction with the United Kingdom. Within this plan both
the United Kingdom and the United States saw the 1960 Treaties as being of central importance in any
consideration of the events. Furthermore, the draft clearly reflected the Turkish position on the issue,
referring to 'states and authorities', and arguing that the Republic of Cyprus lasted only as long as the
Treaties were respected. 5° Bitsios refused to show the proposed resolution to the Cypriots. The
delegation, clearly frustrated by this reply then asked Bitsios for his advice, to which the Greek replied
that the proposal put forward by U Thant should be seriously considered.5'
Fighting Increases in Cyprus
In Cyprus, the situation once again took a turn for the worse. 52 In the west of the island there was a
renewed bout of fighting around the village of Polis, where five hundred Turkish Cypriots were under
siege in a school as Greek Cypriot fighters, dug in about eighty metres away, used searchlights and
loudspeakers to intimidate them. 53 At the time the Truce Force was not present as the troop contingent
that had been based in the village had moved earlier in the week to help deal with the increased fighting
in Limassol. However, a hundred men of the 9 Independent Parachute Squadron quickly left for Polis.
As did General Gyani, who met with Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to arrange a three-day cease-
fire. 54 At the end of the meeting the General praised the Truce Force saying that 'the British Officers
were showing much tact in an extremely difficult task on the island.'55
By this point the combined number of fighters in both communities was estimated to be in the
tens of thousands with a constant supply of weapons flowing in to the Greek Cypriot community from
abroad56 - mainly from communist East European countries. 57 This increase in arms resulted in further
increases in intercommunal fighting as the newly replenished Greek Cypriots attempted to break the
deadlock in a number of areas around the island. To this end the Truce Force was being placed in an
increasingly desperate position as the manpower provided was incapable of meeting such a dispersed
pattern of fighting. Therefore a further one hundred and forty officers of the 3rd Infantry Division left
RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire for Cyprus, and in Britain a brigade headquarters and a further infantry
battalion were placed on seven days notice, as was the 6th Infantry Brigade of the British Army of the
Rhine (BAOR). 58 By this point however the British troops in Cyprus had, for the first time, found
themselves directly threatened by Greek Cypriots when three unarmed military police dog handlers in
a private car were abducted by Greek Cypriot irregulars as they drove to Larnaca on the evening of 15
February. 59 Although they were handed over to the British Army the next morning - following strong
protests from Air Chief Marshal Bamett and the acting-British High Commissioner - it was becoming
obvious that the situation for the Truce Force was becoming untenable. As The Times noted: 'the incident
is regarded as serious in that once the authority of the British truce force [sic] is no longer respected there
will no longer be a dike against political bloodshed.'60
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3. The Security Council Debate Begins
With the political differences between the Greek Cypriots and the United Kingdom and United States
in New York still existing, and the military situation in Cyprus proving to be extremely dangerous, the
stage was now set for a potential showdown when, on 18 Februaiy 1964, the Security Council
reconvened. With a large audience present the proceedings began at 3 p.m. Despite an immediate Soviet
demand that the opening statement be made by the Cyprus Government, 6 ' the floor was instead given,
by Bernardes, to the British delegate - Sir Patrick Dean. 62 With the opportunity to present the United
Kingdom's position63 to the assembled onlookers, Sir Patrick began by outlining the process leading to
the independence of Cyprus and the Treaty of Guarantee. After explaining each article of the Treaty, he
told the Council that the Basic Articles of the Constitution of Cyprus, of which the Treaty of Guarantee
was part, were, 'not subject to amendment whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. Their
principal purpose is to ensure that the rights and interests of the two major communities, that is to say,
the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, in the island shall be fully respected and kept in ba1ance.M
There then followed a synopsis of the events leading to the British involvement in the island following
the outbreak of intercommunal fighting, during which the British Representative gave the Council an
overview of the various events that had occurred, including the presentation of the two international plans
for a peace-keeping force - although the word NATO was omitted altogether. The rejection of these had
led to the decision to move the matter to the Security Council. At the end of his address, Dean gave a few
examples of the nature of the situation in the island. 65 On the all important matter of the British
Government's policy with regard to Cyprus, Sir Patrick noted the following six points:
'First, the United Kingdom's actions in regard to the situation in Cyprus have throughout been
within the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee.
Second, the presence of British forces in the territory of Cyprus stems from an invitation by the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Third, my government's efforts since the beginning have been directed to one end only - namely,
to calming the situation and restoring peace.
Fourth, my Government does not wish to continue to bear the burden of this peace-keeping
operation alone for a day longer than necessary. It is for this reason that it has on several
occasions made proposals for augmenting the peace-keeping force with contingents from other
countries.
Fifth, we have at all stages made it clear that our intention is to act with the agreement of the
duly constituted authorities in Cyprus, and there had been no question of any proposals being
implemented without such agreement.
Sixth, the inability of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to accept any of the proposals
put to it, coupled with the recent and rapid deterioration in the situation in the island, makes it
essential for this Council to be apprised of the situation and to take appropriate action.'66
Given that the British Government now felt that '[i]n these circumstances, the first essential is to restore
peace in Cyprus...the peace-keeping force must be substantially and rapidly augmented', Sir Patrick noted
that he 'had considered whether it would be helpful to the Council if [he] were now to introduce a draft
for consideration. But it seems to my delegation that this is premature at this stage.' 67 In any case, the
British Representative ended his speech by noting that any draft resolution presented,
'[s]hould contain endorsement by the Council of the appeal which the Secretary-General has
already made; it should call upon all parties concerned, including the Guarantor Powers, and in
consultation with the Secretary-General, to secure the establishment of an effective peace-
keeping force as soon as possible; it should also provide in appropriate form for an agreement
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to be reached on the designation of an impartial mediator who may assist the parties in achieving
an agreed settlement. The Council will no doubt wish to call on all States and authorities
concerned to respect the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of
Cyprus, in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee and as established and regulated by the
basic articles of the Constitution.' 68 (Emphasis added by the author)
Next to speak was the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, who had taken the opportunity to
represent the Republic of Cyprus despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot did not recognise him as being
competent to speak on their behalf. 69 Noting that, '[t]he Representative of the United Kingdom gave what
in his view is the historical and the legal background of the situation' Kyprianou went on to state:
'One thing which has not been explained is why, suddenly, at a certain stage in the history of
Cyprus, there was inter-communal fighting, whereas for years in the past the people of Cyprus
as a whole, whether Greek or Turk or Armenian or Maronite, have been living peacefully
together without any incidents between them, and in fact, in the course of two world wars,
Greeks and Turks in Cyprus were together on the same side of the Allies. So one is led to believe
that the present situation in Cyprus - and we are quite convinced about it - is not the cause. The
incidents which occur in Cyprus and which have been occurring recently are just symptoms of
other causes.'7'
As he continued to address the floor he outlined the numerous threats posed by Turkey, 72 and went on
to accuse Turkey - by using numerous statements made by both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders 73 -
of pursuing an active policy of partition in Cyprus. In closing his speech, Kyprianou declared:
'As far as the Government of Cyprus is concerned, we are open to suggestions and ready for
discussions both on the political solution of the problem and on the peace-keeping aspect of the
problem within the framework of the United Nations. I must, however, make it clear that the
territorial integrity, the unity, the sovereignty and the complete independence of our country are
not negotiable. These are the very things we call upon the Security Council to safeguard and
protect. We are an equal member of the United Nations, and we feel that we are entitled to this
protection. We are confident that the Security Council will not fail us. If the fundamental
elements which form the basis of the existence of the Republic of Cyprus are protected and the
threat of aggression is done away with, peace in Cyprus can easily be restored. To this end, my
Government is pledged to do its utmost, with the assistance of the Security Council.'74
At this point the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union called a point of order. After commenting
that following, 'the brilliant explanation by our British colleague, I think that no one has the slightest
illusions left about how British diplomats understand the question of tact, prestige, and so forth',75
Fedorenko went on to ask if, given the late hour, the Council might be allowed to adjourn to consider
Kyprianou's comments in full. However, after hearing no point of objection to the specific question that
the Council continue its work that evening, the President called upon the Turkish Representative to
speak. 76
In replying to Kyprianou, Turkey's acting-Representative, Turgut Menemencioglu, 77 noted that
the Greek Cypriot application to the Council was unconstitutional given that it had been made without
due consultation with Vice President Kllçuk or the Turkish members of the Cabinet. In any case, the
Turkish Representative, although accepting that there had indeed been an overflight of Turkish jets on
25 December, firmly rejected the accusations that there had ever been a real Turkish military threat to
Cyprus. Indeed, he charged that the Greek Cypriots had used the forum of the United Nations on that
occasion as a means of diverting international attention away from the 'hideous crimes' that were, at that
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point, taking place in Cyprus. 78 He then went on to provide another interpretation of the history of Cyprus
- both before and after 21 December 1963 - before concluding:
'As I have already stated, the Turkish Government has done all in its power to help stop the
bloodshed and violence ever since the beginning of these tragic events. At the same time, Turkey
has shown remarkable restraint and moderation in its own attitude, in spite of great provocations.
Turkey, which initiated the tripartite peace actions; Turkey, which appealed to all the Heads of
State and to a great number of international organizations, urging their moral support for ending
the bloodshed; Turkey which asked the European Council for an international investigation of
the massacres; Turkey, which has accepted all practical and useful methods which could put an
end to the existing situation in Cyprus - Turkey will be at the side of arty practical solution which
can be found to this tragic situation.'79
The final speaker of the day was the Greek Representative, Dimitn Bitsios. Taking a stand that was
definitely in favour of the Greek Cypriots, Bitsios ensured that he did not alienate either the United
Kingdom or Turkey. Giving a brief presentation that was perhaps the most moderate of the day, he
presented a picture of Cyprus as a state with both internal and external security difficulties, before stating:
'The three guaranteeing Powers and the Republic of Cyprus must pursue a single, common end -
the restoration of order in Cyprus so that a basic solution to the problem may be sought,
something which is not possible so long as the disorders continue and the threat of international
conflict persists. Differences exist only as to method. We do not pretend to know the precise
answers to all the questions before us. But we are certain that, whatever answers are given by
the International Organization, before which the Cypriots have in full confidence placed their
problems, they cannot but be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Charter.'t°
Before closing the day's session, the President allowed Kyprianou to state that during the course of the
debate, despite the Turkish Representative's assurances, the Turkish Minister of Information had told
reporters that Turkey would intervene if the efforts at the United Nations failed. It was thus on somewhat
of an ominous note that the Council adjourned, at twenty past seven in the evening.
The Second Day
Whereas the first day of the debate had been characterised by the presentation of the views of the Greek
Cypriots and the three Guarantor Powers, the second day saw the first real involvement of the
Superpowers. Ambassador Federenko - the first representative of the day to speak - immediately
introduced a Cold War element by noting that there was a strong NATO presence in the region around
Cyprus. 8 ' Taking the opportunity to criticise the United Kingdom directly, he castigated the British
Government for its 'intolerable lectures addressed to the Government of Cyprus.' 82 Indeed, in the view
of the Soviet Union, the problems in Cyprus were the direct result of pressure on a small state from larger
Powers. Referring, albeit indirectly, to the Khrushchev letter, the Soviet Representative once again asked
if sovereignty was, 'a right only to be possessed by the strong?' 83 At this point Fedorenko stated that
Makarios had in fact been cajoled into accepting the Joint Truce Force as afait accompli. 84 As for the
later proposals put forwards for an international peace-keeping force, the Soviet Representative stated:
'[flhe dangerous actions of the NATO Powers in Cyprus are aimed with cynical frankness at nullifying
the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, tying Cyprus to NATO and converting it to one of their
military bridgeheads.' 85 For his parting shot, Fedorenko indirectly accused the United Kingdom and the
United States of trying to outdo everyone, with the result that they even brought the matter to the UN by
devious means. 86 Concluding what was in fact a long speech, the Soviet Representative stated:
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'The Security Council must take urgent measures to protect the Republic of Cyprus from
aggression and to prohibit and stop any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of this small
State Member of the United Nations. It is the duty of the Security Council to safeguard the
national independence and the territorial inviolability and integrity of Cyprus, and to ensure
respect for the sovereignty, freedom and independence of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance
with the purposes and basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.'87
Although an opportunity to speak was now due to be given to the Representative Stevenson, the President
had taken note of the fact that Sir Patrick Dean wished to reply to Fedorenko's statement. In taking the
floor the British Representative stated that,
'British troops have been operating in the Republic of Cyprus since 26 December 1963, by
invitation of the Government of Cyprus, in order to keep the peace between the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot communities and to restore tranquillity and normal conditions of life for all
- I repeat: all - the inhabitants of Cyprus. Over a period of nearly two months, British troops have
interposed themselves on a number of occasions between the two warring communities, often
a great risk to themselves. They have saved numerous lives, stopped many fights, and secured
the release of a large number of prisoners and hostages on both sides. The Government of
Cyprus and both communities have publicly acknowledged their debt to these British troops and
thanked them for their efforts. Without them, the present situation - bad though it is - would by
now have been infinitely worse. I repeat: all this has been done at the invitation of the
Government of Cyprus, including both communities.
What is more - and what is without parallel, so far as I know, in such circumstances -
is that all this has been done without a single casualty being caused by British troops among
either the Greek Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots. Not a single casualty, I repeat, has been
caused.
My country is proud of this record, and in the circumstances I am content to let the facts
of our actions in the Republic of Cyprus over the last seven weeks speak for themselves and
constitute a categorical refutation of the insinuation against my Government implied in the words
used by the representative of the Soviet Union.'88
Fedorenko, deciding to reserve his reply until a later time, allowed the President of the Council to now
pass the floor to the Representative of the United States of America, who although maintaining that, 'the
Treaty of Guarantee forms an integral part of the organic arrangements that created the Republic of
Cyprus', 89 insisted that the United States held no position as to either, 'the form or shape of a final
settlement of the Cyprus problem... [and] that neither the United States nor any other Western Powers are
seeking to impose their will on the Government of Cyprus.' 9° As for the earlier Soviet assertions of a
NATO based conspiracy, Stevenson simply replied:
'I shall not dwell at this time on the assertions of the representative of the Soviet Union whereby
the anxiety that most of us have that peace must be restored to Cyprus is some form of NATO
plot. No one is even proposing that the international force be comprised just of NATO military
units. The parties will have to agree upon the participants in any such force.'9'
However, Stevenson did pay special attention to trying to foster a continued spirit of Guarantor Power
cohesion. Having by now taken a solid line in favour of the United Kingdom's position on the Treaty of
Guarantee, the US Representative concluded:
'the United States values the spirit of co-operation which Greece and Turkey have shown in
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these dangerous weeks. They have demonstrated great restraint at a difficult moment in history.
Both Governments, I believe, are to be commended for approaching Cyprus' problem, which
has sensitive implications for both of them, with a sense of responsibility not only to the
respective communities in Cyprus but also, more importantly, to the entire world community.
We should be grateful to both of them.'
At this point Bitsios once again took the floor and stated that Greece nonetheless felt that any solution
would have to be acceptable to the Cypriots. Although his speech the previous day was intended 'to strike
a note of moderation, of conciliation', his action now seemed to reveal his pro-Greek Cypriot position
more than at any time before. The first chinks in the Guarantor Power/Western unity on the Cyprus issue
had now appeared. The meeting was now adjourned the meeting until Friday, 21 February.
4. The Role of the Non-Aligned Movement
At this juncture it is perhaps worthwhile to examine the meaning of Fedorenko's comments about the
NATO's desire to see Cyprus as a 'bridgehead.' This comment can only have had meaning if one
considers the importance of Cyprus vis-a-vis the states of either North Africa or the Middle East - states
which were predominantly in the non-aligned camp. Before analysing the role of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), it is worth mentioning a few details about the Movement as it was by 1964. First,
and foremost, it must be remembered that the Non-Aligned Movement was not formalised in the way that
both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation were. (Indeed, the NAM had only had one full
conference by the time of Cyprus - the meeting in Belgrade in 1961.) Instead, it is best viewed as a
grouping of states that held a common viewpoint on a number of issues and, as such, felt that issues
arising in international politics should be judged not by the criteria of the Superpowers but instead should
be appraised on the merits of the individual case.
In any case, it is interesting to note that up until this point the Non-Aligned Movement - as a
collective association of states - had remained remarkably quiet on the subject of Cyprus, which was,
after all, a fellow member. Although there had been a degree of interest shown by certain individual
members of the Movement - including Yugoslavia which, from the evidence available, had alone called
the active support of the Movement as a whole for Cyprus as an 'urgent necessity' 92 - there had been little
overt action taken by the other member states to support directly, and as a collective whole, the case of
the Cypriots in the earlier period of the crisis. Indeed, the few members who did state an opinion did tend
to be the Arab states, of which Egypt was the most prominent, 93 which appeared to be far more concerned
about the Cyprus situation being orchestrated by the West as a means to provide a staging point in
support of Israel, 94 than concerned about the way in which the Greek Cypriots were being pressured by
Britain and the United States as a subject unto itself. One cannot be entirely sure as to why this might
have been the case. Such a course of action on the part of the Arab states may possibly - though
unprovable with any certainty - have been as a result of the dilemma faced by the states who realised that
although Makarios had a prominent position within the NAM, the minority group in the conflict were
Moslem, albeit Turkish. Yet this does not adequately explain the wider lack of voiced support. In the
event, the answer to this problem may have been fairly simple, namely that the support of the Movement
was not directly asked for by the Greek Cypriots. Although this may sound an easy way out of trying to
address this problem there are several good reasons why this may have been the case. In the first instance,
the Greek Cypriots had apparently shown a marked disdain for the idea of some form of African
involvement in a potential Commonwealth peace-keeping force. This seem to signify a certain
xenophobia with regard to potential non-white involvement in Cyprus. While the NAM may have been
a good forum by which to participate in the general airing of third world views on a number of important
developmental issues, there was not, perhaps, a marked interest at this stage, on the part of the Greek
Cypriots, to have such an involvement in the affairs of Cyprus. This in some ways ties in with a second
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argument that may be presented to explain the reason why the Greek Cypriots may not have gone looking
for the support of the NAM as a first option, namely that the Soviet Union had presented itself as that
first option.
In the initial phase of the crisis when the matter was held within the sphere of the Guarantor
Powers, events seemed to be progressing in such a way that the need overtly to internationalise the
problem beyond the general forum of the United Nations, was not, perhaps, deemed necessary. However,
when the matter of the force made up of contingents from NATO member states arose, the matter
immediately became of direct concern to the Soviet Union. This therefore by-passed the NAM as an
option. Indeed, there may well have been a general perception that the Movement would not have been
able to provide an effective means of countering the NATO 'threat' anywhere nearly as well as the Soviet
Union could. If one reviews the Greek Cypriot press at the time it becomes noticeable that almost all the
commentaries refer to the potential role of the USSR, and there is almost no mention made of a possible
role to be played by the NAM. In fact, one may argue that even if the NAM had decided to become
actively involved as a whole its voice may hardly have been heard in amongst the more general intrigues
being pursued by the Superpowers and their allies in the middle phase of the crisis.
Yet it was certainly the case that the increasingly difficult international political situation in
which Cyprus found itself was taking a toll on its relations with both the East and the West. Indeed, as
if to prove the above observation, there were press reports within the Greek Cypriot Community that the
Government was planning to strengthen its ties to the Movement as a means of drawing away from such
partisanship. 95 However, a Greek Cypriot spokesman stated in reply to this that, 'we have always
followed a policy of non-alignment, so there is no question of changing now and becoming more non-
aligned.' 96 Furthermore, the spokesman noted that Cyprus had just accepted an invitation to attend the
Colombo Conference of the non-aligned states, a reply given to the United Arab Republic's (UAR)
Ambassador in Cyprus. Indeed, in his statements made at this point in time President Nasser of the UAR
implied that he would back Cyprus on the position it had put before the United Nations. Considering the
fact that Nasser held a great degree of status within the NAM and was regarded as having pro-
Communist tendencies, this immediately resulted in accusations from the Turkish Foreign Minister,
Feridun Erkin, that Cyprus was deliberately tlying to pull the Soviet bloc into the crisis. 97 This accusation
was once again reiterated by Vice-President KuçUk in a wire transmitted a few days later to Western and
UN leaders.98
Given the Greek Cypriot leadership's clear statement of supposed policy with regard to the
NAM, there was certainly a lot of room for confusion in the minds of the Western Powers and the
Turkish Cypriots as to where the true position of the Greek Cypriots now lay. On the same day as it was
announced that Cyprus was pursuing a non-aligned policy, many newspapers led with a story that Cyprus
was increasing its trade links with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and were actually negotiating
an aviation agreement with the Soviet Government. 99 In conclusion to this debate, it seems as if the NAM
was not a priority for the Greek Cypriots in the same way as the Cyprus situation was not a priority for
the members of the Movement beyond the possible effects that it may have had on certain Arab NAM
members.
5. The Secretary-General Consults the Parties
Meanwhile, Secretary-General Thant was trying to make progress in his attempts to secure Greek and
Turkish support for a planned United Nations force. On the morning of 20 February he had a second
meeting with the Greek Cypriot delegates.'°° In the course of the ensuing ninety minute discussions'°'
the Secretary-General outlined the developments that had taken place noting that the plans for the force
had been drawn up in such a manner as to put the Secretary-General in charge of the day-to-day control
of the force, with advice from the proposed three-man committee of members of the Security Council)°2
Furthermore, the composition of the force would be such that the consent of the Republic of Cyprijs
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would have to be obtained.' 03 On both these points the Greek Cypriots were particularly in favour as it
meant that the link to the Security Council would not only be strong, but that the contingents drawn for
the force would be subject to Cypriot scrutiny.' 04 In addition the Greek Cypriots also mooted their
feelings about the advisability of putting forward two more proposals for a resolution, the first of which
would clarify the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and the second would pertain to the
formation of a peace-keeping force.'° 5 On this idea, Thant promised to sound out the various members
of the Security Council.
Commenting on the Turkish position, the Secretary-General explained that Turkey wished to see
any clause relating to such territorial integrity include a specific clause referring to the rights of the
Guarantor Powers.'°6 In addition Turkey believed that the Committee of Three proposed to guide the
Secretary-General should be comprised of the three Guarantor Powers. The Turks also sought to oppose
the use of the term 'Republic of Cyprus' preferring instead the term 'Greek and Turkish communities
of Cyprus', however Thant was of the opinion that the Turkish Government would not press this point.'07
More controversially, the Turkish Government also proposed the setting-up of a committee to investigate
contraventions of the Convention of Genocide and the Convention of Human Rights.'°8 At this point, the
main Greek Cypriot concern was that there should be no mention of the validity of the Treaty of
Guarantee within the text of the resolution. In addition, political demands within the Greek Cypriot
community meant that the resolution should contain specific reference to the territorial integrity of the
Republic, in which case Makarios would be able to sell the resolution as being a political victory for the
Greek Cypriots.'°9 At this point Thant gave a brief synopsis of the position of the United States and the
United Kingdom, both of whom were against the creation of a committee on the basis that it undoubtedly
posed significant problems as to the nature of its composition."°
The meeting was now adjourned for the day with the Secretary-General undertaking to put
forward the results of the meeting with the Greek Cypriots to the other members of the Security Council.
Indeed, later that same day Thant had a joint meeting with Norwegian Representative Nielsen and US
Representative Stevenson, as well as a 'private discussion' with Representative Menemencioglu of
Turkey." The result of which meant that by the next day the Secretary-General was ready to present a
new set of proposals to the Greek Cypriots. Thus, once again, the Greek Cypriots were called to the
United Nations' Headquarters but were this time were surprised to find that the new proposals were
worse than the previous ideas."2 A lengthy preamble referring to the various Treaties was now proposed.
In the course of the next five hours, another draft set of ideas was created which was more in tune with
the Greek Cypriots' ideas. However, Thant, concerned that Turkey (which had not been happy about the
earlier ideas) would flatly reject these," 3 noted that at this point the only major point of difference
between the parties lay with the Treaties:
'The Turkish, American and British point of view is that reference to the Agreements should be
made. The Turks insisted that the reference should be in the operative part of the resolution. The
British and Americans would possibly be satisfied with a reference to the Treaties in the
preamble. The Cypriot point of view is that no reference to the Treaties should be made either
in the preamble or the operative part."4
The Secretary-General now, 'saw no possibility of establishing common ground and that it would be
better to continue with the 5 In a further complication, the Soviet Union was once again stirring
things up. Rejecting the overall ideas presented, the Soviet (and unsurprisingly, Czechoslovak), view
was:
'(a) The question should be limited to a resolution calling all countries concerned to respect the
territorial integrity, sovereignty, etc. of the Republic and to abstain from any threats or use of
force in accordance with the Charter.
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(b) No reference should be made to the Treaties whatsoever.
(c) No need exists for sending an international force to Cyprus."16
Given the state of the negotiations, the planned Council meeting for that day was postponed. It was now
clear that the issue of the Treaties would take a greater prominence in the Security Council as the behind-
the-scenes process was going nowhere.
The Deteriorating Situation in Cyprus
The deliberations taking place at the United Nations were at that time doing little to ease either the
overall political situation in Cyprus, or the problems faced by the British Army. The continued
expansion of the Truce Force to meet the requirements of its ever more difficult job meant that a further
one and a half thousand men were on their way to Cyprus with around five hundred men drawn from the
26th Regiment Royal Artillery, six hundred men of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
and a squadron of the Royal Dragoons - which arrived with their Ferret armoured cars. In a statement it
was announced that they were 'being sent there to assist with international peace-force. Once there there
will be 6.000 British troops "engaged in internal security duties in Cyprus, as well as 3.000-4.000 officers
and men of all three services in the Sovereign Base areas."7
In structural terms the entire British presence in Cyprus by now consisted of five infantry
battalions, two artillery regiments (without their field guns), four armoured car squadrons (one of which
was involved in patrols and communications without their cars), as well as a divisional headquarters and
a brigade headquarters. Further to this, the 1st Battalion The Devonshire and Dorset regiment stationed
in Northern Ireland were on call, as was the 2nd Battalion The Coldstream Guards. 1 ' 8 Soon thereafter a
further six hundred men of the 20th Regiment Royal Artillery had been placed on stand-by amid
comments that,
'The British Government are becoming worried at the growing hostility which is being shown
in Cyprus to the presence of British troops. This is being fanned by the Greek Cypriot press, and
the idea is catching on among the people that the British are bent on recolonization, and that they
are favouring the Turks - a cry often heard in the days before independence.. .Moreover, the
Turkish Cypriots, in the present delicate situation, are tending to say that the British are treating
them badly.. .one of the fears in Whitehall has always been that the British peace-keeping force
might lose the confidence of both sides, in which case its effectiveness would naturally be
gravely impaired."9
Perhaps with this increase in mind Makarios now made clear his belief that the international force should
be limited to 7,000.120 This figure was three thousand troops short of the figure previously produced for
the NATO-based force. Yet the internal situation in Cyprus had changed to such an extent as to raise the
possibility that any potential force would need in excess of the ten thousand earlier projected. This had
been made all the more clear after an increase in the numbers within the Cyprus police force to around
five thousand, the Greek Cypriot security forces had grown massively from the previous December.'2'
More seriously, there were now reports that Makarios was not wholly in control of the situation.
Although serious intercommunal fighting had diminished noticeably since the beginning of the Security
Council debate, it was nonetheless reported that the two main Greek Cypriot militia leaders - alleged
to have been Nicos Sampson and Interior Minister Polykarpos Yiorgadjis - were in competition against
each other as well as Makarios. In addition both were engaged in violent conflict with the Turkish
Cypriots.' 23 With events threatening to spiral completely out of control, the only positive piece of news
received - no doubt equally by Makarios, the United Kingdom, and the Turkish Cypriots - was that
General Grivas had made a public declaration that, contrary to expectations, he was not planning to
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return to Cyprus to resume what were euphemistically called 'underground activities'.'24
While events in Cyprus were in a state of flux, there appeared to be an ever greater risk that the
situation in Cyprus could escakte into a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey. In commenting to
a British official, the Secretary-general of NATO, Dirk Stikker, raised the matter of a possible role for
NATO in the event of such hostilities. Indeed, '[Stikker] said that the idea had been put forward (he did
not say by whom) that a NATO force might, with the agreement of both countries, be stationed across
the Greco/Turkish border in Thrace, so as to keep the forces of the two countries apart." 25 With an
increase in tensions apparent in the wider eastern Mediterranean, the situation back at the United Nations
could not have been more different to that in Cyprus. U Thant was by now reporting that he was at an
impasse with regard to his negotiations.'26
The Council Reconvenes
At three thirty of the afternoon of 25 February, the Security Council met again. The President of the
Council, noting that Thant wished to address the assembled members, duly passed the floor over to the
Secretary-General. Reading a personal statement to the Security Council, Thant said, inter alia:
'Since the last meeting of the Security Council, and, indeed, even before that meeting, I have had
discussions with the parties principally involved for the purpose of exchanging views in an effort
to clarify and define major issues.. .As you know, I have engaged in these informal discussion
because it was clearly the wish of the parties that I should do so, and especially because in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the Cyprus situation, it is my desire to do everything possible
to help resolve this dangerous crisis.. .The discussions have been devoted primarily to expositions
by the parties of their views of the problem and how it might be dealt with. It has not been my
purpose to offer solutions, but as I said earlier, to seek common ground.. .1 am convinced that
there is an earnest desire on the part of all concerned to seek a peaceful solution, although, as
may be expected, the positions on certain key issues have been firmly taken and
maintained. ..may I express the hope that a reasonable and practical way out of the impasse will
be found by this council. I will, of course, continue to be available and to do whatever may be
appropriate in the circumstances to assist towards reaching a solution."27
Bernardes now gave the floor for the first time to a member of the Security Council that did not have a
direct role in the situation - the acting-Representative of Morocco. Noting that the independence of
Cyprus had been 'welcomed by a number of friendly countries',' 28 Sidi Baba went on to state that
examples of the harmonious coexistence within a state could be found in many Arab countries.' 29 Citing
that once there was a mutual understanding of the need for peaceful coexistence within the state, the
principle of independence and sovereignty should be accepted. To this end, in the view of the Moroccan
delegation was that, 'the less interference there is from abroad, the better it will be for the Cypriot people
and the stability of its institutions." 30 Continuing his speech the Moroccan then stated, with regard to the
London-Zurich Agreements:
'This state of things, we consider, can hardly be reconciled with the effective exercise of national
sovereignty, especially in a country which is a State Member of the United Nations and whose
basic position and guiding principles are those of non-alignment, as Archbishop Makarios
himself said at the Belgrade Conference in 1961."'
The Greek Cypriots must surely have been pleased to see that the Moroccans were now apparently
swinging to their position. However, the Moroccan view was soon revealed to be much more along the
lines of non-alignment that the Greek Cypriots must surely have wanted. Sidi Baba, in commenting on
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why the Turkish Cypriots, as a minority, might attach importance to the London-ZUrich Agreements
stated that,
'[i]t is therefore to be hoped that these guarantees will not be challenged abruptly and
unilaterally, since there is reason to fear that in their absence the island's very existence as a
State might in present circumstances be gravely jeopardized at any moment. We accordingly
agree with those who believe that any changes in the Constitution which affect the guarantee
clauses should be undertaken in a spirit of national fraternity and respect for the rights of the
communities. A constitution amended in such circumstances, while incorporating the desired
improvements would afford the necessary guarantees to the Turkish minority. In achieving this
goal the Cypriot leaders would strip off all moral value those provisions of previous agreements
which they regard as inconsistent with their country's national sovereignty, and would deprive
those who might at any time be tempted to interfere from abroad in the affairs of Cyprus of any
excuse for doing so."32
Thanking the Secretary-General for his role in the search for an acceptable way forward, the Moroccans
made a final note of the fact that they hoped, 'that this Mediterranean island will not become the theatre,
and subsequently the victim, of a trial between the antagonistic forces traditionally bent on maintaining
or establishing a foothold in the Mediterranean basin. ..we, as non-aligned nations, are profoundly anxious
that this part of the world should be progressively withdrawn from exposure to the out-and-out
competition of the cold war."33
The next to speak was the Norwegian Representative. As a representative of a NATO member -
which had also shown some interest in participating in the NATO-based force - Nielsen broadly took the
side of the the United Kingdom. Indeed, he declared: 'It is the view of my Government that it is not for
the Security Council to pronounce on the Constitution of a Member State, nor to pass judgement on a
set of treaties which were negotiated as an integral part of the whole process of granting independence
to that State." 34 In continuing his speech the Norwegian made the first real move taken on the floor of
the Council to establishing the modus operandi of a peace-keeping force:
'So far, none of the parties has objected to the creation of an international peace force. It is
sufficient to remind the Council of the many successful peace-keeping operations of the United
Nations. My delegation would request the parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in
order to reach agreement on the establishment of an international peace force in Cyprus. In our
view, the Security Council would not be well advised to prescribe in detail how this task would
be carried out. We, on our part, would only like to add that the force should be set up without
financial obligations to the United Nations, taking due account of the present financial situation
of the Organization.'135
The next to take his turn was Representative Hajek of Czechoslovakia. Given the pro-Soviet Czech
position up until this point, it came as no surprise to hear that Hajek took the same stance as the Soviet
Representative. However, at the start of his speech he neatly, though with no uncertain bias, caught the
dilemma facing the Security Council in its continued debate of the Cyprus issue:
'The present discussion on the question of Cyprus has so far produced two distinct points of
view. On the one hand, the opinion has been voiced that our task is to ensure and strengthen the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which have been
seriously threatened by interference and aggression from outside. On the other hand, we have
witnessed an attempt to achieve through the United Nations a measure which would enable a
group of States to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. These points of view
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are diametrically opposed to each other, and it is obviously extremely difficult, I am sorry to say,
to find a compromise between them."36
Proceeding to elaborate the same views as had by this point been heard over an over again, the Czech
Representative finally said something of interest when he sought to parallel the situation in Cyprus with
the events that befell his country in 1938, arguing:
'An aggressor from the outside used the leadership of an ethnical minority for unleashing
disputes and conflicts and bringing about the disintegration of the State, for the purpose of
furnishing alleged evidence that not only made the coexistence of that minority with the majority
impossible, but also the very existence of Czechoslovakia untenable.. .In order to facilitate an
agreement between the West and Hitlerite Germany, Czechoslovakia was continually asked and
pressed to grant more and more concessions to the detriment of its sovereignty and security. It
is interesting to note, for instance that one of those demands urged a change be made in the
Czechoslovak Constitution which, in effect, provided that the leadership of the minority, directed
from abroad, would have been virtually able to block any political decision of the Government
and open the door to intervention by the neighbouring State whenever suitable for it.. .In the
name of peace, the Munich Diktat and the partition of the country was imposed upon
Czechoslovakia, followed six months later by the occupation of Prague. Six months later the
Second World War burst out."
Comparing the situation in Cyprus to that which had befallen the Congo a few years earlier,
Representative Usher of the Ivory Coast,' 38 noted that the UN, 'should not encourage a repetition of it
in the Cyprus case." 39 Usher then went on to comment that although the Cypriot Constitution evidently
had faults, and that international treaties should not be 'fixed or static',' 4° 'we must acknowledge that the
unilateral denunciation of a treaty is bound to be a source of conflict and war." 4 ' Agreeing that a force
should be created the Representative of the Ivory Coast concluded by noting that the issue of the
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus should also be addressed in any final resolution.
With three of the non-permanent members of the Council now having spoken their minds on the
issue of Cyprus, the debate now returned to the parties with a direct interest. Taking the floor the Turkish
Representative took the opportunity to reply to the Czech statement and made a somewhat veiled
criticism of their policy of kowtowing to the Soviet Union. In drawing a particular criticism he referred
to the relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the Czechoslovak State,' 42 and noted that
although the Soviet Union had a Constitution that guaranteed the rights of many minorities, this had not
made a 'sovereign identity'.'43
Fedorenko, by-passing the Turkish comments, at this point asked if he might be able to reply to
the statement made by Sir Patrick Dean at the previous meeting, and once again challenged the British
assertion that Makarios invited the Guarantor Powers to intervene in December 1963, and accused the
United Kingdom of the 'flagrant infringement of the sovereignty of Cyprus.' ' Concluding his comments
Fedorenko invited the United Kingdom to state categorically that it would not use 'armed force against
Cyprus and that it intends, in the Cyprus situation, to abide strictly by its obligations as a State Member
of the United Nations." 45 Dean, in what may perhaps be interpreted as an effort to buy time in order to
formulate a response to the statement, asked that Fedorenko's speech be translated into both English and
French. At this point, the Czech Representative asked that he be allowed to respond to the Turkish
Representative's earlier statement, and proceeded to give a detailed rebuttal to the comments, and offered
to send Menemencio1u a copy of the Czech Constitution to show that, 'the existence of the two national
entities is fully respected." 46 By this time the meeting had clearly degenerated into a series of accusations
and counter-accusations. At which point Sir Patrick Dean replied to the earlier Soviet charges by asking
the Soviet Representative to refer back to the six points that he had made in his address before the
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Council on the 18 February.
Kyprianou taking the chance to thank the Secretary-General for his efforts to find a solution, and
emphasising the important role of General Gyani and Mr. RoIz-Bennet, went on to discuss on the
importance, or lack thereof, of the Treaty of Guarantee. In fact, the Greek Cypriot attempted to argue that
under Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the instruction put before all members of the
United Nations was:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail.
Placing an explicit question before the three Guarantor Powers, Kyprianou threw down the gauntlet by
stating,
'I should like, with permission to put a simple question to the Members signatories to the Treaty
of Guarantee. I do not insist on an answer tonight. Is it the view of the Governments of Greece,
Turkey and the United Kingdom that they have the right of military intervention under the Treaty
of Guarantee, particularly, in view of the Charter? On this I must insist on having an answer. It
is very relevant to the whole issue, and I think the Council must have an answer to it before it
forms a final	 47
Although the Soviet Representative took another opportunity to question Dean, Menemenciolu replied
to Kyprianou's vital question by seeking to accuse the Greek Cypriots of hiding behind the United
Nations as a means of doing 'away with all their commitments, including treaties, and to give them the
right to jump upon the remaining Turks, to finish what they have started." 48 Kyprianou immediately
responded: 'As far as the exaggerations and distortions about genocide are concerned, those are words
which can be found more often in the vocabulary of his own country - and I am referring to the past,
when unfortanately there was no Charter of the United Nations."49
To end the session, the Greek Representative decided to reply to Kyprianou's earlier question.
Stating his Government's policy on this issue, Bitsios simply stated 'No'.' 5° In other words the Greek had
stated his belief that intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee was indeed subject to authorization by
the Security Council. However, this answer did not solve the overall question of how to deal with the
issue of the conflicting aims of the parties that still remained. The Greek Cypriots still wished to see a
resolution that explicitly spoke of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic
of Cyprus and effectively abrogated the Treaty of Guarantee. On the other hand, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and Turkey all held that respect for the Treaty of Guarantee was integral to any
resolution.
By the end of the day's session it had become clear that while the Greek Cypriots could
undoubtedly call on the support of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, they faced opposition from
within the Council from the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States. Of the other states, China
had not spoken, nor had France, Brazil or Bolivia. And both the Ivory Coast and Morocco had taken a
position that fell somewhere between the two respective camps. With the Secretary-General now unable
to find a solution behind the scenes, and a real split having taken place within the Security Council it was
becoming increasingly obvious that if the Cyprus situation were not addressed soon, then the debate
could well lapse into an East-West verbal scrap. A solution, now more than ever, was needed. In any
case, the meeting was now adjourned by Bernardes, and was scheduled to meet again on 27 February.
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6. Breaking the Deadlock
Although the Secretary-General had announced the end of his attempts to find common ground, there
were hopeful rumours filtering out that five of the six non-permanent thembers of the Security Council,
under the leadership of Dr. Bernades of Brazil, were about to introduce a new draft resolution for
discussion. In a memorandum written by an official attached to the Greek Cypriot delegation following
a telephone conversation with a member of the Brazilian Mission at the United Nations, the following
was noted:
'Brazil's feeling is that the efforts of the Secretary-General did not result in complete failure and
that if the matter was taken up from there and agreement was reached between the non-
permanent Members, that agreement would be communicated to the parties concerned, with a
view to minor modifications.
At a meeting held yesterday evening a Paper was drafted containing a possible
resolution. Three approaches were represented in the preamble. The first preamble contained
no reference to either the integrity question or to the Treaties. The second draft preamble made
clear reference to both the integrity question and to the Treaties. The third draft preamble made
reference to both these issues in a diluted
It was by now clear that the difficulties that needed to be addressed focussed on the preamble, and that
the operative aspects of the draft were by now settled. In attempting to go some of the way towards
satisfying all the various parties, three options were now presented. In analysing the three proposals, it
was clear, on the basis of earlier arguments, that the first option - with no mention of either the Treaties
or the integrity issue - was for obvious reasons going to be unacceptable to all parties. For the Greek
Cypriots it did not provide an international guarantee against Turkish intervention. For Turkey and the
United Kingdom, it would not have established the fundamental importance of the Treaties. Therefore,
options two and three were likely to be the most viable routes forward. In any case, this timely
intervention proved to be the beginning of the end of the political bargaining over a suitable resolution
for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus.
On Wednesday 26 February, the day following Thant's statement, Bemardes informally
distributed to the other members of the Council the first draft of the text of a resolution for the setting
up of a United Nations force.' In a meeting held by Bemades with the Greek Cypriots that same morning,
the Greek Cypriot delegation took the chance to make some, 'observations on his draft resolution')52
However, it was clear that the Greek Cypriot delegation were generally positive about the draft and saw
it as an attempt "to find something acceptable to everybody." 53 Indeed, Makarios, in spite of the certain
difficulties with the wording of the UN resolution, appeared to be general supportive of the idea for an
United Nations mediator and peace-keeping force although the issue of the exact nature of the proposed
resolution continued to prove to be a sticking point. 154 In particular the Greek Cypriots noted that the draft
resolution failed:
(a) To get Turkey specifically mentioned as the country towards which the admonition to respect
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, was directed.
(b ) To abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee
(c) To include as a term of reference of the Force to be stationed in Cyprus, either to defend
Cyprus from aggression, or to prevent or restore the de facto situation created, or that which




Despite the fact that the proposed resolution failed to meet these points, the draft certainly seemed to
meet the perceived security needs of the Greek Cypriots. As Clerides later noted about the general
reaction to the Resolution within the Greek Cypriot community after the Resolution had been passed:
'The main shortcomings.. .of the resolution escaped the attention of the general public and the
press. This was due to the fact that the attention of everyone was concentrated on the issue of
removing the danger of military intervention by Turkey and not on the issue of abrogating the
agreements."56
Indeed, it seemed to be the case that the need to prevent a Turkish intervention was the main concern
within the Greek Cypriot delegation by this point. And the draft resolution, noting the integrity issue, did
meet this requirement. Therefore following consultations with the Greek Cypriots, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and France all stated that they would support the draft resolution.'57
Therefore it now appeared that the final decision would lay in the hands of The United Kingdom,
the United States and Turkey. As far the British Government were concerned, they 'did not see any
alternative to supporting the Resolution which the Five are proposing." 58 Although the text went a
considerable way towards the Greek Cypriot aim of having the independence, territorial integrity, and
the like, of Cyprus recognised, it did nonetheless make reference to the Treaty of Guarantee, and did not
specifically refer to Turkey. Yet, the Foreign Office seemed to be concerned that the United States might
be against such a resolution. Therefore a request was put through to the US Ambassador in London that
not only should the United States accept the resolution but that they should assist the British Government
by trying to persuade the Turkish Government to accept the draft.' 59 However, later that same day, the
US Ambassador returned a message to the Foreign Office in which he explained that the United States
was, at that time unwilling to accept the draft resolution as it stood, for the simple reason 'that it would
be unacceptable to the This was because under the proposed resolution there was the all-
important preamble referring to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. As for
the position of the United States there appeared to be some, albeit limited, progress being made. It was
now reported that there was,
'...a telegram on the way from H.M. Ambassador in Washington regarding his conversation with
Mr. Ball this morning. He understood that it ended on the note that the Americans would not try
and prevent the Resolution from passing for the sole reason that the Turks disliked it. This was
comforting to a point, although it probably meant that they would now try to manoeuvre so there
was objection to the Resolution from the Greek or Greek-Cypriots as well as the Turks. I said
that, before the Americans went ahead on this line, they must understand that we saw no, repeat
no, alternative compromise to a resolution on the lines now under discussion. If this were to fail,
the result would not be a meeting of the three Guarantor Powers. Sir P. Dean said that he fully
understood this, and that the most likely next step would be a meeting of the Assembly, which
everyone in their senses wished to avoid."6'
A French Role?
At the same time, in an apparent attempt to break the deadlock - or perhaps to break the Western unity'62
- Makarios was at this point reported to have approached President de Gaulle to act as a mediator.' 63 This
had been publicly mooted by Makarios the previous day in another interview with Le Monde. IM j
Cyprus, pro-French feeling had been on the increase throughout the previous week. On 16 February,
Makhi had written that Makarios had decided to establish diplomatic representation in Paris at
ambassadorial level,' 65 and on the subject of a French mediatory role, a commentary written in the
newspaper Ethniki had suggested that de Gaulle would be the 'ideal neutral mediator." 66 Yet despite this
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open statement of intent by the Greek Cypriots in favour of a prominent French position in a negotiation
process, officials within the United States' Government stated that they felt that France would be
unwilling to undertake this role.' 67 However, the United States could surely have not been so confident
about predicting the attitude of the General de Gaulle. Indeed, th& role of the French Government
throughout the crisis period had proved to be both enigmatic and quietly important. On the latter point,
it is worthy remembering that both Makarios and Kuçuk had chosen to give high profile interviews to
the French newspaper Le Monde earlier in the crisis - perhaps with a view to swaying the views of the
French. Indeed, it was now being reported that Makarios had decided to upgrade its diplomatic
representation in Paris to full ambassadorial level.'68
Given the earlier French refusal to contribute to the NATO-based force, the issue of France
acting as a mediator seemed to concern the British. The reason why Makarios may have been willing to
see cle Gaulle acting in that role was because of certain views that the General was reported to have had
with a view to solving the continuing difficulty. A letter submitted to the Foreign Office by the United
Kingdom's Delegation in Paris noted that the question of Cyprus had apparently not come up in a
meeting between President Segni of Italy and General de Gaulle,' 69 but that,
'...the Italians had gathered from French officials that it was General de Gaulle's view that a
really radical solution was called for. Furthermore, General de Gaulle had said to the Italian
Ambassador here [Paris] before the State Visit that any lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem
would have to be based on a large-scale repatriation or re-settlement of the Turkish community
on the island."7°
However, despite the degree of attention given to the idea of a role for General de Gaulle, French
Government officials denied knowledge of an official request for mediation,' 7 ' and the idea did not
appear again as a serious proposal.
Contingency Planning
Without realising that the draft resolution was basically acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, there was
concern being expressed within the British Cabinet that while the draft resolution was acceptable to the
United Kingdom, and possibly the United States, it was still unlikely to find favour with the Turkey, and
indeed by now, Greece.' 72 This appraisal of the Greek Government's position had been made following
a note from the United States' Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in which George Ball had
noted that in the event that the Security Council did not come up with an acceptable resolution the
possibility of a bilateral meeting between Papandreou and tnönü would be unlikely to occur without
some form of 'third party invitation and ajuridical excuse for conferring." 73 However, Ball suggested
that some form of conference may succeed if it were done under the auspices of the provisions of the
Treaty of Guarantee. Indeed, as Ball commented,
'I feel more than ever that some move of this kind is imperative. It seems evident that the Greek
Cypriot game is to keep the United Nations proceedings going. This is a forum where they can
draw support from their Communist friends. It provides them with insulation against a Turkish
move while eroding Turkish intervention rights."74
Assessing the profile of the Security Council, Ball noted that the Greek Cypriots were having some
success in wooing the support of the Moroccans and the Permanent Representative of the Ivory Coast -
both of which had previously seemed to be 'neutral' from their respective speeches at the Security
Council.' 75 To this end the idea of a meeting of the Guarantor Powers seemed, to the United States at
least, to have afforded the following opportunities:
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'(A.) To convince Makarios that the Turks mean business and that he is playing too risky a
game;
(B.) To press Makarios to accept and support a peace-keeping forëe along the lines of the
Thant plan; and
(C.) To undertake contingency planning for a possible tripartite intervention as an alternative
to unilateral Turkish move."76
Yet to expect to cajole Makarios once again would be difficult to say the least. Whereas previously the
Archbishop had the support of the Soviet Union, on this occasion he would have not just Soviet backing,
but also support from the Greek Government. In the case of the which, it was interesting to note that the
British Government had, by the day following the Ball message, almost completely ruled out another
meeting of the Guarantor Powers on the basis that it was almost certain that the Greek Government would
refuse to attend.'77
7. The Changing Position of the Greek Government
Changes in the political scene in Athens meant that there was a Greek Government in place that
supported the Greek Cypriots in a way that the caretaker Government had been unable to do. The General
Elections held in Greece on 16 February had brought to power the veteran liberal politician George
Papandreou, whose arrival was heralded by significant anti-British and anti-American violent
demonstrations in Athens.' 78 Although Papandreou had welcomed the initial British intervention in
Cyprus back in December, he had campaigned on a platform that, inter alia, opposed the London-Zü rich
Agreements.' 79 Yet a coherent policy on Cyprus was not articulated in the initial week or so after the
election - during which the incoming Government was forming a Cabinet) 80 However, the changed
policy of the new Government over that taken by Paraskevopoulos took a very strong hold by the point
at which Thant announced that his attempts to break the deadlock at the United Nations had failed.
Indeed, the same day as this announcement was made, the new Greek Foreign Minister announced that
he was re-examining Athens Radio broadcasts of Greek language BBC World Service and Voice of
America (VOA) news items on the basis that such accounts were 'unfavourable' to Cyprus.' 8 ' And, on
27 February, Papandreou told the Ambassadors of Britain and the United States that his government had
decided to support Makarios's views and help restore the 'peace and the principles of democracy' in
Cyprus) 82 The next day the threatened ban on BBC broadcasting came into effect, although VOA and
Radiodiffusion Fran caise (RDF) were allowed to run as usual. However the day after this a blanket ban
was imposed (including the RDF) with only one Greek language broadcast by VOA allowed per day, in
the evening. At the same time Papandreou made an announcement to the Greek nation in which the clear
shift in Greek policy was revealed when he commented that: 'The Greek Government gives its
unqualified assistance to the just struggle of Cypriot Hellenism..jtjhe tragic consequences of the Treaties
of London and Zurich are now being revealed." 83 This had followed a warning given by Foreign Minister
Kostopoulos to Turkish Ambassador 11km: 'if Turkey decided to make a unilateral intervention in
Cyprus, Greece would intervene."84
With this Makarios was now in a position where he could now play on pan-Hellenistic feelings,
as support for his position was now being actively voiced in the new Greek Government.' 85 The change
in Greek attitudes no doubt affected the United Kingdom's perceptions of its military position in Cyprus,
as it could no longer rely on a broad Guarantor Power coalition. However, such changes in Greece were
mediated by the continued support of Turkey towards the British Government and the Truce Force. With
such increased Greek support for the Greek Cypriot community the Turkish Government would surely
have been expected to support the Turkish Cypriots with threats against any Greek attempts to
overwhelm the island. However, with the prospect of a resolution looming large on the horizon, the
Turkish position seemed to have softened considerably. In a statement to the press, Prime Minister Inönü
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said that Turkey would try 'all imaginable measures' to avoid the 'last resort' of intervention in
Cyprus.' 86 Of course one must show a degree of scepticism towards statements made by politicians to the
press, but in this case the actions of Turkey seemed to support the idea that by this point Turkey had
indeed been persuaded to take a softer line on the issue of Cyprus, and accept the draft resolution. To this
extent its role at the United Nations seemed to reflect this. However, if the Turkish Government was by
now trying to be conciliatory in its dealings with the Cyprus problem, the Turkish Cypriots were not.
Before the draft resolution could be passed, the Turkish Cypriot case would have to be heard by the
Council.
The Council Meets Again
As had been scheduled at the last meeting, the Security Council reconvened on the afternoon of Thursday
27 February. The first item of discussion was a letter submitted, on 19 February, in which the acting
Permanent Representative of Turkey had requested that Rauf Denkta, the President of the Turkish
Cypriot Communal Chamber, be allowed to address the Council.' 87 Although the Greek Cypriots
investigated the means by which to prevent such an address from happening, they soon became aware
that as they were not a member of the Security Council they would have no chance of preventing
Denkta' appearance if the majority of Security Council so wanted.' 88 Thus, resigned to having to accept
the will of the greater number of the Council, they remained quiet on the issue. And when the Council
session began the immediate response of the Soviet Representative was to reject the application on the
grounds that, '[t]he Security Council has already invited the accredited delegation of the Republic of
Cyprus.. .to participate in the discussion of the complaint of Cyprus... [and that] the Council cannot and
must not become a party to the exertion of pressure on the Government of Cyprus through diplomatic
and political isolation." 89On the other hand Representative Sidi Baba of Morocco, though voicing
sympathy with the Republic of Cyprus, felt that 'hearing him might be particularly useful for our debate
and might considerably facilitate our discussion of the Señor Castrillo Justiniano, the Bolivian
Representative - speaking for the first time - also noted that the Cypriot delegation before the Council
represented the Republic of Cyprus, and to hear the Turkish Cypriot delegate could be viewed as an
infringement of the United Nations' principle of non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction of states.
To this end, he asked that the President clarify the exact issue at stake if the Turkish Cypriots wanted to
address the Council. 19 ' At this the Bernardes asked if there were any further comments, and after another
brief interjection by the Soviet representative, the President asked that a formal proposal, under United
Nations' Security Council Rule of Procedure 39, be made by the Council.' 92 Despite some further
procedural debates, Rauf Denkta was duly called upon as an individual - not as the representative of the
Turkish Cypriots - to present his case to the Security Council at the next session.'93
However, before this could be done there were still a number of speakers listed to participate that
day - the first of which was Sir Patrick Dean. In referring to the direct question on the Treaty of
Guarantee vis-à-vis the Charter of the United Nations posed by Kyprianou at the previous meeting, Dean
made note of the fact that provisions were made, under Article 51, for the use of force.' In addition,
Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee did not permit the use of force unilaterally, but instead allowed for,
"the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present
Treaty." [emphasis added by the author] Making an important point as to the question posed, the British
representative said that it was not, '...part of our present task in this Council to consider hypothetical
situations which, if the Government of Cyprus and all other Governments concerned do their duty, will
remain hypothetical for Indeed, in a comment of considerable significance, Sir Patrick, stated:
'It was not therefore, under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee that the United Kingdom Government
sent its troops to Cyprus. We sent our troops because they were asked for and because they were
generally considered necessary and helpful in preventing further serious strfe. '[emphasis added by the
author]' 96 Continuing on from this note, Dean made another important point:
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'When I spoke last week [1095th meeting], I warned the Council that for any one nation to carry
the main responsibility of peace-keeping is, at the least, unwise. Events since then have
underlined the dangers of this and the need for an international force. My Government is
prepared to take such part as may be thought appropriate ii an international force properly
constituted, but I must warn the Council that it is neither helpful nor fitting for us to continue
alone to carry out this thankless task if there is no prospect of an international force or steps
towards an agreed solution of the problems of Cyprus.' 197 [emphasis added by the author]
The British Representative had just made two important points. In the first instance the United Kingdom
had chosen to emphasise, in a very public setting, that the Joint Truce force was not an imposed
interventionary force placed in Cyprus by the Guarantor Powers with little concern for the wishes of the
Cypriots. By doing this Dean was in fact reserving the United Kingdom's, if not Greece and Turkey's,
position on the question of the rights of the Guarantor Powers to intervene at a later stage. This important
point, coupled the United Kingdom's open declaration of its intention to withdraw from its role if no
suitable resolution could be found' 98 meant that Sir Patrick Dean had - in a move that was either
unwitting or supremely intelligent - just threatened the Greek Cypriots by throwing the door open to a
direct intervention by Turkey in Cyprus. However, the British Representative had also made such an
intervention all the more politically dangerous for Turkey as it would clearly have to invoke the Treaty
of Guarantee - a move that had, on the basis of Dean's previous comment, clearly not been done by this
point.' 99 In effect, Dean had just tried to emphasise to both the Greek Cypriots and to Turkey the
importance of accepting the presented draft resolution.
Kyprianou, seemingly ignoring this vital speech, instead chose to make made another effort to
try to produce a definite answer to his earlier question. The Cypriot Foreign Minister noted: 'since the
day the Council took up the question there has in fact been, with the exception of a few minor incidents,
considerable improvement in Cyprus.' 20° This had come about, according to Kyprianou, as a result of the
reduction in concern about an external intervention. A result of which had been a limited amount of
Greek-Turkish Cypriot co-habitation in a number of areas.20'
At the end of Kyprianou's statements, Representative Seydoux presented France's position in
the Council for the first time. After the various rumours that had been bandied about as to a possible
French role in the crisis as a mediator, Seydoux made what was in fact a fairly short speech relative to
many that had gone before. In the course of his comments he seemed to disassociate France from its
rumoured ties to the Greek Cypriots by noting despite the tragic state of affairs in the island the Council
had no right to interpret the agreements forming the Republic of Cyprus, 202 but that the duty of the
Council was to urge the two communities and the Government of Cyprus to exercise restraint. 203 The
Bolivian Representative then followed and took the chance to give a more comprehensive account of his
Government's view of the situation than had been given in his earlier address. Noting some parallels
between his country and Cyprus, Justiniano noted that a small state such as Cyprus with only limited
military power had no option but to seek the 're-negotiation or revision of unjust treaties.' 204 Indeed,
referring to events in the Americas, the Bolivian drew the Council's attention that even that morning
there had been press reports that the United States was about to renegotiate the 1903 Treaty with Panama:
'[A] magnificent example, because here we have a powerful country, one of the most powerful in history,
approaching Panama, the small country, in order to review a situation and find a solution to the problem
that has arisen between them.' 205 In concluding, Justiniano restated his support for Cyprus' desire to have
the Treaties reviewed, but also expressed clear agreement with the United Kingdom's desire to see a
peace-keeping force put in place.206
At this point the Turkish Representative clarified a number of accusation that had been made
over the previous few days and once again held that the Treaties were important documents needed to
secure the vital interests of a number of countries, and were signed on this basis. However, given the
situation in Cyprus the most urgent and pressing task of the Council was the issue of a peace-keeping
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force. In reply, Kyprianou made a brief comment in which he accused Menemenciolu of calling for
partition,207 and that the fact that Makarios had signed the various agreements did not mean that they were
signed willingly.208 After a further, brief comment by the Greek Representative in which he took note of
the fact that the Turkish Representative had called Kyprianou the representative of the Greek Cypriots,
rather than the representative of the Government of Cyprus,209 the meeting came to an end.
The day had once again highlighted the deep division within the Council as to how the Cyprus
situation should be handled. It was by now obvious that any move to have the members of the Council
pronounce on the invalidity of the Treaty of Guarantee would fail, especially as it now seemed that those
Treaties were designed to facilitate non-violent negotiation rather than permitting military intervention
of any kind. However, it was also becoming clearer that there were positive moves towards the idea that
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the island should be addressed. With some sort
of clarity now becoming apparent, the Greek Cypriots were on the verge of being recognised by the
international community as the Government of Cyprus with or without the continued role of the Turkish
Cypriots. The final chance to have this state of affairs avoided by the Turkish Cypriot community lay
with the presentation of the their case to the Security Council by Rauf Denkta. The next day would, in
many ways determine the final shape of a Security Council resolution.
8. Denkta Presents the Turkish Cypriot View
It was within this context that the members of the Council reconvened the next afternoon, 28 February,
to hear the presentation, in a purely personal capacity, of Rauf Denkta. Yet immediately, the Soviet
Representative called a point of order, and asked the Turkish Representative to clarify the point raised
by Bitsios as to his use of terminology with regard to the representation of Kyprianou as a Greek
Cypriot. 210 Menemencioglu, questioning the role of the Soviet Union to make such a point, replied by
drawing Fedorenko's attention to the fact on the important issue of foreign affairs, decisions could only
be taken after a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Cyprus, and with the agreement of both the
President and Vice-President of the Republic. 211 Seeing as this had not been done 'it is only natural for
me to say that these opinions [presented by Kyprianou at the Council] reflect only the opinion of those
who made them.' 212 Not content with this answer the Soviet Representative launched into a polemic
about the important rules laid down by the United Nations about such matters. At the end of this,
Bernardes called upon Kyprianou to make some comments to the Council. At this point the Greek
Cypriot declined from criticising the Turkish Representative directly, but made note of the fact that the
insult inherent in the comment was directed not at himself but at the Security Council as an institution.213
In replying, the Turkish Representative noted that he had presented his case and would henceforth cease
to participate in debates of this kind, especially as the Soviet Union was seeking to separate the interested
parties. 214 Yet again Fedorenko tried to call Menemencioglu to account for his statement. 215 Yet the
Turkish Representative made no move to answer. At this point, Bernardes called upon Denkta to address
the Council.
Almost immediately upon beginning his address, the Turkish Cypriot launched into an attack
on the Greek Cypriots, and Archbishop Makarios in particular. In drawing the Security Council's
attention to the continuing fighting in Cyprus, Denkta. questioned the intentions of the Greek Cypriots
to see a United Nations' peace-keeping force put in place. 216 In elaborating the difficult nature of the
situation, he went on to describe the historic nature of Greek and Turkish Cypriot cohabitation:
'Turks and Greeks have lived in Cyprus together since 1571. They have so lived always as
Greeks or Turks. They have each stuck to their separate culture, religion, tradition and national
heritage. They are in effect Turkey and Greece projected into Cyprus for the Turkish and Greek
populations respectively. Any attempts to make them anything but Greeks or Turks have met
with strong opposition from these groups in Cyprus. They have lived as autonomous
160
Chapter V
communities together, yet always separate. Down to the smallest village there have always been,
and there is, Greek and Turkish authorities looking after the affairs of their communities
separately. As long as they enjoyed equality and justice, they lived together happily. As soon as
one side attempted to dominate the other politically, trouble: brewed and their relations were
momentarily estranged.'217
The speech continued with an account of the EOKA period, before moving on to present a number of
examples that sought to show that the Greek Cypriots saw independence as a transitionary stage that
would eventually lead to full union with Greece, thus rendering the Turkish Cypriots a small minority.
This had resulted in the outbreak of fighting. In attempting to present the Turkish Cypriots in a more
conciliatory light, Denkta read out a letter from Vice-President Kuçtik to President Makarios in which
the Turkish Cypriot leader had attempted to highlight the numerous mistakes that Makarios had made
with regard to his policy vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriot community. 218 Through the use of a 'propaganda
machine', the impression given by the Greek Cypriots of the Turkish Cypriots to the international
community was one of a rebellious minority, and not of partners in the Republic of Cyprus. It was for
this reason that the Security Council had not seen the importance of the need to ensure that the
Constitution, and therefore the Treaty of Guarantee, would not be abrogated or amended. 2 ' 9 Following
on from this, the Turkish Cypriot categorically denied a plot designed to bring about partition in Cyprus.
However, in his final words he said:
'Today no constitution is in effect in Cyprus. None of the provisions of the Constitution are
being complied with or applied. In the circumstances which have been created it cannot be
applied. So the two communities have fallen apart. It is not the fault of Mr. Kyprianou that he
has not been able to get full instructions from Dr. Kuçiik and the Turkish Ministers to have this
discussed fully in the Ministerial Council. The Greek gunmen will not let the Turks go to the
other side and the ministerial function is finished. But with due respect to him, I do not think he
can say or that he can claim in justice and fairness and humanity that he can represent the
Turkish voice, that he can fully represent the Turkish side in this Council. He cannot.'220
The Turkish Cypriots had now had their opportunity to present their case. Kyprianou, by not even
bothering to respond to the statement at once, 22 ' made it clear that he felt that he had successfully
managed to create the impression the Government of the Republic of Cyprus did still exist with or
without the active participation of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, with this concession gained
it was also clear that the question of the Council determining the fate of the Constitution of Cyprus was
at an end. The full picture of the Cyprus situation had now been presented by all the interested parties
and it was obvious that most of the assembled representatives now wished to bring to an end the
discussions and proceed with a vote on a resolution. Yet, as a note of warning, Liu Chieh of China stated
that despite the complexity of the Cyprus situation, the Security Council must refrain from becoming a
judicial rather than a political body.222
The next to speak was the Greek Representative. First he thanked both the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council for their 'untiring efforts.. .to reconcile diverging views and to work
out procedures which, with due regard for the interests of the parties involved in the Cyprus question,
might cope constructively with the extreme gravity of the situation we are considering.' 2 After this,
Bitsios went on to present the two views originally brought before the Council, and, in the course of his
statement, he stated that the Greek Cypriots had justified their claim against Turkey, and criticised
Denkta as a man 'whose personal responsibility for the difficulties Cyprus now faces and in recent years
has had to face is...heavy'. 2 Kyprianou, upon finally taking the floor, then announced that he would
not reply to Denkta there and then, but instead wanted to refer back to the situation in Cyprus which,
although calm, was again under a renewed threat of attack from Turkey. In once again pronouncing the
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Greek Cypriot position on a resolution, Kyprianou commented:
'I am confident that, if the Security Council decides to protect the territorial integrity and the
independence of Cyprus, peace will be restored in the island. As we have said on various
occasions, in order to allay certain fears - which we believe have no basis - we do not object in
principle to having an international force under the United Nations. Some people have tried to
say that we have attempted by tricks to avoid having such a force. We feel that, if Cyprus is
protected, a force is not necessary - but nevertheless we are prepared to have it. However, having
a force is not the goal. Having a force is one of the means towards the restoration of normal
conditions and order. You cannot have a force there to restore normal internal conditions for a
period of three months - and yet have Turkey feel that it has the right to intervene whenever it
likes. You will not thereby be serving any purpose.'225
In reply, Representative Menemencioglu made an attempt to be conciliatory in his comments. Seeming
to try to calm the situation down and move forward on the issue, he stated that Turkey had no territorial
claim on Cyprus, and that, as a founder of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey wished to see it prosper.226
In what was a vital statement, the Turkish Representative then drew the Council's attention to the fact
that the issue brought before the Council by the Greek Cypriots was the need to have the territorial
integrity, and the like, of Cyprus respected and for the Treaty of Guarantee to be abrogated, and yet,
under Article II of the Treaty:
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of
Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence,
territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus
In other words, these issues were, in the view of Turkey, redundant. This was emphasised by the fact that,
'Turkey has never said that it feels free to invade or intervene whenever it sees fit.' 227 At this point
Kyprianou asked the Turkish Representative if he would therefore object to having such phraseology
used within the text of a resolution. 228 Menemenciolu again refused to answer directly, 229 stating that
his earlier comment was on record, and that he accepted responsibility for his comments.23°
Representative Bitsios, therefore noted that there could no longer be any difficulty with this clause as
Turkey had already recognised it. 23 ' A point picked up by the Soviet Representative who again asked the
Turk for a direct answer, 232 which was once more avoided by Menemencioglu who drew the Council's
attention to his earlier statement. 233 At which point Fedorenko made another attempt to elicit an answer
from the Turk. 234 Kyprianou, seeing the pointlessness of this, tried a different approach by noting that
if it were the case that the Turkish Government had already made clear that the Treaty of Guarantee was
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and that Cyprus was a member of the United
Nations, then it would not be difficult for the Turkish member to accept a resolution calling for the
sovereignty, and the like, of Cyprus to be accepted. Again Fedorenko pushed for a direct answer.
Menemencioglu having made his important comment, simply referred to the fact that he had answered
this question twice, 235 at which point the President of Council called the meeting to an end, and scheduled
the next session for 2 p.m., on Monday 2 March.
It was now obvious that the political situation within the Security Council was such that no
particular party was going to get all their demands met within a resolution. Given Menemencioglu's
comment, it seemed as if the Turkish Government had, by this point, obviously agreed to accept a
resolution that called upon unspecified states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Cyprus, but which also recognised the current validity of the various Treaties signed in 1960-
especially the Treaty of Guarantee. 236 The United Kingdom, seeking to have a peace-keeping force put
in place - while not alienating Turkey - had seen its difficulties overcome. The United States likewise had
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the same result. The Greek Cypriots though unhappy with these points were about to be recognised as
the effective Government of Cyprus, and had made a Turkish military intervention unlikely. However,
the final stumbling block to the agreement was the Turkish Cypriots, who were wholeheartedly against
any such recognition of the Greek Cypriots as the Government ofCyprus. To this end the United
Kingdom and United States formulated an approach to be taken to the Turkish Cypriots with regard to
a diplomatic solution to the problem. The two countries - with the knowledge of the Turkish
Government237 - asked that the Turkish Cypriot community's concern about the question of recognition
be put to one side as the United Kingdom and the United States would ensure that once the resolution
had been passed then they would continue to press for the Turkish Cypriot case. 238 Although this promise
is now regarded by the Turkish Cypriots as having been a lie, 239 it was on the basis of this promise that
the Turkish Cypriot leadership - pressured by Turkey 24° - agreed to co-operate The final major
difficulty had now, apparently, been overcome.
9. The Resolution of the Five
On 2 March, the Security Council met again. The Presidency of the Council had by this point rotated and
Liu Chieh of China had replaced Carlos Bernardes. After taking the chance to thank the Brazilian
representative,2"2 Liu passed on to the substantive matter of the day - the presentation of a draft resolution
to the Council. This document was the final version of the proposal that had been formulated by five of
the six non-permanent members of the Security Council - Bolivia, Brazil, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and
Norway. To this end the President gave the floor to the Brazilian representative. Speaking on behalf of
the five, Bernardes explained the thinking behind the draft, stating:
'My colleagues and I, benefitting from the groundwork laid by the Secretary-General, are thus
in a position to put before the Council a draft resolution which we consider to be a fair and
balanced document. This draft is the result of lengthy negotiations, much give-and-take and
compromise, and if it fails to give entire satisfaction to any of the parties concerned - and this
may be its greatest value - we earnestly believe that it will not be unacceptable to them.'2'13
At this point the Brazilian took the chance to run through the document and explain each of the seven
paragraphs that made up the proposed reso1ution," the main aim of which was stated as be the
prevention of any fighting that might threaten international peace and security. To this end the draft
resolution presented, under operational paragraph 4, to
'recommend the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations
peace-keeping force in Cyprus, whose composition and size would be established by the
Secretary-General, in consultation with Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and
whose commander would be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The
Secretary-General would keep the Governments providing the force fully informed and would
report periodically to the Council on its operations.'2'15
At the end of his speech Representative Bernades expressed his 'earnest and sincere wish that the
Council may see its way clear to giving its approval to the draft resolution before it'. Realising that the
various representatives to the Council might need time to consult their respective governments, Liu
accepted the Brazilian's proposal that the council be adjourned and reconvened the following day, 3
March.
As it stood, the resolution as a whole took no stand as regards any of the participants to the
conflict, a result that by now proved acceptable to Turkey. Indeed, they even saw fit to express their
overall satisfaction with the draft resolution. And, importantly, four of the five Permanent Members -
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Britain, the United States, France and the Chinese - also saw the draft resolution as being broadly
acceptable. It was therefore left only to the Soviet Union to support the resolution. However, at this
juncture the Soviet Permanent Representative expressed his concern over the resolution.246 Despite the
previous assurance given the Greek Cypriots that the draft resolution was acceptable, Fedorenko's
specific worry now lay with the role given to the Secretary-General in the creation of the peace-keeping
force. In light of the Congo experience, the Soviet Union did not favour giving the Secretary-General
power which they felt should be solely in the hands of the Security Council. 247 Therefore, before
Fedorenko could vote on the resolution as a whole, the Soviet delegation had to cable the draft back to
Moscow for guidance.248
By the afternoon of 3 March this had still not been given and the Security Council reconvened.
After Permanent Representative Liu noted that none of the representatives wished to speak formally on
the draft he suggested that the Council reconvene the following morning. At this point the British
Representative made the following statement:
'Of course I will bow to your wishes, Mr. President, and to the wishes of my colleagues that
there should be a further adjournment, but I am bound to say that the proposal for a further
adjournment does not at this moment seem to my delegation to be very satisfactory. I do not
know quite what the reason may be, but if some of my colleagues are still waiting for their
instructions, I can of course well understand that position; at some time or other we all find
ourselves in the position of needing further time. But in this particular case I would urge that the
Council, if it has to adjourn, should not adjourn for long. Events do not wait in Cyprus. The
situation is urgent as well as important, and if it really is impossible for all concerned round this
table to proceed this afternoon, I am bound, for the record, to express my Government's concern
at the further delay involved.''9
The same day, the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons, in response to a question asking
whether it would have been 'wiser' for the Government to have taken the matter to the Security Council
earlier, Douglas-Home stated:
'[w]e have had to play this hand in a way which would get the agreement of the Greeks and the
Turks, and we had to put a resolution to the United Nations which would not be vetoed by the
Russians. That has been an extremely tricky thing to do and we should not have had a chance
if we had done it earlier.'250
Although the tabled resolution now looked almost certain to be passed, the pressures on the Truce Force
were almost unbearable by now. Despite the fact that there had been a certain drop in fighting since the
matter had been moved to the Security Council, the troops of the Joint Truce Force found themselves
totally incapacitated and unable to intervene in any situations, often physically being prevented from
doing so by Greek Cypriot police.' This inability to control the situation was mainly due to unrelenting
attacks on its role - by now appearing daily - in the Greek Cypriot newspapers. In the Greek Cypriot
Communal Chamber, a representative had referred to the, 'untimely and provocative actions of the
British soIdiers', 2 and a large demonstration conducted by the organisation of right-wing trade unions
(SEK) in Famagusta had seen large numbers of people carrying placards with slogans such as
'Englishmen get out of Cyprus', and 'English, do not provoke our feeling more, our patience will be
exhausted' •253 This ill-feeling was exacerbated by reports that British soldiers were carrying mail for
Turkish Cypriots. This accusation was made after letters were found in a British Forces postal bag which
had been given to a soldier of the Glosters at the Turkish Cypriot police station in Ktima. 254 Although
British troops were ordered not to do it again, the Greek Cypriots took the opportunity to claim that this
was a clear example of British attempts to undermine their authority and foster partition. 255 Such was the
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paranoia of the Greek Cypriot community towards the United Kingdom's actions by this point that there
were even accusations that the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Rauf Denkta, was being
used as a 'tool' by the British to ensure partition.256
Furthermore, there were significant doubts being expressed as to the United Kingdom's
operational ability to continue with the task of policing the situation. During Prime Minister's questions
in the House of Commons on 3 March, the Labour Member for Dudley West, Mr. Wigg, suggested that
this was because of the fact that British Army units in Cyprus were acting below strength. In reply to this
question the Prime Minister denied that this was as a result of such weakness as implied by Wigg, and
that Britain had, 'some 8,000 to 12,000 men there.'257
The Council Meets for the Final Time
With the deterioration in the situation now more than clear, there was a tension surrounding the
reconvening of the Security Council. Meeting at ten thirty in the morning of 4 March 1964, two days
after the presentation of the draft resolution, the first to speak was the Permanent Representative of Soviet
Union. Taking the opportunity to address the Council, Fedorenko briefly restated the Soviet position on
the Cyprus question as being an internal matter best left to the Cypriots to handle. 258 However, in
returning to the issue of the resolution the Soviet Representative stated:
'We consider it necessary to draw attention to those provisions in the draft resolution - we have
in mind, in particular, paragraph 4 - which concern the procedure for settling matters relating to
the composition, size and command of the United Nations force that it is proposed to send to
Cyprus. Although the agreement of the Government of Cyprus is required for the establishment
of a United Nations force in Cyprus and although the composition and size of that force are to
be decided in consultation with the Governments of the so-called guaranteeing Powers - namely,
the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey - there is no escaping the fact that this procedure in
practice bypasses the Security Council.
Moreover, the provision in the draft resolution to the effect that the commander of the
force will report to the Secretary-General, who will report periodically to the Security Council,
is, of course, not adequate.'259
To this extent Fedorenko requested that, 'paragraph 4 be voted upon separately'. This would allow the
draft resolution to be passed in entirety but also allow the Soviet Union to register their disapproval on
this particular point. Before ending his speech the Soviet Representative landed a parting shot and took
the opportunity to present their view on the 'illegal occupation of the Presidency of the Council, and of
the place belonging to the People's Republic of China.' 260 Liu, choosing to avoid the issue for the sake
of being able to press on with the matter at hand, passed the floor to Bernardes.' After making some
comments about the structure of the resolution Bernardes noted that the Secretary-General wished to
make an statement. Taking the floor, Thant, obviously wishing to allay Soviet concerns, explained that
it was his intention to keep the Council fully informed of a number of operational aspects pertaining to
the force. In addition he made note of the fact that the United Nations force for Cyprus would, unlike
UNEF or ONUC, be set in place for a three month period, after which any extension would have to be
agreed to by the Security Council: 'In sum, although the responsibilities for the Secretary-General
foreseen by the draft resolution are serious, they do not differ substantially from past experience and I
have no hesitation in undertaking them.'2
With this concluded the President then called the votes on the resolution. The first vote to be
taken was on paragraph 4. This was passed eight (8) votes to none (0) with three abstentions, namely the
Soviet Union, France, and Czechoslovakia. With the concern of these three officially registered, a vote
could now be taken upon the entire text. At which point the resolution was passed unanimously with no
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abstentions. The floor was now handed to the French Representative in order to allow him to explain the
French reasons for abstaining of paragraph 4263 In his speech Seydoux pointed to a concern that the
Secretary-General was assuming too much responsibility and that this consequently reduced the
responsibilities of the Security Council.2M Although not a personal critIcism of the Secretary-General,265
Seydoux stressed that the French Government did not regard the responsibilities contained in the
Resolution as forming a precedent. 266 The next speaker, the Czechoslovak Representative, also took the
stand that the Secretary-General was being given powers that rightly belonged to the Security Council.267
In commenting on the text of the resolution as a whole Hajek noted:
'In spite of the weaknesses of the resolution, which we have had occasion to criticize in the
course of conversations with its sponsors, the Czechoslovak delegation voted for it out of respect
for the fact that the Cyprus delegation considers it to be acceptable and in the hope that its
implementation will speedily create conditions that will facilitate the Cyprus Government's
efforts to maintain and strengthen the country's independence and unity. By so doing, we have
shown - as we shall never fail to do - our support for the just cause of the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the defence and consistent
application of the principles of the Charter.'266
Liu, as President stated the belief that all the members of the Council felt 'gratified' that the resolution
of the five non-permanent members had been passed. After thanking the Cypriot Foreign Minister and
the Representatives of Greece and Turkey 'for their participation and co-operation in the deliberations
of the Council', the President of the Council then passed the floor to Foreign Minister Kyprianou for a
final comment:
'I would like, on behalf of my Government, to express to the Council our appreciation for the
understanding shown by all the members and for their sincere desire to help in solving the
problems of Cyprus. Thank you, Mr. President.'269
At this the floor returned to Liu who simply stated: 'Since there is no further business, the meeting stands
adjourned.'270





Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is-likely to threaten international
peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken
to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,
Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at
Nicosia on 16 August 1960,
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its
Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations",
1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action to worsen the situation in
the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and
restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and
bloodshed in Cyprus;
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost
restraint;
4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United
Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be
established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The commander of the Force shall be appointed by the
Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments
providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its
operation;
5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving
international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and,
as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to
normal conditions;
6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all
costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments
providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also
accept voluntary contributions for the purpose;
7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the
Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom a
mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and
also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and
an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, having in mind the well- being of the people as a whole and the preservation
of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-
General on his efforts;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as
appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.
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Summary of Chapter V
The move to the United Nations Security Council had highlighted the rift in the views between the Greek
Cypriots and the Governments of Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as to
the root of the problem that needed to be addressed in Cyprus. For the Greek Cypriots, the threat of
Turkish military action against the Republic of Cyprus and a debate on the Constitution remained the
main issues and therefore the main aim of the Security Council debate was to abrogate the 1960 Treaties.
For the British Government - who wished to maintain a good relationship with Turkey and retain its
military facilities on the island - these aims were to be avoided. Instead, it was the need to resolve
intercommunal differences within the bounds of the Constitution and the creation of a peace-keeping
force to replace its own presence on the island that formed the backbone of the United Kingdom's policy.
These differences ensured that any debate would be fraught with the potential for considerable acrimony.
Indeed, the realisation of this within the Greek Cypriot community had meant that there was a
considerable backlash against the the United Kingdom which had been viewed as attempting to usurp
the Greek Cypriots' position. However, events revealed a wholly more calm and considered approach
by the Greek Cypriot representatives in New York, who saw the need to negotiate. In the final analysis,
it was clear that by this stage all parties desired an outcome that would reduce the tensions on the island.
Paradoxically, this was both facilitated and constrained by the difficulties presented in the public
forum of the Security Council chamber. In the numerous meetings of the Security Council there was a
strong tendency for the debates to degenerate into volatile and vitriolic mud-slinging between the
representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, and the Soviet Union. Fedorenko, who took the opportunity to speak
at almost every possible juncture, was apparently determined to call all those who expressed any dissent
with the Greek Cypriots to account for their statements and in doing so undoubtedly created more ill-will
between the parties than had hitherto been the case in the international arena.
Yet in reaching a final resolution the Security Council showed itself to be more than a talking
shop at which anger could be vented. The degree of sensitivity and the perceived need for conciliation
expressed by most of the non-permanent representatives at the Security Council - the Czechs being the
exception - whose countries were not involved with the situation contributed in large degree to the final
outcome. As did the final overall view of the Security Council that it could not pronounce upon the
validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. And although U Thant had, by 25 February, decided to end his
personal attempt to reach an agreed solution with the various parties over the text of a draft resolution,
five of the six non-permanent members took up the issue with great aplomb. Continuing to work
alongside the Secretary-General, they had, over the days of debate leading to the Secretary-General's
statement, made it clear to all parties concerned that there were limits to the demands that were being
made. To this extent, the process at the United Nations was shown to be structured by a pragmatic
understanding of the difficulties involved with the Cyprus situation. The parties were therefore eventually
forced to consider their positions and negotiate on terms that they themselves could agree. This was
assisted by the realisation that no single party was going to achieve all their demands. However, the one
difficulty in this situation was that the Turkish Cypriot community - which had not been given an official
role in the proceedings - clearly objected to the process. However, by the time that Rauf Denkta was
allowed to present the Turkish Cypriot case to the Council the process of reaching an agreement on the
text of a draft resolution was almost complete. The Governments of both the United Kingdom and the
United States, not wishing to see a difficulty in having the text approved, therefore asked the Turkish
Cypriots to accept the resolution, with a view to later negotiations taking place. In this endeavour they
were assisted by the Government of Turkey, and, for the second time in the period since the outbreak of
intercommunal violence, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves again being pressured by their closest
ally to accept an agreement that amounted to a de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriots as the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
At this point a new difficulty was presented by the Soviet Union. Although the important
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political differences between the main protagonists had by now been solved, there remained the question
of financing the force, and the powers accorded to the Secretary-General in the structuring and operation
of the force. This was not a new issue, and it was only because the Soviets were able to see that by
obstructing the resolution they were going against the wishes of the Greek Cypriots that they accepted
the Resolution. Though this was done with a separate vote in order to register their disapproval.
Therefore, on 4 March 1964, the initial phase of the Cyprus situation came to an end with the passing
of Resolution 186 (1964), and the establishment of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.
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Conclusion
International Politics on the Road to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)
This work set as its aim an appraisal of the international political process leading to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), the Resolution that formed the United Nations Force in Cyprus.
However, it would be wrong to suppose that a United Nations peace-keeping force spontaneously
appeared as a result of the need to deal with the intercommunal fighting in Cyprus. The origins of
UNFICYP were to be found within the development of international politics from the end of the Second
World War - the most important features of which was the development of the Cold War and the
resulting strategies of containment and expansion pursued by the Superpower states of the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a number of areas beyond the delineations of
Europe. To this end, Chapter I sought, among other things, to show that the evolution of United Nations
peace-keeping came about as a mechanism to halt conflicts that had Cold War ramifications - the main
examples being Egypt (1956), the Lebanon (1958) and the Congo (1960).
Yet the Cyprus crisis was never going to be a Cold War issue in the way that Egypt, the Lebanon,
or the Congo had been. For example, Egypt, under the guidance of Colonel Nasser, had encouraged both
the Soviet Bloc - purchasing arms from the Czechs - and the West - for funding for the Aswan High
Dam. In the case of the Lebanon, President Chamoun, a pro-Western leader, perceived a threat to the
borders of the Lebanon from the pro-Soviet President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. And in the
Congo the Belgian action and the secession of Katanga threatened to split the country both
geographically and politically, hi order to prevent this the Congolese tried to involve the Superpowers
at various stages. In all three instances the formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force presented
a means by which to limit the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union. UNEF, the first
example of United Nations peace-keeping, was a necessary move in order to prevent the Soviet Union
from becoming directly involved as a means to counter the actions of the United Kingdom, France and
Israel. Although the argument that the Soviet Union may not have wished to have taken a direct role
given the events taking place in Hungary, the United States could not afford to run the risk of
permanently alienating either Egypt, or the other Soviet leaning Arab states by being seen to condone
or remain neutral on the British, French and Israeli action. (However, one could also argue that the
United States was attempting to end the influence of the United Kingdom and France in the Near and
Middle East.) In the Lebanon, UNOGIL was a means by which to extricate the United States - invited
into the country by Chamoun - from a situation that was affecting the delicate balance between the pro-
Western Monarchical regimes and the Arab nationalist Republics in the region. ONUC was, inter alia,
a means of ensuring that the Congo - the heart of the African continent - did not become embroiled in
Cold War intrigues as a response to the military intervention by Belgium - a NATO member. The Soviet
Union was poised to make a stand once the United States had turned down a Congolese offer to
intervene. To this extent the United Nations became a way of delineating the situation from the Cold
War.
However, from the very beginning Cyprus was not an issue that immediately fell into the grey
area of international politics of the Cold War. For the West, Cyprus was always regarded as being an
essentially a Western matter - the three Guarantor Powers were, after all, members of NATO. Yet,
paradoxically, the Cyprus situation could never have been handled effectively within the bounds of
NATO. To have done so would have immediately forced the 'internationalisation' of the crisis by the
Greek Cypriots beyond the Western realm into the United Nations. For the Greek Cypriots it was not the
'rebellion' of the Turkish Cypriots per se which was of most immediate concern, it was the perceived
threat that Turkey would intervene to protect the Turkish Cypriots and thus force the partitioning of the
island. In the post-independence period, if not after 1955 when Turkey was first brought diplomatically
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into the affairs of Cyprus by the United Kingdom, Makarios's political outlook was fundamentally
shaped by his perceptions of the Turkish threat to Cyprus. The Archbishop, supremely aware of the
delicate nature of the regional NATO balance of power system, knew that despite the fact that Greece
was a member of NATO, Turkey had, by virtue of geography, a relatively more important position within
the Organisation. This therefore made any NATO proposal immediately unacceptable as it would favour
Turkey in the wider interests of the Organisation. Perhaps in order to counter this Makarios had devoted
his attention to developing Cyprus' ties with the Non-Aligned Movement. In any case, the fact that he
had attended the Bandung Conference, and thereafter fostered ties with the anti-colonial third world
leaders during the EOKA period had made Cyprus' membership of the NAM a logical step in the post-
independence period.
Despite this tie, the Greek Cypriots nonetheless realised that any move to incorporate the wider
international community into the Cyprus situation at an early stage could well have resulted in a unilateral
Turkish move to preserve its interests in the island. Indeed, the political motive behind the initial
acceptance of tripartite action by the Guarantor Powers - although not conducted under the terms of the
Treaty of Guarantee - was a pragmatic reaction to avert such an unilateral Turkish intervention.
Nevertheless, this initial stop-gap measure could not be certain to succeed in which case a Turkish
intervention would have been the likely result. Therefore the internationalisation of the conflict beyond
the Guarantor Power alliance and NATO became a foreign policy imperative for the Greek Cypilots from
the earliest stages. The initial move to the United Nations Security Council was a reflection of this aim.
It was an early attempt to have the international community warn Turkey about the consequences of its
actions if it did chose to intercede militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. However, even this policy
was not designed to have a Cold War nature. There was no move to try and involve the Soviet Union at
this stage. Indeed, the debate at the Security Council did not even feature the Soviet Representative.
There was, at this point, absolutely no reason to suppose that Makarios had the intention to bring
the Soviet Union into the situation. (Having said this, President Makarios would likewise never have
approached the United States - a NATO member and the main supporter of Turkey since 1946 - for
assistance in the same way as Chamoun had done in the Lebanon when he faced an external threat.) The
Archbishop was not by natural inclination a communist.' He would not have sought, under usual
circumstances, to involve the Soviet Union. Indeed, one may remember that throughout the period of
British colonial rule in Cyprus the Orthodox Church had been a major force opposing communism on
the island, and the fact that Makarios had been one of the leaders of the EOKA movement - a movement
opposed by the Greek Cypriot communists - re-enforced this. However, the Greek Cypriots' desire
to internationalise the situation - though not along Cold War lines - by taking it to the United Nations was
something that the United Kingdom sought to avoid right from the very beginning. This was a decision
based on the United Kingdom's misperception of why this policy would be pursued. The United
Kingdom saw the Greek Cypriot policy as being one fundamentally designed to challenge the Treaty of
Guarantee and therefore, by extension, eventually to threaten its position with regard to the Sovereign
Base Areas (SBAs). (Although the SBAs were founded on the basis of the Treaty of Establishment,
Article ifi of the Treaty of Guarantee held an important role in ensuring that the Republic of Cyprus
would 'respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus'.) However, this view that Makarios would try to rid Cyprus of
the SBAs was flawed in a number of ways. Following independence, Makarios had genuinely worked
to improve the ties between Cyprus and the United Kingdom. The main forum within which this was
done was the Commonwealth of Nations, which Makarios embraced warmly soon after Cypriot
independence. Indeed, this move may have been a means by which Makarios could develop a separate
channel of communication with the United Kingdom other than that which had been bequeathed by the
Treaty of Guarantee. The Treaty, which had given the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey a say in the
affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, was simply unacceptable to many Greek Cypriots solely for the fact
that it opened the door for overt Turkish interference. The ties with Greece were undoubtedly welcomed,
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and the ties with the United Kingdom were seen as useful - if not beneficial - given the regional strength
of Turkey. In effect, the Greek Cypriots for all the ill-feeling that may have occurred in the period 1955-
59, did want to develop their ties with the United Kingdom, and were not, with the exception of a small,
particularly nationalist group, too concerned with the issue of the Bases. This is not to say that the Bases
were acceptable, but that they were never an overriding issue that soured Anglo-Cypriot relations.
Another, important, piece of evidence to substantiate the degree to which the Greek Cypriots viewed the
United Kingdom as being broadly sympathetic with their desire to change the Constitution comes from
the - unproven - allegations that Makarios had been assisted by the British High Commissioner in
formulating his proposals for constitutional change. Even if this were not true, Makarios nonetheless
submitted his proposals to the British Government a full two weeks before he officially gave them to the
Guarantor Powers. Indeed, Clark's comment stating that the United Kingdom would not intervene
militarily in the event of intercommunal disturbances must have been yet another factor that would
convince the Greek Cypriots as to the extent to which the United Kingdom would accept the changes to
the Constitution.
And yet when the intercommunal fighting did occur, the United Kingdom did in fact become
involved in a military operation, albeit with Greece and Turkey. The primary reason for this undoubtedly
lies in the fact that the potential for the Greek Cypriots to challenge the presence of the Bases prevailed
in the United Kingdom's analyses of the Archbishop's intentions. Thus it may be argued that the United
Kingdom was either a victim of its own misperceptions, or else politically unaware of the tide of opinion
in the Greek Cypriot leadership. Makarios was not anti-the United Kingdom, he was anti-Turkey. His
development of Cypriot international relations was directed to this end, and not done as a means to
challenge the United Kingdom's position with regard to the Treaty of Guarantee or the Treaty of
Establishment - by which the Bases were founded. This point seems to have been missed by the decision-
makers in the British Government. For the United Kingdom, the formation of the Joint Truce Force was
therefore partly as a result of the need to protect the Bases in the face of intercommunal fighting.
However, to ascribe purely national interest reasons for the creation of the Force would be wrong on two
counts. In the first instance there is clear evidence to suggest that the United Kingdom, from the first days
following the formation of the Truce Force, actively intended to have the Force develop a humanitarian
function. The valuable work undertaken by medical teams attached to the Truce Force in areas of heavy
fighting, as well as the negotiations for freedom of movement and the release of hostages provide
examples to underline what would appear to be a genuine commitment to the relief of suffering on the
island.
The second reason for the creation of the Truce Force lies in the wider strategic implications of
the fighting in Cyprus. Therefore another vital, if not the primary, consideration in the mind of the British
Government was the prospect of a Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. It was undoubtedly the case that
had Turkey chosen to intervene unilaterally, Greece would have been forced to have aided the Greek
Cypriots. For the United Kingdom, the best means by which to counter the risk of Turkish intervention
was to act within the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee - although not under the provisions of the
Treaty of Guarantee - in conjunction with Greece and Turkey. Yet for the Force to remain viable the
Treaty of Guarantee had to remain intact. Any attempt by Makarios to internationalise the issue of
intercommunal fighting beyond the strict framework of the Treaty was highly dangerous. To close the
Turkish option of intervention by attempting to abrogate the Treaty could have resulted in a 'first strike'
policy being enacted by the Turkish Government, and would therefore have resulted in a full-blown
Greco-Turkish conflict. Thus, at the earliest point in the crisis, it was made clear to the international
community, in particular the members of the NATO Council, that the matter was being handled
adequately within the existing arrangement of the tripartite intervention that had resulted in the Truce
Force.
The rift between the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots, though unfounded on the issue
of the Bases, was impossible to avoid on the issue of regional peace and security between Greece and
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Turkey. Although there was in effect little to concern the United Kingdom with regard to Makarios's
intentions with regard to the Bases, the United Kingdom, and indeed all of NATO, could not afford to
have Turkey intervene in Cyprus with all the subsequent intra-NATO, inter-Superpower effects that such
an action could entail. Thus, the Treaty of Guarantee had to remain iii place, and the United Kingdom
was presented with a no-win situation. Fortunately, in the initial period considered - 21 December 1963-
25 January 1964 - the room for manoeuvre of the Greek Cypriots on the issue of the Treaty of Guarantee
was limited. The fact that both Greece and Turkey had, to their credit, also prevented the
internationalisation of the problem by working hand-in-hand with the United Kingdom left the Greek
Cypriots isolated. There was no reason for the wider community to become involved, and although there
were behind-the-scenes rumblings of a potential interest from the NATO secretariat to try to work to
maintain the Alliance in the face of the difficulties in south-east Europe, the Guarantor Powers managed
to quash this at an early stage.
As noted above, the main threat to the cohesion within the Guarantor Power alliance came from
the possibility of wider United Nations involvement, the most likely forum within which any Greek
Cypriot move would be made. A challenge to the authority of the Treaty of Guarantee on the floor of the
Security Council could technically have had damaging effect on the legality, and legitimacy, of the
tripartite action insofar as the question could then be raised about the right of the Guarantors Powers to
be involved in Cyprus once the Treaty of Guarantee had ceased to exist. Although, having said this, in
reality it would not - likely as not - have had much effect if one considers that Makarios had consented
to the presence of the Truce Force in the first place, and that the Force had therefore not been conducted
under the Treaty of Guarantee. However, with the success of the action by the Guarantor Powers there
appeared to be little wider interest in the situation from the Council. Indeed, the United Nations'
Secretary-General was at this time opposed to any direct United Nations role in the situation. The
continuing peace-keeping operation in the Congo was undoubtedly a major influence on this decision,
and Thant seemed to be wholly in accordance with the United Kingdom's desire to keep a lid on the
matter by sticking strictly within the bounds of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Truce Force. This view
seems to have been accepted internationally given the lack of comment by the wider international
community - a situation that was, in my view, justified given the way in which the United Kingdom had
conducted the political process.
In fact, it can be argued that the British Government followed the spirit of the United Nations
Charter in the first month of the crisis. By both (a) proposing the London Conference and by (b)
undertaking the Truce Force operation with the consent of both of the communities of Cyprus (or, in the
view of the Greek Cypriots, with the consent of the Republic of Cyprus) it could clearly be argued that
its role was entirely in accordance with a number of important articles of the United Nations Charter. The
London Conference could be seen to represent a clear attempt under Article 33 to address the conflict
within the regional framework - a fact recognised by U Thant. The use of the Treaty of Guarantee to form
the Joint Truce Force could for all practical purposes under Chapter VIII of the Charter be interpreted
in such a way as to allow the argument that the signatories of the Treaty formed a de facto regional
organisation, and that this regional organisation had the right - without prior Security Council
authorisation - to attempt to deal with the matter before it could be passed over to the United Nations
Security Council. Furthermore, by informing the Council of its actions the United Kingdom fulfilled its
obligations according to Article 54 of the UN Charter. Within the remit of this chapter of the Charter,
the fact that the United Kingdom had prevented the internationalisation of the crisis through the Truce
Force and the London Conference was an intelligent, and internationally desirable move done in
accordance with the original spirit underlying the founding of the United Nations Organisation.
However, the drawback to this approach became apparent with the failure of the London
Conference. Due to the intransigence of Turkey and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it nonetheless left
only the most limited room for the United Kingdom to continue to pursue this policy of regional
containment of the issue within the Treaty of Guarantee, or under regional arrangements. One could
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argue that Makarios actively intended the Conference to fail in order to swing the balance of international
opinion and therefore open up room to have the matter discussed in a more international framework than
the Treaty arrangements had allowed. However, such an allegation is difficult to prove on the basis of
the evidence available. The closest one could come to such an argument about Makarios's intention to
widen the debate is perhaps to regard the creation of a bi-lateral treaty with the United Kingdom to
replace the Treaty of Guarantee as a cynical ploy to split the cohesiveness of the Guarantor Alliance and
force the internationalisation of the situation along the lines favoured by the Greek Cypriots as there
would no longer be a 'regional' element to the situation.
Yet, the failure of the Conference presented an enormous difficulty to the United Kingdom on
another level - that of the operation of the Joint Truce Force. The fact that no political resolution to the
crisis had been found meant that the operation of the Joint Truce Force now became open-ended. The
manpower consideration required for such an operation, coupled with the intercommunal instability
caused by the failure to find an acceptable cross-communal solution made the British position untenable
in anything but the short-run. Although the JTF continued with support from the United Kingdom,
Greece and Turkey it could not run indefinitely. Given the above stated political reasons, there was
undoubtedly a strong case in Makarios' favour for taking the matter to the United Nations by this point.
However, the British Government could not accept the validity of such a move as long as there
was either a threat to the Bases, or a risk of Turkish intervention. Although the Truce Force was created
to prevent the violent aspect of intercommunal political differences from being exposed, it could never
be a solution to those differences. From this point onwards, the JTF would necessarily have to be a
continuing operation - an option that was impossible for the United Kingdom to consider given the
difficulties outlined above. With the decision to avoid a recourse to the United Nations, the Greek
Government's option for a NATO-based force appeared to be the only way out that would ensure the
maintenance of the British Bases, and limit the risk of Turkish military intervention. Yet, by pushing
ahead with the plan to create a NATO-based force - an option that all knew was contrary to the wishes
of the Greek Cypriots - the Guarantors finally gave Makarios all he needed to involve the international
community. It should have been obvious that a collection of NATO states under British command could
never hope to be a political broker in the search for peace, given the Greek Cypriot fears of Turkey's
influence in the Organisation. Any NATO option would simply be a military action, albeit peace-keeping
in nature, conducted with the constant threat of being open to international criticism and withdrawal if
the Greek Cypriot leadership felt that its actions were in any way favouring the Turkish Cypriots. The
partiality, whether real or imagined, of a NATO-based force would always be a handicap to its operations
if it had come into being. Therefore, with the suggestion of the formation of a NATO-based force, the
Cyprus crisis was finally internationalised. The Guarantor Powers should have known that if they pushed
too hard on the issue, Makarios could use the non-aligned status of the island as the perfect tool to foil
this move. From the moment that the Guarantor Powers sought to introduce the United States and NATO
into the situation, the Cyprus situation was doomed to develop into a Cold War battleground.
Yet need this have necessarily been the case? There is a strong argument to be made that there
was the option of creating a Commonwealth peace-keeping force. This was an idea which was known
to have been favoured by the Greek Cypriots. Yet this was rejected on several occasions on the grounds
that it was not viable. However, there never appeared to be any move made by the United Kingdom to
investigate fully the willingness of Commonwealth countries to participate. And although one could
argue that Turkey might well have been against such an action on the grounds that the force would have
been pro-Greek Cypriot, this does not necessarily hold true. For example if the argument were made that
Makarios' influence with the Third World was likely to mean that contributors would be biased misses
the fact that the Commonwealth included Australia, New Zealand and Canada - all of which were
essentially pro-Western states. Likewise a Commonwealth force could have included Moslem contingents
from Pakistan, and possibly Nigeria. (The Malaysian Federation was unlikely to be another option given
its continuing problems with Indonesia.) Yet the argument runs that this would have been unacceptable
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to the Greek Cypriots, as would the participation of African troops. However, the Greek Cypriots would,
in all likelihood, have been persuaded to accept such a contribution if the cost of not accepting the troops
was a breakdown in the Guarantor Power alliance which could have resulted in a unilateral Turkish
intervention. In any case, the United Kingdom chose to ignore this proposal for Commonwealth peace-
keeping and instead approached the United States on the subject of a NATO-based force.
Although the United States acted in conjunction, though very cautiously, with the Guarantors
in the initial phase of the crisis it was not immediately in favour of becoming overtly involved. Instead,
the new Johnson Administration - just over a month old at the beginning of the crisis, and perhaps wary
of overextending its direct role in the international system - chose to exert diplomatic pressure on Greece
and Turkey rather than target the Cypriot communities. This was, on the face of it a stabilising move as
it maintained the importance of the Guarantor Alliance as the directly interested parties to the crisis, and
thus prevented the undesirable internationalisation of the situation. The mistake made by the United
Kingdom with regard to the United States was that it played too heavily upon the dangers of NATO
instability if such Guarantor cohesion broke down. Although there were undoubtedly problems in the
Guarantor Alliance both Greece and Turkey had, nonetheless, acted with remarkable restraint. In the case
of Greece, internal political instability had, in the earliest stages of the Crisis, resulted in the formation
of a cautious and technocratic caretaker government that had also benefited from the fact that Greece
clearly had less at stake on the island and therefore did not need to prepare for a unilateral intervention.
Yet it was also the case that Turkey, which undoubtedly had more to play for in Cyprus displayed a
willingness to refrain from intervening in order to allow peace-making and peace-keeping efforts by first
the United Kingdom, and then by the United Kingdom and the United States. This remains so in spite
of its numerous threats to intervene as well as its periodic military mobilisations Indeed, such was the
willingness of the Turkish Government to work in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United
States that on two separate, but vitally important, occasions it actually avoided taking a stand in favour
of the Turkish Cypriot community. The first time was in London when Foreign Minister Erkin persuaded
the Turkish Cypriot delegation to remain despite the fact that the Greek Cypriots had managed to have
two delegations recognised - one as the Greek Cypriot community and the other as the Government of
the Republic of Cyprus, from which the Turkish Cypriots were excluded. The second period was when
Turkey sided with the United Kingdom and the United States and persuaded the Turkish Cypriots to
accept the proposed terms of Resolution 186. These two incidents perhaps represent the most vital
periods in securing for the Greek Cypriots recognition of their position as the legal Government of the
Republic of Cyprus. One may contest the degree to which any Turkish opposition to these issues may
have actually affected any outcome, but one cannot contest the fact that Turkey did, nonetheless, play
a significant part in the events that led to the eventual alienation of the Turkish Cypriot community from
the apparatus of the Government of Cyprus that resulted from the defacto, if not de jure, recognition of
the Greek Cypriot leadership as the rightful holders of that title.
if the aim of the United Kingdom and the United States was to avoid a Greco-Turkish conflict
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the actions of both Greece and Turkey throughout the greater part of the
period reviewed were to be commended. And it was not until the election of the Papandreou Government
in mid-February that a return to more traditional Greek-Turkish animosity was reached - by which point
the move to the United Nations had already been made. Yet, despite the essentially calm way in which
both Greece and Turkey had handled the Cyprus crisis, the United Kingdom necessarily had to highlight
the dangers of a potential Greek-Turkish split in order to develop the interest of the United States in the
situation. It could not present a plan to the United States that asked for its involvement in Cyprus simply
because it could no longer bear the burden alone - a move that had already been done once at the end of
the Second World War. When the United Kingdom did try that tactic - in the period before the London
Conference - the Johnson Administration asked the British Government to consider looking elsewhere,
for example to the Commonwealth. However, this option had already been discounted on the, arguably
weak, basis that the Commonwealth would not be able to meet the burden. Therefore in order to bring
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the United States into the situation as a credible actor, it would have to be presented with a serious
enough scenario to warrant its involvement. The threat to NATO stability was such a reason.
Once the United States had considered and accepted this danger, it took up the cause with ill-
concealed gusto. Indeed, its diplomatic actions soon left the United Kingdom, for the most part, as a
secondary actor in the process - a position that the British Government undoubtedly favoured. The
burden of the Truce Force was taking enough of its energies and political resources, and to be relieved
of the extra burden of trying to maintain the overall cooperation of the Guarantor Powers in the face of
Makarios's internationalisation of the issue, was not something to be mourned. Yet such involvement
by the United States was necessarily fraught with danger. Cyprus was a member of the Non-Aligned
Movement and not of NATO, and therefore to pressure the Cypriots to accept a NATO-based option
could easily have been interpreted as an example of NATO expansionism. There was no way in which
the situation could be regarded as one of containment at this point as the Soviet Union had taken only
the slightest of interest in the conflict. By not considering the strength of Greek Cypriot opposition to the
NATO-based plan, the United States and the United Kingdom gave Makarios the ability to have the
matter internationalised. With NATO involvement, Makarios could encourage the Soviet Union to take
a more robust role in the problem.
In analysing the role of the Soviet Union in the Cyprus situation, it is possible to say that in many
ways it conducted its policy over Cyprus in almost textbook fashion in light of its overall international
policies at the time. In the first stage of the crisis, when Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom had
been involved it had remained somewhat aloof from the situation. One could argue that at this point the
Soviet Union simply interpreted the events in Cyprus to be wholly within the Western realm and
therefore a risky area in which to become embroiled as it could well have resulted in a direct
confrontation with the United States. Indeed, the fact that Makarios had sanctioned the tripartite
intervention by the Guarantor Powers could only have added to that perception. Even when the issue of
a Turkish threat to Cyprus came up in the first Security Council session in December 1963, the Soviet
Union remained quiet. (However, if one wanted to find a justification for the Soviet Union's lack of
action at this point, one could argue that the Soviet Union was aware of the delicate nature of the Greek
Cypriots position, but deliberately remained quiet in order not to upset the process of the withdrawal of
US missiles from Turkey that had secretly been reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis.) However, the
idea for a force made up of NATO members was to alter the Soviet Union's position. Yet the impetus
for this change was driven by Makarios. By approaching the already interested Soviet Union with the
NATO threat posed against the island - a member of the Non-Aligned Movement - the Archbishop was
able to encourage the typical opportunistic behaviour that had so often characterised Soviet foreign
policy. For both Makarios and the Soviet Union, the actions of the United Kingdom and the United States
with regard to Cyprus meant that the Greek Cypriots were now engaged in a form of national liberation
movement to exert the right to express its own sovereignty in the face of NATO pressure.
Yet throughout this period the lack of non-aligned involvement in the Cyprus situation was
somewhat of a surprise. Although there is the argument that the participation of the NAM was
deliberately avoided by the Greek Cypriots, there is a clear case to be made that the various members of
the Movement did not seek to develop a unified policy on the Cyprus in order to counter the Guarantor
Powers and the United States on the issue of a NATO-based peace-keeping force. In any case, even if
it had decided to formulate such a policy, the loose nature of the grouping would have made it difficult
for the Movement to present a credible alternative to either NATO or the Warsaw Treaty countries in
terms of power politics. The strength of the group lay solely at the level of moral authority - that small,
or large states that chose to remain cut-off from the wrangles of the Superpowers should be allowed to
do so. Makarios, chose to enlist the support of the Soviet Union, and the non-aligned states seemed to
choose to accept that decision.
Yet although Makarios looked to the Soviet Union, instead of the NAM, for pragmatic reasons,




diminished significantly. To this extent one can posit the argument that the role of the United Nations
was of considerable importance insofar as it allowed for a general easing of tensions.
Yet there was almost no direct tension between the Superpowers by this point. Perhaps in light
of the experiences of Representative Zorin during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Representative Fedorenko
avoided any direct conflict with the United States on the floor of the Security Council chamber. Instead,
he preferred to voice support for the Greek Cypriots against the representatives of Turkey and the United
Kingdom. Although it must be stated that the United States also avoided criticising the Soviet Union, one
may argue that the Soviet Union had little reason to force a Cold War showdown over Cyprus on the
floor of the Security Council. They had done their job of preventing a NATO based force being forced
upon the Greek Cypriots and to ruin the chances of further détente in the aftermath of Cuba by continuing
the matter once the main issues of the problem of a NATO-based force had been settled could only lead
to further problems. Both of the Superpowers displayed a pragmatic approach to the situation, and were
prepared to let the process at the United Nations run its course, albeit with Fedorenko' s theatrical
outbursts that only served to emphasise his developing reputation for being a 'notoriously obnoxious'
individual.2
Nevertheless, there was another aspect of the Soviet Union's role that needed to be considered.
When the draft resolution of the five non-permanent members of the Security Council looked to have
found a way in which to overcome the deadlock in the Council and result in the creation a United Nations
peace-keeping force, both the Soviet Union - and France - chose to adopt their by now traditional position
on the over extensive role of the Secretary-General in the structuring of peace-keeping. The fact that U
Thant, who Khrushchev regarded in a positive light, was now at the helm certainly changed the attitude
of the Soviet Union from one of vehement opposition to the man (as had been the case with Trygve Lie
and Dag Hammarskjöld), to a more general suspicion of the development of the office - a fact that was
made clear to Thant when the Soviet Union reproached him for sending an Observer to Cyprus without
the prior consent of the Security Council.
In addition, with the massive cost of ONUC in mind, the Soviet Union also chose to question
the proposals for the financing of the force. This move resulted in the unusual step to finance the force
by voluntary contributions. Yet there was really very little new in these two points insofar as they simply
reflected overall French and Soviet policy towards United Nations peace-keeping that had been
developing over the previous decade.
Yet in the final analysis, it is possible to argue that United Nations Security Council Resolution
186 showed that both France and the Soviet Union accepted - along with the most of the international
community - that United Nations peace-keeping had a valid and worthwhile role to play in the
management of a conflict that was deemed to be a threat to international peace and security. This was
despite the fact that the Cyprus situation was essentially an intercommunal conflict that had eventually
been interpreted - despite all the best efforts of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the United
States - to represent a threat to international peace and security through the dangerous and bloody minded
determination of the Greek Cypriots led by Archbishop Makarios.
Options for Non-United Nations Peace-keeping in Cyprus in 1964
In spite of the fact that Cyprus eventually received a United Nations peace-keeping force, the question
still remains as to whether there was any justifiable reason to assume that peace-keeping duties in Cyprus
could have been undertaken by an alternative organisation. After almost a month of its operation, the
British Government considered that the Joint Truce Force appeared unable to continue alone in its
operation in Cyprus. The result of this was the need to find a peace-keeping force to replace it. This
search revolved around three separate options: (1) a United Nations force, (2) a NATO-based force, and,
(3) a Commonwealth force. Within the remit of an analysis of the acceptability of non-United Nations
peace-keeping, Cyprus showed that peace-keeping undertaken by non-United Nations organisations - i.e.
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options 2 & 3 - was theoretically a viable option but only in the case of Commonwealth peace-keeping.
The prospect of the creation of a Commonwealth force certainly seemed to have mileage. It was
clearly acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, and although discounted by the United Kingdom for - unproven
- practical reasons, it was never rejected on the grounds that it could not serve a useful purpose. The
argument that it may not have been acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey can not be proffered
as it was not even presented to them, and even if it had been, there was little to say that the United
Kingdom and the United States - known to have considered the option - could not have brought sufficient
pressure to bear on the parties to accept the idea. What is perhaps more interesting to consider are the
consequences that a Commonwealth Secretariat may have had on events - as it was the Secretariat was
not created until 1965. At the time of the Cyprus Crisis the agenda of the Commonwealth was almost
exclusively set by the United Kingdom's Commonwealth Relations Office, if for no other reason than
the fact that it acted as the main conduit for matters relating to the Commonwealth to be brought to the
attention of the wider membership. What may have happened had there been a Secretariat? It is not
usually within the bounds of a work such as this to speculate, but one could imagine that the idea for a
Commonwealth peace-keeping force would have been explored more fully. An independent Secretariat
would, one would assume, have looked more deeply into the viability of the idea than the Commonwealth
Relations Office - which appears to have been against the idea of a Commonwealth Force. In any case,
the idea for the creation of some form of Commonwealth peace-keeping was to lay dormant for another
fifteen years but did in fact eventually come to some sort of fruition when the Commonwealth Monitoring
Force was established in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.3
As for NATO peace-keeping, the proposal for a NATO-based force would always have been
problematic. In the first instance, one must remember that at the root of the problem was the Greek
Cypriot fear of Turkey, and its role in NATO. Therefore although the idea was viable in the minds of
Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, it would always have been open to the
criticism that it was not impartial. However, and importantly, the nature of the Cold War made such an
idea a practical impossibility for geo-political reasons. Although Chapter Vifi of the Charter of the
United Nations makes explicit provision for regional organisations to play a role in the prevention and
termination of conflict in accordance with the rules laid out in Articles 34 & 35 of Chapter VI, the fact
that the only two regional organisations which had the viable military capabilities to conduct such an
operation were NATO and the Warsaw Pact made such an idea worthless in the prevailing political
conditions of the time. The fact that the United Nations was never able to implement Chapter VI for
reasons to do with the Cold War thus made it impossible for the regional organisations that represented
the Cold War adversaries to replace the United Nations successfully. United Nations peace-keeping was
the result of improvisation - somewhat accurately called Chapter 6 ½ - and had been developed to
diminish the chance of Superpower conflict in areas that were not of direct national or strategic interest
to either. This therefore meant that any proposal to put in place an alternative peace-keeper in an area not
controlled by either Superpower necessarily required that the proposed alternative had to be removed
from the Cold War. For this reason, NATO-based peace-keeping in a non-aligned state was always likely
to be unacceptable. In Cyprus, NATO-based peace-keeping threatened to have a Cold War element
precisely because to the Soviet Union and the NAM it represented an attempt at ideological expansion
into a state which had rejected the principles of the NATO as a Western military bloc. Indeed, any NAM-
member state that accepted such a NATO action would immediately cease to be an adherent to the
principle of non-alignment. One could not accept NATO and still claim to be neutral in the Cold War.
As much as Makarios dismissed NATO because of Turkey's role, he must have understood the exact
nature of this point. The fact that he enlisted the Soviet Union's support for his attempt to beat off such
an offer did not contravene this neutrality. In some ways it could be regarded as an acceptable use of one
Superpower to intimidate the other, in order to pursue the longer-term goal of nonalignment.
In the final instance, overall conflict management in cases such as Cyprus would always have




the fact that the United Nations' role had developed to be essentially non-partisan in the Cold War. Thus
the Commonwealth whose eclectic membership included prominent members of the Non-Aligned
Movement, fitted the bill. The loose nature of the Commonwealth as a body of states brought together
through mutual history and not mutual politics ensured it fell beyond the Cold War in a way that NATO,
by its purpose, could not.
United Nations Peace-keeping and Military Intervention in the Developing
Post-Colonial International Environment, 1945-64
Although the events in Cyprus had demonstrated a number of problems that related to the issue of peace-
keeping by non-United Nations actors, one could make a case in favour of seeing the Joint Truce Force
as evidence that peace-keeping could be undertaken by parties other than the United Nations. However,
this argument could more easily be made on the basis of the efforts of the Arab League in Kuwait - which
predated the Joint Truce Force. What in fact we are left with is a much more difficult problem relating
to the subject of military interventions in the developing post-colonial international environment rather
than a problem concerning peace-keeping. Yet, before tackling this issue of military intervention, it is
first necessary to review the Truce Force.
In the course of reviewing the criteria by which we judge the validity of attaching the title 'peace-
keeping force' to a military action it is possible to say that there are three conditions that need to be met,
namely that the force is there with the consent of the host state, that it follows the principle of non-
enforcement, and that it is seen to be impartial in the conduct of its operation. In the case of the Joint
Truce Force we can say that it met the two first conditions with little difficulty. The Force, from its
inception, was in Cyprus with the consent of both the communities of Cyprus - indeed, the United
Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey deliberately chose to avoid taking conjoint action under the provisions
of the Treaty of Guarantee and instead opted for a mission undertaken with the consent of the parties.
And although there were a number of groups that became increasingly opposed to the Truce Force over
the course of its operation, it was never openly challenged by either President Makarios or Vice-President
Kuçuk. On the second point - concerning non-enforcement - we can say that although there was an
incident when shots were fired over the heads of demonstrators, the JTF did conduct its overall operation
in a non-coercive manner - in spirit as well as action - during the whole period under review. Evidence
supporting the view that the intention of the Force was never intended to develop an enforcement policy
can perhaps be drawn from the fact that although the units sent to Cyprus were diverse and included
artillery units, in all cases the heavy guns attached to these units were left behind in the United Kingdom.
The final point that needs to be addressed is that of the impartiality of the Force. There have been
a number of criticisms made regarding the alleged bias of the Truce Force towards one or other
community during the Cyprus Crisis. However, and importantly, these have come from both sides of the
Green Line, and, in the course of reviewing the actions of the Force, there seems to be little to merit such
accusations. In the first instance, the troops serving with the JTF often found themselves targeted by both
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot militias rather than just one of the factions. In the second instance, the fact
that the Force came between the two must not be seen as evidence that they were attempting to protect
the Turkish Cypriots who were often the weaker party. Peace-keeping involves interposition, and to argue
that this action is biased is to argue that all peace-keeping forces must sit to one side for fear of being
identified as being partial to the weaker, or 'losing' side. On the issue of impartiality, it would therefore
seem fair to say that the JTF was impartial. It was an unfortunate outcome of the situation that the
impartiality exhibited was interpreted by both communities, at one point or another, as being designed
to favour the other. Yet, there are likely to be those within the Greek Cypriot community who will always
maintain that the political guidance given to the JTF was designed to favour the Turkish Cypriots and
therefore to assist in securing the partition of the island. The available evidence does not seem to support
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this argument. Instead, during the course of the period under review, the operational orders given in the
field remained true to the aim of ensuring that a peace was maintained between the fighting factions
rather than follow a particular political agenda with regard to supporting either of the two communities.
If impartiality means that a peace-keeping force displays no obvious bias towards any particular
conflicting party, but that it displays a clear partiality towards the implementation of its mandate - even
if this might be interpreted negatively by a party to the conflict - then the Truce Force was indeed
impartial.
Yet there are two more criteria by which we can further the argument in favour of seeing the
Truce Force as a peace-keeping entity. In the first case we can examine the various documents released
by the British Government, which often refer to, if not emphasise, the fact that the Truce Force was
peace-keeping, and, correspondingly, never cite it as being a coercive undertaking. In the second
instance, we can point to the fact that very often peace-keeping forces are detailed to develop a
humanitarian role. As Michael Pugh has stated, 'In a broad, philosophical sense, peacekeeping has
humanitarian objectives.' 4 Even if we take this literally and demand examples of humanitarian actions
beyond the operation of keeping the peace, we can clearly cite examples of cases where the JTF carried
out such a functions and thus, seemingly, again met the criteria for being assessed as a peace-keeper.
However, the term peace-keeping nonetheless does not seem to sit comfortably when applied to
the Joint Truce Force. What seems to be the enduring image in the minds the Cypriots about the JTF was
the undeniable 'Britishness' of the Force. Although it seemed that everyone - on both sides of the line -
when questioned on the matter of whether one can view the Joint Truce Force as a peace-keeping force
agreed that it fulfilled an important role in calming intercommunal tensions at the time, there remained
a clear recognition of the fact that the Force was always viewed in a slightly suspicious way by a large
number of those in the Greek Cypriot community. This appears to devolve from the fact that the soldiers
of the JTF were wearing the uniform of the British Army which had, less than four years earlier, been
the sworn enemy of most of the majority Greek Cypriot population. And although it seems to be the case
that most of those interviewed were able to differentiate clearly between the British Army as an entity
trying to keep the peace in 1963-64 from the British Army which was the tool by which the United
Kingdom attempted to retain its colonial position in Cyprus in 1955-59, the temptation to accuse the
Truce Force of following a neo-colonial enterprise was too much to resist for elements in the Greek
Cypriot community when events, unrelated to the operational actions of the Truce Force, went against
them. This is an important point, which, to be answered, is perhaps best looked at within a wider context.
The answer to the problem of why the peace-keeping status of the Joint Truce Force is somehow
inappropriate in the minds of many of the Greek Cypriot population appears to be related to the evolution
of the international system since the end of the Second World War. During the early twentieth century
the international system began a transformation that saw the erosion of the imperial holdings of the
European Powers. At the termination of hostilities in 1945, the majority of the European Powers had
been weakened so much by their war efforts that the economic costs of retaining an empire became
unbearable. Allied to this, the political costs of having an empire also became more pronounced as the
demise of the European Powers during the previous fifty years had been paralleled by the ascendency
of the two new Powers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union - which, although having
competing ideologies, both shared a world view that abhorred the very notion of imperialism. Therefore,
and in spite of the acrimony of the Cold War, the new agenda in international relations developed around
the ideal of a decolonised world. Although the United States had first brought pressure to bear on the
United Kingdom to relinquish its Empire during the War, it was only during the formation of the Charter
of the United Nations that the formalisation of the issue of decolonisation as an agenda item became
apparent. The subsequent rise of the Superpowers during the following years only increased the pressures
on the colonial Powers to relinquish their empires.
As the process continued, the membership of the United Nations grew which further increased
these pressures. By 1960 decolonisation was in full flow. However, in the rush to relieve themselves of
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the burden of colonial territories, the European Powers all too often paid scant attention to the issue of
providing for post-colonial stability. Thus the result of these ill-planned and badly executed colonial
withdrawals was, in many cases, civil unrest. In addition to this factor, the leaders who took the reigns
of power were often drawn from the leadership of the anti-colonial struggle many of whom harboured
a deep distrust, if not resentment, of the former imperial Powers. These two factors seemed to provide
much by way of opportunities for the Soviet Union which was eager to exploit what seemed to be
widespread post-colonial disillusionment with the West. In the atmosphere of the Cold War it was
therefore not unnatural that this, in turn, served to focus the energies of the United States on these same
areas as a response to what they saw as the Soviet Union's expansionist policies towards the Third
World. Given the dangers of the Cold War, the problem of the two Superpowers jockeying for influence
often appeared to threaten international peace and security, and therefore provided clear cases for the
involvement of the United Nations.
Given the factors highlighted above it is perhaps no source of surprise, therefore, that the main
UN peace-keeping missions undertaken in the period 1945-63 were as a result of untidy decolonisation
processes which threatened to embroil the Superpowers. However, the cases that have had most influence
in the course of the development of UN peace-keeping - rather than UN observation missions, such as
UNTSO and UNMOGIP - were the ones undertaken in response to some form of military intervention
by former colonial Powers. In the reviewing the cases resulting in UNEF, ONUC and UNFICYP (and
to a certain extent UNOGIL5) there seems to be a case for stating the view that all too often the former
colonial Powers were slow to realise that once they had left a territory the new state created would be less
than eager to see them return. It did not seem to be clear to the former imperial Powers concerned that
they could not simply walk out of a country and then expect to return when things did not go the way in
which they wanted them to go in terms of their remaining national or strategic interests. Notwithstanding
the fact that these Powers were sometimes sucked into a crisis (like, for example, the United Kingdom
in the Cyprus situation), rather than willing interveners, there appeared to be a distinct aversion on the
part of these Powers to acknowledge the positive effect that the United Nations could have. Despite the
development of the United Nations as a body able to cope with certain specific instances of threats to
international peace and security a number of these Powers seemed to still feel that they had a role to play.
This in spite of the fact that the former colonies had often become hunting grounds for the East and West
and therefore were risky areas to become embroiled.
This point seems to have been clear in the three examples of the Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus.
In these three cases, all of which resulted in the creation of a UN peace-keeping force, there appeared
to be a developing realisation that the traditional methods of strong-arm tactics were of a past era, but that
they still had a right to intervene if necessary. The attempt by the United Kingdom and France to use the
Israeli invasion of Egypt - which they had planned in conjunction with Israel - as a pretext to intervene
in order to halt fighting was a thinly disguised attempt at blatant aggression to ensure that access to the
Suez Canal remained under their terms rather than Egypt's. However, it nonetheless is interesting to note
that both the United Kingdom and France by this point felt that they in fact needed some form of pretext
in order to act. It would seem to be the case that had it been thirty years earlier neither would have felt
compelled to find such a reason, instead one would imagine that they would have acted with little thought
as to the means of justifying such an action. Tn the second case of Belgium in the Congo it was clear that
the Belgian troops were at first responding to a clearly humanitarian problem arising from the civil unrest
following the mutinies of the Congolese Army against their Belgian officers. The difficulties arose when
they adopted a clearly coercive approach with little interest in performing an impartial role. (They were
also implicated with the secessionist movement of Katanga in which a number of Belgian companies had
mining interests). Yet by the time of the third case, that of the United Kingdom in Cyprus - which seemed
to threaten, to a greater or lesser degree, both NATO and the Sovereign Base Areas - there finally
seemed to have been a clear movement towards an acceptance of the principles of the United Nations.
Yet the actions of the Force, as we have seen, were often regarded with suspicion which eventually
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became hostility. This seems to indicate that there might, nonetheless, appear to be a case for arguing that
the use of military forces by the colonial Powers were, in some instances, viable in the short term.
However, such actions did not seem to be sustainable in the medium-long term. It is perhaps an
unfortunate fact for these forces that by being initially successful they seemed, almost inevitably, to seal
their own fate. Once the situation had moved beyond the initial crisis period the acceptability of the
continued presence of a former colonial Power became open to question in a way that did not seem to
happen when a United Nations peace-keeping force carried out the same task. In the case of Cyprus, the
eventual formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force to act, by its commander's own admission,
in a similar fashion to the 1FF therefore leads us to question what it was that set the United Nations apart
from the United Kingdom as a viable peace-keeper for Cyprus, or, indeed, as a peace-keeper in any other
similar case in which a former colonial power was attempting peace-keeping. Given that the JTF met the
criteria by which we judge peace-keeping, one can only conclude that the lack of success (the term
'failure' seems too harsh) of the Joint Truce Force was as a result of the fact that the United Kingdom
was not the United Nations. It seems as though it was idea of the United Nations, rather than the idea of
peace-keeping, that represented the vital element in the term 'United Nations peace-keeping'. The Joint
Truce Force, for all its peace-keeping intentions, was always the army of the former colonial Power.
Endnotes to Conclusions
1. It is perhaps interesting to note that it is very difficult to say exactly who Makarios was in a
psychological sense. Although much of this work is directed towards understanding the policies he
adopted, there is, however, little by way of direct comment explaining how he himself viewed the events.
This is a result of the fact that most of the accounts used have been from those who knew him. It is an
unfortunate fact for historians that Makarios left no memoirs - that we know of - and therefore there has
been precious little to draw upon that revealed the exact intentions of the Archbishop at various junctures
in the modern history of Cyprus. In my conversations and interviews with people in Cyprus, I have often
been struck by the fact that although Makarios excites often extreme emotions in people, no one, even
those who knew him personally, ever made a claim fully to understand Makarios.
2. Urquhart, Brian; Ralph Bunche: An American Life; (London: WW Norton and Company, 1993), p.378
3. For more information see Verrier, Anthony; 'Peacekeeping or Peacemaking? The Commonwealth
Monitoring Force, Southern Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, 1979-1980'; International Peacekeeping, Volume 1,
Number 4, Winter 1994.
4. Pugh, Michael; 'Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping'; Global Society, Volume 10, Number 3, 1996,
p.206.
5. I have not categorised UNOGIL with the others as it represented a slightly different situation insofar
as the United States had not been the colonial Power in the Lebanon (although the United Kingdom had
been in the Trans-Jordan). In addition, the mission had not initially been formed as a response to an
intervention by an outside Power to internal troubles but, instead, had come about as a result of the fact
that the United States had wanted to avoid becoming involved at the earliest stages. However, tJNOGIL
can be seen as conforming to the examples of UNEF, ONUC and IJNFICYP insofar as its mandate was




Selected Extracts from the Charter of the United Nations
We the peoples of the United Nations determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
and for these ends
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed forces shall not be
used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all
peoples,
have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San
Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present





The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in confomiity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and





The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in
accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present
Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which
the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations
act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in this present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the





1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
ARTICLE 10
The General assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present
Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organ provided for it in the present Charter, and,
except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or
to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.
ARTICLE 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the
regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members
or to the Security Council or to both.
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2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the
Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Naiions in accordance with Article
35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any
such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such questions
on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General assembly either
before or after discussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which
are likely to endanger international peace and security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general
scope of Article 10
ARTICLE 12
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation
with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the
General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and
security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General
Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately
the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.
VOTING
ARTICLE 18
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds
majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with
respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent
members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the
election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph I (c) of Article 86, the
admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of
membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and
budgetary questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of








1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern freland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security
Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent
members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution
of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other
purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two
years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of
one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.
VOTING
ARTICLE 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in




Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may
participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever
the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.
ARTICLE 32
Any Member of the United nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state
which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the
Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.
The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which





Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the
parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement
of the dispute.
Chapter VII.
Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression
ARTICLE 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
ARTICLE 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The
Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
ARTICLE 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.
ARTICLE 42
Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.
ARTICLE 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness
and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possibJe on the initiative of
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the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between
the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states
in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
ARTICLE 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not
represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite
that Member, if the Member so desires to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning
the employment of contingents of that Member's aimed forces.
ARTICLE 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The
strength arid degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be
determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43,
by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
ARTICLE 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance
of the Military Staff Committee.
ARTICLE 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not
represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the
efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities require the participation of that Member in its
work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the
Strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating
to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after
consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.
ARTICLE 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations
or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.




concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2.	 The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which
during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.
ARTICLE 54
The Security council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in





The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in
his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE 100
1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or
receive instruction from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They
shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible
only to the Organization.
2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not seek to influence them in




1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the
United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the
Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph I of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before
any organ of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 103
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail.
ARTICLE 104
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may
be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.
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I. Treaty of Guarantee
II. Treaty of Alliance
ifi.	 Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus
I. Treaty of Guarantee
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland of the other part,
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of independence, territorial integrity
and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of the
Constitution, are in their common interest,
II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that
Constitution,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial
integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any
state whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly,
either union with any State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE II
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taken note of the undertakings of the Republic of
Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic
Articles of the Constitution.
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them,
any activity aimed at promoting, directly and indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or
partition of the Island.
ARTICLE ifi
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas
retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus,
and guarantee the use arid enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the
Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of
Cyprus signed at Nicosia on today's date.
ARTICLE LV
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United
Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to
ensure observance of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing
powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by
the present Treaty.
ARTICLE V
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present
Treaty shall be deposited in Nicosia.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present




II. Treaty of Alliance
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,
I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,
II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult
together on the problems raised by that defence.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect,
directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
Article III
For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite
Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
Article IV
Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the
military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.
The said contingents shall provide for training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.
Article V
The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation for a period of one
year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the
Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.
Article VI
The present Treaty shall enter force on the date of signature.
The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the
present Treaty renders them necessary.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the
present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the United
Nations Charter.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. 1
I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall
comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers,
non-commissioned officers and men.
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II.	 The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may
request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.
ifi. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Ttirkish contingents participating
in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and
taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions
concerning the organization and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by
a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than Treaty of Alliance.
IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months
after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist,
in the initial period, of a limited number of officers, charged with the training of the armed forces of the
Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the
date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. 2
Article I
A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognizance of any
question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied Countries shall agree to
submit to it.
Article II
The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of Urgency
the Committee of Ministers can be convened in a special session by its Chairman at the request of one
of the members of the Alliance.
Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.
Article III
The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by
each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in
the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office,
preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.
The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the
fulfilment of its task
Article IV
The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the
Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's
ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarter's activities.
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III. Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and the
Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus on the other part.
Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the Government of the
United Kingdom on the 17th February, 1959, during the Conference at London, in accordance with the
subsequent Declarations made at the Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the
Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot
Community:
Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to this Treaty:
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Is land of Cyprus, together with the
islands lying off its coast, with the exceptions of the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty, which
areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. These areas are in the Treaty and its
annexes referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.
ARTICLE 2
(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall accord to the United Kingdom the rights set forth in Annex
B to this Treaty.
(2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the
security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area, and
the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult and co-
operate in the common defence of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 4
The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those contained
in Annex C to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 5
The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and
fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in Section I of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th of November, 1950, and
the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on the 20th of March, 1952.
ARTICLE 6
The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the established of the




The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the necessary
financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the termination of British
administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These arrangemthits are set forth in annex E to
this Treaty.
ARTICLE 8
(1) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United
Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the Republic of Cyprus,
can be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
(2) The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United
Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be
enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 9
The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements concerning trade,
commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 10
Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled
as follows:
(a) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military requirements
of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of the Treaty in so far as they affect the status,
rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or any other forces associated with them under the terms
of this Treaty, or of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall ordinarily be settled by negotiation between
the tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the authorities of the armed
forces of the United Kingdom.
(b) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty on
which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities in the cases described
above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the parties concerned through the diplomatic channel,
shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal appointed for the purpose, which shall be composed of
four representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United Kingdom, The
Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey, and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,
together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice.
If the President is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus or of
Greece or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act; and if he also is such a citizen, the next
senior Judge of the Court.
ARTICLE 11
The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 12
This Treaty shall enter force on signature by all the Parties to it.
The Texts of the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment (excluding the Annexes to the Treaty
of Establishment) have been taken from reprints appearing in the Supplementary Memorandum to the
Minutes of Evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Co,n,nons, Third
Report, Sessions 1986-1987, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office) pp.27-3]
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I. The Text of the Letter from Chairman Khrushchev, 7 February 1964
II. The Text of the Reply from President Johnson, 4 March 1964
ifi.	 The Text of the Reply from Prime Minister Pareskevoploulos, 11 February 1964
IV.	 The Text of the Reply from Prime Minister InönU, 24 February 1964
I. The Text of the Letter from Chairman Khrushchev,
7 February 1964
7th February, 1964.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister,
I consider it necessary to address you in the name of the Soviet Government in connection with
the fact that of late the situation around the Republic of Cyprus is becoming increasingly heated, creating
a danger of serious international complications in the area of the Mediterranean Sea. The causes of the
tension which has arisen are well known: the disagreements between the two communities in Cyprus -
the Greeks, who constitute the majority of the population, and the Turks - have long been heated from
outside, and they are being used as a pretext for unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of the
Republic of Cyprus - a sovereign, independent State and a member of the United Nation Organisation.
Some Powers, trampling on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the
universally accepted norms of International Law, are now trying to impose on the people and
Government of Cyprus a solution favourable to these Powers of problems which affect only Cypriots,
and furthermore they are conveying the impression that the solution of these internal problems can be
brought to Cyprus only on foreign bayonets. In this connection variants of "solutions" are being
discussed - for example, the despatch to Cyprus of N.A.T.O. troops or of troops from individual
N.A.T.O. countries, although basically all these variants have one aim - the factual occupation by the
armed forces of N.A.T.O. of the Republic of Cyprus, which follows a policy of non-adherence to military
blocs. In other words, it is a question of a gross infringement of the sovereignty, independence and
freedom of the Republic of Cyprus, of an attempt to place this small neutral State under the military
control of N.A.T.O.
In the minds of all those who are interested in the preservation of peace, in ensuring for any
States-large or small, strong or weak-the possibility of building their national life in accordance with their
own interests and aspirations, there arises the question: if the sovereignty of States is not an empty phrase
written in the United Nations Charter, if the right to freedom and independence is really a sacred right
of all peoples, of all States, then why do they wish to exclude the Republic of Cyprus from the number
of those who are allowed to enjoy the benefits of sovereignty and to build their own national life without
intervention from outside? Do they not think that sovereignty is the right of only the strong, and that
genuine independence is the privilege only of those who dispose of powerful armed forces? Do they not
thus consider that small States, such as the Republic of Cyprus, which possesses neither atomic weapons
nor numerous armed forces, constitute States of some other sort, to the sovereignty and rights of which
consideration need not be paid?
Such views, if the Governments of Great Powers, especially the permanent members of the
Security Council, were guided by them, could constitute a serious danger for universal peace, and could
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become a source of international complications, fraught with grave consequences for the peoples.
Sometimes in justification of the plans for the dispatch of N.A.T.O. troops to Cyprus, the point
of view is expressed that the Cypriots are not able to settle their own internal problems on their own, that
they cannot reach agreement on how the Greek and Turkish communities should live together within the
framework of a single State. But who can better know whether the Cypriots can overcome their internal
difficulties independently without any intervention from abroad than the Cypriots themselves, who, under
the leadership of their Government and of President Makarios, are manfully and firmly defending the
sovereignty of their Republic, defending their national independence, their rights? Is there really a wish
to make anyone believe that it is easier to deal with the internal problems of Cyprus in the capitals of
other countries? And it is no secret that in N.A.T.O. circles discussion is proceeding on the question
whether to send to Cyprus as part of the so-called "N.A.T.O. forces" soldiers of the German Bundeswehr,
though in these regions memories have by no means compLetely faded of the steel helmets of the soldiers
of the Wehrmacht, which during the years of the Second World war brought destruction and death to the
area of the Mediterranean Sea.
We are convinced that the Cypriots are fully able to deal with their internal affairs themselves,
as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has repeatedly stated, and to find for the problems which
confront them solutions which will accord in the highest degree with their national interests. But we are
prepared to admit that other States may have a different approach to this question, and in their evaluation
the situation may be such that the people of Cyprus really needs help in overcoming its internal
difficulties. But even if that were the case, at the utmost it could only be a question of giving the Cypriots
good advice if they asked for it, and in no case of intervention in their internal affairs.
And if one is to speak of the review of the Cyprus question in an international forum, do there
not exist between all States agreements, embodied in the United Nations Charter, laying down where and
in which international organs such questions should be considered and how it is appropriate to do this
without violating the Sovereignty of States? Yet at present everything is being done to prevent the
discussion of the Cyprus question in the Security Council, on whose agenda it was placed at the request
of the Government of Cyprus. And this is being done in spite of the fact that the Security Council is
precisely the organ charged under the Charter of the United Nations with ensuring international peace
and security.
Everything conceivable is being done at present in order to prevent the further consideration of
the Cyprus question in the Security Council. The Government of Cyprus is being made the object of
persuasion, it is being subjected to pressure. It is being threatened, military demonstrations are being
conducted near the coasts of Cyprus, the flag of naval blockade is being waved, and meanwhile efforts
of all kinds are being made to prevent a new appeal by the Government of Cyprus to he Security Council.
From all this it is evident that preference is being given to the consideration of the Cyprus
question at closed conferences, where, having replaced the United Nations Charter by arbitrary methods,
people are counting on breaking the resistance of a small State, the Republic of Cyprus, by means of
pressure from outside.
Taking into account all the circumstances which have arisen in connection with plans for the
organisation of military intervention against the Republic of Cyprus, I should like to state that the Soviet
Government condemns such plans, just as it condemns in general the use of such methods in the practice
of international relations. The Soviet Government appeals to all States concerned, and first to all the
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permanent members of the Security Council who bear a responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, including the United States and Great Britain, to show restraint, to make
a realistic and all-round assessment of all the consequences to which a military invasion of Cyprus could
lead, to respect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus.
In making this appeal, which is dictated by care for the preservation and consolidation of peace
and for ensuring the rights of peoples, I also start from the premise that the Soviet Union, although it is
not immediately adjacent to the republic of Cyprus, cannot remain indifferent to the situation which is
developing in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean, an area which is not so far removed from the
Southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R., especially if account is taken of how the concept of distance has
changed in our time.
I think that abstention from any plans which might make more acute the situation in the area of
the Eastern Mediterranean and infringe the legitimate rights of the people of Cyprus to freedom and
independence would be in accordance not only with the common interests of the Cypriots but with our
interests. The leaders of the Great Powers have repeatedly stated that they are aiming at the reduction of
international tension, irrespective of whether this concerns Central Europe, the Mediterranean or any
other area. If this is so, then it seems to me that the whole of their weight, the whole international
authority and influence of the leading Statesmen of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great
Britain, France and also of the States which are neighbours of Cyprus-Turkey and Greece-should now
be used in order not to permit any further heating of the situation around Cyprus, in order to extinguish
the passions which are being heated from abroad, and which have already exercised such a negative
influence on the situation, and thereby to contribute to the consolidation of peace in this important area.
I should like, Mr. Prime Minister, to express the hope that your Government will correctly
understand the motives by which the Soviet Government is guided in again raising its voice in defence
of the just cause of the Republic of Cyprus and that it will take due account of the considerations set out
in the present communication.
With respect,
(Sgd.) N. Khrushchev
Taken from the House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), Fifth Series-
Volume 689, Comprising the Period lOth-2lst February, 1964, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office) pp.108-ill (Written Answers)
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II. Text of the Reply from President Johnson of the United States of
America, 4 March 1964
I have carefully studied the letter you sent to me on February 7 concerning the situation in Cyprus, and
I can only conclude that, whatever may have been the motivations of the Soviet government, your
message was based upon a seriously mistaken appreciation both of the situation in Cyprus, and of the
United States in agreeing to lend its assistance in improving that situation. The United States has been
cooperating with the Governments concerned, including the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, for
one purpose alone, that of assisting the Cypriots to restore a peaceful situation in Cyprus. I will, however,
agree fully, Mr. Chairman, with one though that you expressed in your letter. It is certainly true that
avoiding the aggravation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is in the general interests of all of
us. We should all strive not to inflame passions from without. I can assure you that this is the firm
intention of my Government, and I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that it is also that of your Government.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Taken from a telegram from Washington to FO, No.883, 4 March 1964, FO 371/174747
III. Text of the Reply from Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos of Greece,
11 February 1964
I wish to thank you for your message of 7th instant regarding the developments in the question of Cyprus.
The position of the Greek Government on this question is known, as well as its dedication to a policy of
insuring the fundamental rights of the Cypriots and preserving the independence and territorial integrity
of the State of Cyprus. At the present stage and following the occurence of communalo strife our efforts
are aimed at the pacification of the island, not through intervention, but through the granting of the
international support and assistance requested for the above purpose by the Government of Cyprus.
(Signed) J. Pareskevopoulos
'Message dated]] February 1964 from the Prime Minister of Greece to the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the question of Cyprus' (Unofficial
translation). Contained in 'Letter dated 15 February from the Representative of Greece to the Secretary-




Among other things, these Agreements proposed and recognized reciprocal rights and obligations
for both Greek and Turkish communities in the Island, and at the same time brought into existence the
Republic of Cyprus to respect these principles and to guarantee them in a proper manner.
After the formation of the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of these Agreements, when
its request for membership of the United Nations was being discussed, both in the Security Council and
in the General Assembly, the internal Constitution and the special powers were submitted to the attention
of the United nations and this request for membership was accepted unanimously.
Respect for international law and existing agreements and the peaceful solution of international
disputes are the unchanging principles of Turkish foreign policy and will continue to be so.
My respects,
Ismet Inönü
This letter was originally submitted to the British Embassy in Ankara in Turkish. The Turkish
Government apologised 'for the fact that it was not accompanied by a translation but explained that as
the Russians had sent their note to them in Russian without even an unofficial translation, they had acted
similarly and merely sent their note in Turkish.' FO 371/174748
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First Draft of a Resolution prepared by the President of the Security Council in
consultation with the six Non-Permanent Members of the Council
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
NOTING that the present situation in Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further
deteriorate unless further measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and seek out a durable solution;
BEARING TIN MIND the duty of all Member States to respect, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus, and to refrain from the threat or use of force
in respect to Cyprus;
RECALLING that Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertook to recognize and guarantee the
independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and also the state of affairs established
by the Basic Articles of its Constitution;
CONSIDERING the positions taken by the parties in relation to these agreements;
1. APPEALS to all Member States to refrain from any action likely to worsen relations between the communities
in Cyprus;
2. ASKS the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and
order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;
3. CALLS UPON the two communities of Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;
4. RECOMMENDS the establishment of a peace-keeping force in Cyprus, the composition, size and command
of which shall be determined by the Secretary-General. The commander of the force will report to the Secretary-
General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed as well as the Security Council, to
which the Secretary-General shall periodically report;
5. RECOMMENDS that the stationing of the force shall be for a period not exceeding three months, all costs
pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents;
6. FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the Secretary-General designate in agreement with the Governments of
Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, a Mediator, who shall use his ggod
offices, as appropriate, with the representatives of the local communities and also with the aforesaid four
Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem
confronting Cyprus, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of
international peace and security. The Mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts:
7. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide, from the funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the
renumeration and expenses of the Mediator and his staff.
Cited in Clerides, Glafkos; Cyprus: My Deposition; (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989), pp.73-74
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